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Abstract 
 
Intrinsic Motivation and Information Systems Security Policy Compliance in 
Organizations 
 
by Yurita Yakimin Abdul Talib 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of 
Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015 
 
Chair: Professor Gurpreet Dhillon 
Department of Information Systems, School of Business 
 
Incidents of computer abuse, proprietary information leaks and other security lapses have 
been on the increase. Most often, such security lapses are attributed to internal employees in 
organizations subverting established organizational IS security policy. As employee compliance 
with IS security policy is the key to escalating IS security breaches, understanding employee 
motivation for following IS security policy is critical. In addition to several types of extrinsic 
motives noted in prior studies, including sanctions, rewards, and social pressures, this study adds 
that an important contributing intrinsic factor is empowerment. Per Thomas and Velthouse’s 
(1990) intrinsic motivation model, empowerment is the positive feelings derived from IS security 
task assessments. Through survey data collected from 289 participants, the study assesses how 
  
 
 
dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e., competence, meaning, impact, and choice) as 
derived from IS security task may impact the IS security performance of the participants, 
measured by their compliance with IS security policy. The study demonstrates that the 
competence and meaning dimensions of psychological empowerment have a positive impact on 
participants’ IS security policy compliance intention, while impact has a marginal negative 
influence on compliance. Furthermore, dimensions of psychological empowerment can be 
predicted by structural empowerment facets, particularly IS security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA), access to IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security 
decision-making. In addition, the competence and meaning dimensions of psychological 
empowerment may act as mediators for the relations between structural empowerment and 
participants’ IS security policy compliance. Theoretical contributions, managerial implications, 
and directions for future research of this study will be discussed.  
Keywords: IS security policy compliance, intrinsic motivation, psychological empowerment, 
structural empowerment 
. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
This study concerns employee information systems (IS) security policy compliance in 
organizations. IS security policy compliance is the act or process of conformity to official 
requirements, including disposition to yield to others (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). The consequences of not complying with IS security policy may include insider security 
breaches, which pose a significant threat. Over the years, a large body of researchers has 
attempted to understand the motivations that influence IS security policy compliance. A general 
conclusion of prior research is that extrinsic motivational factors are the main reasons for an 
individual to engage in acts that lead to compliance with IS security policy (e.g., Straub, 1990; 
Pahnila et al., 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
There have been some studies that point to the importance of intrinsic motivational 
factors with respect to IS security policy compliance (e.g., Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011). 
Such studies are, however, limited and lack theoretical support. Responding to the limited body 
of work in this area, this research attempts to fill the gap in the body of literature besides heeding 
to the various calls  for undertaking research in the area of intrinsic motivation for IS security 
policy compliance (see Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011; Padayachee, 2012). The intrinsic 
motivation model from Thomas and Velthouse (1990) is used to investigate the influence of four 
dimensions of psychological empowerment (perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and 
choice) on IS security policy compliance. In addition, intrinsic motivation theorists have argued 
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that feelings of empowerment not only arise from the innate part of individuals and derived from 
a task, but also driven by factors external to the individuals (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Conger and 
Kanungo, 1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Prior studies in IS security compliance have 
suggested various external factors and strategies, such as training, task design, and etc, to 
enhance an employee intrinsic motivation (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son, 
2011). However, rather than exploring the range of strategies empirically, the studies simply 
acknowledged their importance. This current study extends prior research to explore the factors 
that enhance individual intrinsic motivation. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides the definitions of important 
concepts. Section 1.3 addresses the research problem, specific research questions, and 
contributions of the study, as well as the overall organization of the dissertation.  
1.2 Definitions 
In recent years, the term IS security policy compliance has received a great amount of 
attention from researchers and practitioners alike (Straub, 1990; Siponen et al., 2007; Herath and 
Rao, 2009a; Myyry et al., 2009). This section explores the concept of IS security policy 
compliance in organizations. Two classes of definitions form the basis for developing an 
understanding of IS security policy compliance, specifically information systems security and 
information systems security policy.  
Information Systems Security  
 IS security refers to a range of activities to control and manage potential threats to data 
or information. Such controls help ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Loch 
et al., 1992). Dhillon (2007) considered IS security at three levels of control: technical, formal, 
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and informal. He argues that any discordance between the three levels may result in potential 
security issues. 
Technical controls aim at securing the hardware, software, and information held in the 
computer systems. Dhillon (2007) identified six categories of threats to the hardware, software, 
and the data which reside in computer systems that may lead to a compromise – modification, 
destruction, disclosure, interception, interruption, and fabrication. Thus, in protecting technical 
systems, controls are normally assigned in the area of access control and authentication (Dhillon, 
2007). This might include the application of smart card technology, or the development of block 
ciphers, voice analysis, and digital signature. These technology-oriented security controls have 
generally helped the organizations to safeguard sensitive information.  
However, IS security problems cannot be dealt by mere technical controls. For instance, 
perpetrators may find it easier to procure information from documents left in the garbage rather 
than electronically via computer systems (Dhillon, 2007). Technological controls require support 
from formal controls. Formal controls refer to a proper security responsibility and authority 
structures, establishment of all-encompassing strategy and policy, and adequate business 
processes. Furthermore, identifying roles and the right people in an organization is needed to 
ensure that responsibility, strategy and policy, and business processes are sustained (Dhillon, 
2007).  
Even formal controls (i.e., the rules and procedures) cannot work on their own (Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010). In order to ensure that formal controls work, it is essential that people adopt and 
accept them (Dhillon, 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The process of adopting formal controls 
involves communication amongst individuals in an organization. Such communication may be 
formal or informal. Good communication ensures that controls get socialized into an 
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organization. Balancing the values and attitudes of employees and ensuring the general integrity 
of the edifice is at the heart of the socialization process.  
IS Security Policy  
IS security policy is a part of the formal control structure. A policy sketches the security 
roles and responsibilities, and standard operating procedures for protecting the information 
resources of a firm (Dhillon, 1997; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Hence, IS security policy is defined as 
a baseline statement of the IS security tasks or IS security-related activities that employees 
should do to ensure the information of their organizations is protected. The IS security tasks 
include the appropriate use of computer and network resources, good password habits, frequently 
backing up files, checking for encryptions, manual virus-check, not sharing the computer with 
others, locking the computer, and etc. (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010; Dhillon, 2007; Herath 
and Rao, 2009a). Typically, IS security policies are informed by current practices of a firm; 
however, various international standards are increasingly used as a basis for defining practices. 
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800 series documents have been 
extensively used to define security policies. Various other standards such as ISO 17799 (now 
ISO 27002) and GASSP (Generally Accepted Security System Principles) also exist. 
The essence of most standards has been succinctly captured by Kwok and Longley 
(1999) in their classic Handbook of Information Security where they note that any IS security 
policies should include the following: 
• Definition of information security; 
• Statement of management's intention supporting the goals and principles of information 
security; 
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• Explanation of the specific security policies, principles, standards, and compliance 
requirements; and 
• Definition of general and specific responsibilities for all aspects of information security 
explanation of the process for reporting suspected security incidents 
IS Security Policy Compliance  
IS security policy compliance refers to the act of an individual carrying out IS security 
tasks to maintain IS security, as stipulated by IS security policies (Chan et al., 2005; Herath and 
Rao, 2009b). IS security tasks that employees required to perform demand additional time and 
effort (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). A study by Albrechtsen (2007) discovered that employees may 
choose not to perform many IS security tasks for reasons of convenience. The employees 
prioritize other work tasks more than their IS security tasks (Herath and Rao, 2009a). It follows 
that to comply with IS security policy means investing more effort and time to execute or 
implement the IS security tasks.  
1.3. Research problem, questions and contributions 
Past research has argued that employee compliance with organizational IS security policy 
is motivated by two types of factors, extrinsic and intrinsic (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011; 
Padayachee, 2012). Extrinsic factors include sanctions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), rewards (Boss et 
al., 2009), social pressure (Herath and Rao, 2009a), and social climate (Chan et al., 2005). 
Although extrinsic motivation explains employee IS security policy compliance, it is not without 
limitations. For instance, the observed result of the extrinsic motivation is not always consistent 
with theory, largely because individuals are able to neutralize or justify their potentially actions 
(Siponen and Vance, 2010). Neutralization refers to psychological techniques, such as defense of 
necessity, denial of injury, and denial of responsibility, which people use to enable themselves to 
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commit rule breaking or wrongdoing actions (Sykes and Matza, 1957). One problematic issue is 
that neutralization is unobservable (Albrecth et al., 2004). Since neutralization is unobservable, it 
becomes difficult to remedy it. Furthermore, individuals who feel controlled or oppressed by the 
external forces (e.g., sanctions, rewards, social pressure) might not fully endorse the behavior 
and are predicted to show poor persistence in performing a related task (Deci et al., 1999). Thus, 
organizations might only gain a temporary IS security advantage, if any, through extrinsic 
mechanisms. 
Intrinsic factors may also explain employee IS security policy compliance behavior. For 
instance, perceived effectiveness of the IS security tasks (Herath and Rao, 2009a), perceived 
self-efficacy to execute IS security tasks (Rhee et al., 2009), and perceived ownership of IS 
(Anderson and Agarwal, 2010) influence individuals to take IS security actions. It is an 
individual’s innate desire to act and/or intrinsic values derived from the IS security tasks that 
motivates him/her to carry out IS security actions. In fact, the intrinsic factors are stronger 
predictors of IS security behavior that the extrinsic factors (Son, 2011). Intrinsic motivation 
models (e.g., Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990) 
provide the logical backdrop for the argument that intrinsic motivation could influence 
individuals to expend time and energy to perform a specific task. However, there is a paucity of 
research examining the relations between intrinsic factors and employees IS security behavior. 
There are two primary motivations which influence IS security behavior—extrinsic and intrinsic: 
the latter is deserving of greater empirical attention (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011; 
Padayachee, 2012).  
To examine the relations between intrinsic motivation and IS security policy compliance 
behavior, this study draws upon Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model. 
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Thomas and Velthouse (1990) noted that “intrinsic motivation involves positively valued 
experiences that the individual derives directly from the task” (p. 688). The principle of the 
model is on task assessments regarding four dimensions of psychological empowerment: 
perceived competence, meaning, impact, and choice. That is, an individual feels empowered if 
he/she perceives that he/she has the capability to perform task activities skillfully and 
successfully, if the value of the task is consistent with his/her personal beliefs, if he/she can make 
a significant difference or contribute to the organization if he/she executes the task, and finally, if 
he/she feels autonomy in the tasks.  
Prior studies have argued that feelings of empowerment exerts influence on individuals to 
put more effort to execute and perform the task well (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Deci and 
Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et 
al., 2000). While empirical studies have found that these four dimensions are capturing an 
essence of the psychological empowerment construct (Spreitzer, 1995a; Kraimer et al., 1999), 
researchers have argued that it is also crucial to tease apart which psychological empowerment 
dimensions actually drive the associations with outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 
1999; Maynard et al., 2012). In fact, studies have found that each dimension contributes to 
different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). This study extends prior 
research by examining which dimensions of psychological empowerment can best explain 
employees’ compliance with IS security policy. This study also not only responds to the gaps in 
the IS security literature, but also the empowerment literature by investigating the influences of 
each dimension of psychological empowerment on IS security policy compliance. 
In addition, this study seeks to investigate factors that drive individuals’ intrinsic 
motivation. Intrinsic motivation theorists have argued that feelings of empowerment are not only 
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emerge from individuals’ assessment of their tasks, but also from factors external to the 
individuals (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). 
Ryan and Deci (2000) called for additional research to investigate factors that enhance 
individuals intrinsic motivation. This has not been investigated within the IS security behavior 
literature. Therefore, this study seeks to answer this call by examining several organizational 
factors, which are expected to influence individuals’ feelings of empowerment. Specifically, this 
study investigates the impact of structural empowerment on psychological empowerment.  
Structural empowerment refers to conditions or practices where an organization provides 
all levels of employees with more access to power tools—defined as opportunity, resources, 
information, and support (Kanter, 1977). Prior studies have provided strong evidence that 
structural empowerment drives individual psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1996; Siu et 
al., 2005; Wallach and Mueller, 2006; Zhang and Bartol, 2010; Seibert et al., 2011). In the 
literature, empowerment work practices have been discussed extensively and various elements of 
structural empowerment have been suggested, such as training, participation in decision-making, 
and access to information (Spreitzer, 1996; Zacharatos et al., 2005; Seibert et al., 2011; Maynard 
et al., 2012). Often, these practices are ‘bundled’ together into one construct, making it difficult 
to identify which element of structural empowerment is actually associated with psychological 
empowerment (Maynard et al., 2012). Therefore, Maynard et al. (2012) called for future research 
to conduct in-depth considerations of the associations between various elements of structural 
empowerment on the dimensions of psychological empowerment. Thus, this study examines how 
empowerment work practices in terms of security education, training, and awareness (SETA) 
programs, access to organizational IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security 
decision-making, predict the four dimensions of psychological empowerment. 
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Structural empowerment is associated with psychological empowerment. In turn, both are 
related to performance-related outcomes at various levels (i.e., individual, team, or unit). This 
notion has been supported in numerous studies (Spreitzer, 2007; Maynard et al., 2012). This 
means that psychological empowerment serves as a mediator between structural empowerment 
and behavioral outcomes. Nielsen (1986) claimed that changing the organizational structural 
context is not enough to change individual behavior; ultimately, an individual feeling of 
empowerment is necessary to influence such behaviors (cf. Spreitzer, 1995b). Consistent with 
this line of argument, this study seeks to investigate the mediating role of dimensions of 
psychological empowerment on the relations between elements of structural empowerment and 
IS security policy compliance intentions. Figure 1.1 displays the conceptual structure of this 
study.  
 
 
 
 
 
Given the background and overview of the research problem, this study aims to extend 
the knowledge about employee IS security policy compliance by investigating the influence of 
psychological empowerment. In summary, this study addresses the following research questions:  
1) What is the impact of employees’ psychological empowerment, particularly 
perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice, on IS security policy 
compliance intentions?  
2) How do elements of structural empowerment, including IS security education, 
training, and awareness (SETA), access to information regarding IS security strategy 
Structural 
Empowerment  
Psychological 
Empowerment 
IS Security Policy 
Compliance 
Intention 
Figure 0.1: Conceptual Model 
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and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making, enhance the dimensions 
of psychological empowerment with respect to IS security? 
3) How do dimensions of psychological empowerment mediate the relations among 
elements of structural empowerment and IS security policy compliance intentions?  
To address these questions, this study aims to develop a conceptual research framework 
that evaluates employees IS security policy compliance intentions based on Thomas and 
Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model and Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment 
theory. A cross-sectional survey of individuals working in a broad spectrum of firms in the 
United States (US) is used to provide empirical support.  
The study will contribute to both researchers and practitioners for several reasons. First, 
from a theoretical standpoint, an adoption of Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic 
motivation theory in IS security context is new. The study will enrich the current body of 
knowledge on factors that improve IS security behavior at the workplace. From a practical 
perspective, the results may be able to help in defining the best practices for managing employee 
behavior with respect to IS security. Finally, the findings are hoping to offer valuable guidelines 
for designing and implementation of IS security program in an organization.  
The following paragraph outlines the structure of the dissertation and gives a brief 
summary of each of the remaining chapters. This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. 
Following an introduction, the second chapter reviews the literature in the area of employee IS 
security policy compliance. Self-determination theory is used as a conceptual map. In particular, 
research related to extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and their impact on employee security 
behavior is reviewed, and the gaps are identified. Further, the theoretical foundation of the study 
is also discussed. The third chapter presents the research hypotheses. The potential antecedents 
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influencing an employee compliance with IS security policy are identified and relevant 
hypotheses are developed. The fourth chapter sketches the research methodology used to conduct 
this research (e.g, data collection approaches and procedures). The fifth chapter presents the 
analysis and the results of the study. The sixth chapter analyzes and synthesizes the findings in 
the previous chapter. The final chapter provides the conclusion of the study that includes a 
review of the findings, a discussion of  the practical and theoretical implications of the study, 
along with a discussion of the limitations and possible future research directions. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The expectations of an IS security policy do not necessarily translate into desirable 
security actions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). For instance, a survey by Ponemon (2009) found that 
while more than 71% of respondents were aware of their organizational password sharing 
security policy, 47% admitted sharing passwords with coworkers. This type of disconnect 
between IS security responsibilities and real-world practices poses a significant challenge for 
managing IS security breaches. The consequences of such breaches can be significant. In fact, 
recent Computer Security Institute (CSI) industry surveys have shown how insider IS security 
breaches are a prevalent problem and are more costly to handle than outsider IS security 
breaches (Richardson, 2011). It is therefore important to investigate the factors that motivate 
employees to execute the IS security tasks as prescribed in the IS security policies (Straub, 1990; 
Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
This section of the dissertation begins with a review of the current body of literature 
regarding IS security policy compliance behaviors. Two orientations of motivation have emerged 
within the IS security policy compliance literature to explain types of motivation for compliance. 
Motivation may be intrinsic or extrinsic. As a result of the review of both orientations, it has 
been discovered that the intrinsic motivation perspective remains under-researched (Herath and 
Rao, 2009b; Padayachee, 2012). Thus, drawing upon the intrinsic motivation model of Thomas 
and Velthouse (1990), a logical argument explaining how and why intrinsic factors can serve as 
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mechanisms to encourage IS security policies compliance is discussed. Next, based on Kanter’s 
(1977) structural empowerment model, potential drivers to enhance intrinsic motivation are 
discussed.  
2.2 Motivations for IS security policy compliance 
A person who feels impetus or inspirational to act is considered motivated (Deci and 
Ryan, 2000). Ryan and Deci (2000), in their self-determination theory (SDT), organized the 
distinction of factors to motivate people to take action into two paradigms, extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation. The term ‘extrinsic motivation’ (Ryan and Deci, 2000) refers to “doing something 
because it leads to a separable outcome” (p. 55). It relates to an individual’s belief that he/she 
will attain some separable outcome or instrumental value when carrying out specific activity. For 
example, employees who perform a IS security task due to fear of sanctions for not doing it are 
extrinsically motivated, they perform the task in order to attain the separable outcome of 
avoiding sanctions (Straub, 1990).  
Intrinsic motivation has been surmised by Broedling (1977) as a “catchall explanation 
whenever behaviors occur which cannot be clearly linked to external outcomes” (p. 268). Deci 
and Ryan (2009) further stated that the definition of intrinsic motivation is based on two axioms. 
First, intrinsic motivation exists within individuals, suggesting that an individual’s motivation to 
act comes from intrinsic regulation or from the self, not from others (Deci and Ryan, 2000). 
Second, intrinsic motivation exists within the relations between individuals and tasks, suggesting 
that engagement in an activity may be rewarding in itself. Intrinsic motivation is based on an 
assessment of how the task engagement provides satisfaction or fulfillment of innate 
psychological needs or desires (Ryan and Deci, 2000). In other words, the reward is in the 
activity itself (Deci and Ryan, 2009). For instance, employees who use computer software in the 
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workplace due to the inherit enjoyment of using it are intrinsically motivated (Davis et al., 1992). 
In the following section, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation for IS security policy compliance are 
reviewed.  
Extrinsic motivation and IS security policy compliance 
One extrinsic motivator for IS security policies compliance which has received a great 
deal of attention in the scientific literature is sanctions. A sanction is described as a negative 
stimulus or a negative incentive to discourage individuals from performing acts or taking 
decisions that are not aligned with organizational goals. Straub (1990) explained that the concept 
of sanction is derived from from general deterrence theory (GDT) and is used by traditional 
disciplinary systems to intimidate employees. In the IS security literature, a sanction is classified 
into the two subcategories of certainty and severity. Certainty of a sanction refers to the 
possibility that an employee’s wrongdoing act will be caught, whereas severity of sanction 
denotes the degree of punishment if caught (Nagin, 1975). The concept of sanctions assumes 
humans to be fundamentally rational; hence, the theory argues that people are less likely to 
perform deviant acts if they believe the risk of being punished is high and the punishment severe 
(Nagin, 1975).  
GDT has had significant influence amongst the IS security scholars (Straub, 1990; 
Siponen et al., 2007; Myyry et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012). Straub (1990) 
conducted an empirical field study among 1,211 employees from multiple organizations to 
identify strategies for reducing computer abuse. The results suggested that when the certainty 
and severity of sanctions for violations are clearly stated and communicated, employees are 
highly motivated to use computers appropriately. Similarly, in the context of IS security 
compliance, Siponen et al. (2007) integrated GDT, protection motivation theory (PMT), and the 
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theory of reasoned action (TRA) to investigate the impact of sanctions on adherence to IS 
security policies. The study consisted of 917 employees in four Finnish organizations. They 
found that sanctions had a significant impact on actual compliance with IS security policies.  
In addition, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) adopted the rational choice theory (RCT) to examine 
how individuals make decisions when facing choices in terms of compliance or noncompliance. 
The theory purports that employees make decisions based on an overall assessment of the 
consequences of the decision (e.g., compliance with IS security policies). In their study, one 
assessment of consequences used was the cost of noncompliance. The authors postulated that an 
employee’s belief about the cost of noncompliance were shaped by sanctions. They measured 
sanctions as tangible or intangible penalties, monetary or nonmonetary penalties, and 
unfavorable personal mention in oral or written assessment reports. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
predicted that sanctions would drive an employee’s belief about the cost of noncompliance, 
which then influences decisions to comply. Based on data collected from 464 employees in the 
US who had some familiarity with the requirements of their organizational IS security policies, 
their general ideas and predictions were supported. 
Monitoring 
Organizations have responded to an increase in insider security breaches through the 
implementation of control-based monitoring to increase compliance with rules and regulations 
(Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002), despite concerns for cost, privacy, trust, performance, 
productivity, and satisfaction (Stanton and Weiss, 2000; Mirchandani and Motwani, 2003; Sipior 
and Ward, 2009; Smith and Tabak, 2009). A 2010 Cyber Security Watch survey found that 64% 
of organizations monitor employee Internet connections, whereas 46% and 32% of organizations 
monitor the online activities of suspicious and disgruntled employees, respectively (CSO, 2010). 
  
18 
 
 
Knowing that information is easily transmitted electronically, organizations have increased 
monitoring of e-mails to prevent the possibility of leaking trade secrets and business strategies 
(Dominique, 1999). 
Monitoring techniques range from the evaluation of employee security behaviors to the 
electronic surveillance of computer, e-mail, and Internet activities (Straub and Nance, 1990; 
Ariss, 2002; Siau et al., 2002; Stanton et al., 2005; Boss et al., 2009; Smith and Tabak, 2009). 
Evaluation refers to the application of a feedback system on the output by means of audit and 
performance evaluations (Kirby and Davis, 1998; Stanton and Weiss, 2000; Urbaczewski and 
Jessup, 2002; Boss et al., 2009). Evaluation uses data to determine whether an employee has 
appropriately performed the required security practices and procedures as prescribed in the IS 
security policies (Kirsch, 2004). Unless constant evaluation of employee security behaviors is 
established, the existence of IS security policies remains meaningless (Boss et al., 2009). For 
instance, an IS security auditor may use a server log to track employee IS security online 
activities or employers can physically examine any employees’ computer system (Boss et al., 
2009).  
Dhillon (2001) stated that informal evaluations, such as interpreting employee behavioral 
changes, may also be useful in establishing adequate checks and balances. Within the IS security 
literature, the evaluation of employee security behavior is based on the belief that when 
employees realize that their IS security activities are being monitored and assessed for 
compliance, this knowledge creates a sense of social pressure on them to conform to desired 
behavior (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Boss et al., 2009). A study conducted by Boss et al. (2009), 
used 1698 valid responses from all levels of employees at one organization in the US to examine 
the association between evaluation and IS security compliance behaviors. This results suggested 
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that evaluation makes employees feel that the IS security policies is mandatory; hence, it 
positively impacts their compliance behaviors.  
Studies have also focused on electronic surveillance systems to monitor employee usage 
of the Internet and e-mail at the workplace (Straub, 1990; Ariss, 2002; Siau et al., 2002; Tabak 
and Smith, 2005). Typically, employers monitor Internet usage to control non-essential 
browsing, reduce bandwidth abuse, and eliminate downloads of pirated software (Siau et al., 
2002). E-mail usage is typically scrutinized to prevent wrongful transmitting of confidential 
organizational data (such as trade secret and business strategies), e-mail spamming, and 
downloading of potential viruses (Siau et al., 2002).  
D’Arcy et al. (2009), in a study involving 269 employees from eight organizations in the 
US, found that when computer monitoring is known to be in place, incidents of IS misuse drop 
significantly. Prior to this study, Straub (1990) found a positive association between monitoring 
and the frequency of changing one’s password. Employees tended to comply with a password 
security policy because they knew that they are being monitored. Other research has supported 
the idea that monitoring activities of deviant behaviors increases the perception of sanctions and 
punitive consequences. Fears of sanctions should motivate potential deviants to comply with the 
rules and policies (Straub and Nance, 1990; Tyler and Blader, 2005; D’Arcy et al., 2009).  
Rewards 
A reward is an element of positive control, which is implemented with the goal of 
encouraging conformity with the desired behaviors (Boss et al., 2009). Rewards have two 
general categories: (1) tangible, such as financial remuneration, medals, and awards, and (2) 
intangible, such as job advancement, recognition, and praise by peers (Pahnila et al., 2007; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010). In the IS security setting, employees are encouraged to comply with IS 
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security policies when they are sufficiently motivated to attain rewards and recognitions. 
Rewards also signal to employees that conformance with IS security policies is mandatory (Boss 
et al., 2009). Such IS security policies are not accorded much importance by employees in the 
absence of any reward for compliance (Boss et al., 2009). 
Stanton et al. (2005) discovered that rewards show a positive correlation with password-
related security behaviors, such as changing passwords more frequently and choosing stronger 
passwords. Similarly, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) postulated that, based on RCT, the perception of 
benefits of compliance is shaped by a reward system. They described rewards as tangible or 
intangible compensation which an organization provides in return for compliance with the 
requirements of IS security policies. Rewards included salary raises, awards, promotions, and 
personal appreciation in either oral or written form. Their study, based on a sample size of 474 
respondents from varying organizations, showed that rewards were positively correlated with IS 
security policies compliance. Thus, rewards may be used as an effective means for increasing 
motivation for IS security policies compliance.  
Social Pressures  
 Individuals may also be motivated to perform actions to avoid guilt and anxiety or to gain 
pride and ego-enhancements (Ryan and Deci, 2000). This indicates that the motivation for 
individuals to perform a specific action may be the desire to maintain a feeling of self-worth and 
self-esteem. This is associated to the pressures individuals receive from their social interaction 
with the organizational members to perform the behavior in question (Venkatesh and Brown, 
2001). Social pressures exerted by subjective norms (perceived expectation) and descriptive 
norms (observation) should positively influence IS security compliance intentions (Herath and 
Rao, 2009a).  
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Normative beliefs are based on the beliefs as to whether or not significant others expect 
the individual to perform a specific behavior (Ajzen, 1991). This indicates that a message about 
expectations from one member’s social network is able to influence another member’s behavior. 
In the IS security setting, examples of normative beliefs are the expectations of superiors, IT 
management, and peers in IS departments on IS security policies compliance (Herath and Rao, 
2009a). A study has shown that if an employee believes that others expect IS security policy 
compliance from him or her, then that individual will comply (Herath and Rao, 2009a). Simply 
put, the possibility of gaining approval from others motivates individuals to perform IS security 
compliant behaviors.  
Descriptive norms concern observations of behaviors demonstrated by others (Leach, 
2003), and they are strongly influenced by the behavior of others. New or existing employees 
who need to conform with their organizational norms tend to build their IS security behaviors 
according to the IS security practices and behaviors demonstrated by senior management and 
peers (Leach, 2003). Chan et al. (2005) examined how perceptions of descriptive norms derive 
from the observation of organizational management, direct supervisor’s, and peers’ IS security 
behaviors. Management behaviors include the routine actions of management as observed by 
individual employees. Such behaviors and practices include outlining written IS security policies 
and providing training and awareness programs. These actions demonstrate to employees that the 
organization stresses the importance of good IS security. Direct supervisory behaviors and 
practices are measured by the repeated actions of supervisors as observed by the individual 
employee. Since supervisors have the most contact with subordinates, they are the ideal 
candidates for communicating and enforcing organizational goals. Thus, employees who observe 
their supervisors giving greater emphasis to prescribed IS security procedures tend to be inclined 
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to carry out the same behaviors. Peer socialization refers to observation of peer behaviors (Chan 
et al., 2005). This view holds that an individual’s decision to perform a certain behavior is based 
on the observation that others are doing it. In other words, employees’ reciprocate the behavior 
of others because they believe they need to do what many others do. Chan et al. (2005) provided 
evidence that management practices, supervisory practices, and peer behaviors do influence 
employees’ compliant behavior. Similarly, Herath and Rao (2009a) found that if employees see 
their coworkers routinely following IS security rules, they are motivated to perform the same 
behaviors and, thus, follow the IS security rules as well. 
Intrinsic motivation and IS security policy compliance  
In recognizing the importance of intrinsic incentives, IS security researchers have 
incorporated feelings of competence (Chan et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath and Rao, 
2009b; Rhee et al., 2009), feelings of contribution from one’s IS security actions (Herath and 
Rao, 2009a), and feelings of value congruence and legitimacy (Son, 2011) in their models.  
Perceived competence  
Competence or self-efficacy refers to an individual’s belief in his/her capability to 
perform a specific task (Bandura, 1977). Self-efficacy theory argues that individuals with low 
self-efficacy on a specific task tend to avoid that task. Self-efficacy regarding IS security tasks 
have been widely studied (e.g., Chan et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath and Rao, 2009b; 
Rhee et al., 2009). Chan et al. (2005) examined the causal role of employee self-efficacy and IS 
security compliant behavior in IT intensive organizations in the logistics and petrochemical 
industries. This study indicated that employees’ belief in their efficacy in IS security influenced 
their decision to perform (or not perform) IS security related tasks, particularly those prescribed 
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through organizational IS security policies. Chan et al.’s (2005) results indicated that self-
efficacy perceptions are an important determinant of performance related to a specific task.  
Self-efficacy beliefs also affect individual efforts and persistence efforts related to a 
specific task. Rhee et al. (2009) showed that self-efficacy in IS security influences individuals’ 
intention to strengthen IS security efforts, both in terms of security technology use and security-
conscious behavior. Furthermore, self-efficacy influenced individuals’ intention to continue their 
IS security efforts. That is, they tend to agree to strengthen their knowledge about IS security, 
enforce IS security procedures, and add extra IS security measures in the future. The results 
suggest that if employees have high levels of IS security self-efficacy, they will increase 
compliance-related behaviors. 
Perceived effectiveness  
Herath and Rao (2009a) examined how intrinsic incentives affect employee compliance 
behavior. This study considered intrinsic incentive in term of feeling of contribution from one’s 
action. Herath and Rao (2009a) postulated that if employees believe that their IS security actions 
or behaviors can contribute to the betterment of the organization, it is likely that they will carry 
out the actions. Their web-based survey was carried out in collaboration with Cyber Task Force, 
Buffalo Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and involved 312 employees from 
77 organizations across the US. Herath and Rao’s (2009a) results indicated that employees adopt 
a favorable IS security compliance behaviors if they believe that their IS security actions are 
effective. Thus, intrinsic motivation, measured by perceived effectiveness of IS security actions 
predicted employees intention to comply with IS security policies.  
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Beliefs about organization 
Son (2011) suggested that employees’ assessment of their employer may be an important 
source of intrinsic motivation to follow rules. Drawing upon the work by Tyler and Blader 
(1995), Son (2011) specified two specific employer assessment conditions: perceived value 
congruence and perceived legitimacy. Perceived value congruence refers to the alignment 
between individuals and organizational IS security values (Son, 2011). Son (2011) posited that 
individuals (and organizations) tend to cooperate when their belief systems match. Thus, when 
employees perceive their values are in congruence with the organization’s values, they tend to 
commit and maintain a long-lasting relation. However, if there is a lack of alignment, chances 
are that an individual is not loyal to the organization and, thus, poses a security risk. In the 
context of IS security policy compliance, if employees feel that their IS security value system is 
in congruence with that of the organization, there is a higher chance of IS security policy 
compliance. Perceived legitimacy refers to employees’ assessment of the IS security policy in 
terms of its appropriateness and desirability (Son, 2011). Son (2011) purported that it is 
important for organisation to achieve legitimacy in order to influence the organisational members 
behaviors. The results of his study indicated that both perceived value congruence and legitimacy 
were positively related to IS security compliance behaviors. Thus, employees innate desires and 
preferences for legitimacy and value congruence of the IS security were found to influence thier 
IS security behaviors.  
Another strand of research has focused on the assessment of an asset as a source of 
individual intrinsic motivation to perform a desired behavior. Specifically, this stream of 
research is based on individual assessment of psychological ownership of an asset. The logical 
argument is that rational people will not destroy or take unnecessary action against something 
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that belongs to them. As much as possible, such people will protect what belongs to them. In the 
context of IS security behavior related to home computing, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) 
investigated the impact of feelings of ownership of the Internet and the computer on behavioral 
intentions to protect the Internet and one’s computer. They found that an individual’s level of 
psychological ownership towards the Internet and computer does influence IS security behavior. 
Table 0.1 presents a summary of seminal work in the two paradigms, dominated by the extrinsic 
motivation paradigm. 
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Table 0.1: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of IS security policy compliance 
 
Extrinsic or intrinsic motivation? 
Herath and Rao (2009a) examined the influence of variables under both extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation models of IS security policy compliance intentions. They reported that 
employees’ intrinsic motivation, measured by perceived effectiveness, predicted IS security 
compliance intentions (β = .22, p < .05). The extrinsic motivation model, measured by severity 
Motivation  Factors Description Theory Used
Some Seminal 
Papers
Sanctions I comply with security policies to avoid 
penalties.
General 
Deterrence 
Theory (GDT); 
Agency Theory
Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Pahnila et 
al., 2007; Straub, 
1990 
Monitoring I comply with security policies because I 
know my activities is being monitored.
Control Theory
Boss et al., 2009; 
Stanton and 
Weiss, 2000; 
D’Arcy et al., 
2009; Straub, 1990
Rewards I comply with security policies to attain 
rewards.
Rational Choice 
Theory; Theory of 
Planned Behavior
Boss et al., 2009; 
Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Stanton et 
al., 2005
Normative 
Beliefs
I comply with security policies because I 
belief that significant others (superiors, IT 
management and peers in IS departments) 
expect me to comply.
Protection 
Motivation 
Theory
Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Herath and 
Rao, 2009; Pahnila 
et al., 2007
Social Climate 
/ Observation 
I comply with security policies because I 
observe that my management, supervisors 
and colleagues give great emphasis to 
prescribed security procedures.
Protection 
Motivation 
Theory
(Chan et al., 2005; 
Herath and Rao, 
2009; Leach, 2003)
Perceived 
Effectiveness
I comply with security policies because I 
perceive that my security actions will help 
for the betterment of my organization.
Herath and Rao, 
2009 
Perceived Self-
Efficacy
I comply with security policies because I 
perceive that I have the skills or 
competency to perform the security 
activities.
Self-efficacy 
theory
(Chan et al., 2005; 
Rhee et al., 2009; 
Workman et al., 
2008)
Perceived 
Value 
Congruence
I comply with security policies because I 
perceive that the security values/goals are 
congruence with my values.
Son, 2011
Perceived 
Ownership
I comply with security policies because I 
perceive that I own the assets (computer 
and the Internet).
Anderson and 
Argawal, 2010
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R
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of penalty, certainty of detection, peer behavior, and normative beliefs, was partially supported. 
Overall, Herath and Rao’s (2009a) findings suggested that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators 
may influence the IS security behaviors of employees. However, the study did not predict the 
magnitude of contribution for each model (i.e., the extrinsic and the intrinsic motivation model).  
Recent work by Son (2011) examined the impact of perceived certainty and severity of 
sanctions (i.e., the extrinsic motivation model), and perceived legitimacy and perceived value 
congruence (i.e., the intrinsic motivation model) of IS security policy compliance among 
employees in the US. Both extrinsic and intrinsic models were assessed for their significance. 
The results of Son’s (2011) study showed that factors that rooted in the intrinsic motivation 
model were significantly related to IS security policy compliance (β = .36 and .26, p < .05). 
However, contrary to expectations, both extrinsic factors were not significant (β = .05 and .06, p 
> .1). More interestingly, Son (2011) predicted that both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
models will explain significantly more employees’ IS security policy compliance than would 
variables from either the extrinsic or intrinsic motivation model. His results showe that the 
extrinsic model explained 16% and the intrinsic model explained 41% of variance of IS security 
policies compliance behaviors. By simultaneously testing the relations between the extrinsic 
factors, intrinsic factors, and IS security policy compliance intention, the model explained a 
substantial amount of variance of IS security policies compliance behavior (R2 = .42). Son’s 
(2011) results showed that the contribution of the intrinsic motivation model exceeded that of the 
extrinsic motivation. He proposed that intrinsic motivation may generate alternative explanations 
and solutions for compliance with organizational IS security policy. Thus, organizations should 
increase their emphasis on intrinsic motivation-based approaches, and rely less on extrinsic-
based approaches (Son, 2011).  
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Summary  
In sum, IS security policy compliance research has witnessed the rise of the extrinsic 
motivation argument. Scholars considering extrinsic factors to be important in ensuring 
compliance have largely examined the four dimensions of sanctions, rewards, monitoring, and 
social pressures. It goes without saying that individual compliance with IS security policy can be 
explained with respect to the extent of sanctions or rewards, how well they are being monitored, 
and what their social pressures might be.  
Although most past and current research in IS security policy compliance has focused 
mainly on employees’ value of extrinsic rewards (see Table 0.1) employees tend to value both 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (Herath and Rao, 2009a). Intrinsic motivational factors such as 
self-efficacy, psychological ownership, perceived effectiveness, and perceived value congruence 
influence employees’ decisions to comply with IS security policy. Interestingly, a recent study 
provided empirical evidence that the intrinsic factors could explain more of the variance in IS 
security policy compliance than extrinsic factors (Son, 2011). This suggests that the factors 
constituting intrinsic motivation to comply with IS security policy are certainly promising. 
Unfortunately, relatively little research has been conducted within the intrinsic motivation 
paradigm. Hence, calls have be made to investigate other intrinsic factors (Herath and Rao, 
2009a; Son, 2011; Padayachee, 2012).  
Further, Herath and Rao (2009a) and Son (2011) have acknowleged few strategies or 
drivers, such as IS security training, and IS security climate, to enhance employees’ intrinsic 
motivation. However, eventually no empirical research has investigated the drivers to enhance 
employees’ intrinsic motivation. As a result, this study investigates the impact of psychological 
empowerment, a factor rooted in intrinsic motivation model, on IS security policies compliance 
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intentions, and explores the antecedents of psychological empowerment. The following section 
describes the theoretical foundation of this study.  
2.3 Theoretical foundation  
Based on the gap described above, this section seeks to explain individuals’ intrinsic 
motivation to comply with IS security policy. In doing so, the present study incorporates the 
conceptual ideas of Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation/empowerment model, 
as well as Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment theory. 
Thomas and Velthouse’s Intrinsic Motivation/Empowerment Model  
Although there are various definitions of intrinsic motivation, Thomas and Velthouse 
(1990) defined it as “positively valued experiences that the individual derives directly from the 
task” or “those generic conditions by an individual, pertaining directly to the task, that produce 
motivation and satisfaction” (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990, p. 668). This indicates that a 
motivation to act occurs within a person and refers to the task itself. Thomas and Velthouse 
(1990) claimed that a task refers to a set of activities directed towards a purpose. In other words, 
a task contains both activities and goals. Thus, the design of their model may be applied to 
various tasks in the work context.  
Thomas and Velthouse’s model conceptualizes empowerment as intrinsic task 
motivation. Empowerment refers to a set of cognitions reflecting one’s perceptions about their 
task and their ability to control, shape or influence the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; 
Spreitzer, 1995b). This contrasts with structural empowerment, which focuses on managerial 
practices that share power with employees (Spreitzer, 2007). Psychological empowerment is 
formed based on individuals’ assessments or judgments of a task regarding four cognitions: 
competence, meaning, impact, and choice (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Thus, the core of their 
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model focuses on identifying these cognitions, known as task assessments. In other words, 
individuals are considered intrinsically motivated whenever they experience these four 
cognitions from a task, which are described next.  
Perceptions of competence 
Competence or self-efficacy refers to an assessment of one’s own capability to perform a 
task activities skillfully (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Bandura (1995, p. 2) defined self-
efficacy as “the belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required 
to manage prospective situations.” Thus, competence relates to an individual’s belief regarding 
whether he/she has the ability to perform a specific task. Self-efficacy theory states that when a 
person has low self-efficacy regardind a particular skill to execute a specific task, he or she will 
avoid such a tasks where this skill is required (Bandura, 1977).  
Perceptions of meaning 
Meaning refers to judgments of the value of a task goals with individual’s own goals and 
standards (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). A feeling of meaningfulness materializes if there is a 
fit between the task objectives and employees own beliefs, values, and behaviors (Spreitzer, 
1995a). This is analogous to Hackman and Oldham’s (1980) concept of experience 
meaningfulness of the work. Experiencing work as meaningful indicates the degree to which a 
person believes that the work objective or purpose is significant in one’s own value system 
(Hackman and Oldham, 1980). Thus, the cognitive assessment of task meaningfulness relates to 
an individuals’ belief concerning whether a given task is trivial or not. If a task is important or 
meaningful to individuals, they will invest their energy to accomplish the goal of the task 
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). In contrast, individuals who perceive that a task is meaningless 
tend to be apathetic and detached from said task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990).  
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Perceptions of impact  
Impact refers to judgments concerning how a behavior or an action regarding a task may 
make a significant difference to the organization in terms of accomplishing the goal of the task 
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Thus, the cognitive assessment of impact relates to an 
individual’s belief regarding whether he/she can contribute to the organization by performing or 
executing a specific task. If individuals are aware that the results of their action will benefit 
others, it encourages them to invest their time and energy to perform the task (Thomas and 
Velthouse, 1990). This is analogous to the knowledge of results in Hackman and Oldham’s 
(1980) model. According to Hackman and Oldham (1980), knowledge of the results indicates 
that individuals know about the outcomes of their work activities. If they know that the impact of 
their work will be beneficial and significant, they become intrinsically motivated to perform said 
activity well (Hackman and Oldham, 1980). 
Perceptions of choice/self-determination 
Choice involves a causal responsibility for a person’s actions (Thomas and Velthouse, 
1990). Thomas (2009) asserted that a “sense of choice also gives you a feeling of ownership” (p. 
54). A cognitive assessment of choice is based on whether people believe that they have 
autonomy or experience self-determination in how they perform a given task (Ryan and Deci, 
2000; Deci and Ryan, 2009). In other words, cognitions of choice means believing that one has 
control or discretion in initiating and regulating a specific task, and has the authority to make 
decisions related to the task. When individuals experience a sense of choice over their task, they 
feel personal responsibility concerning the outcomes of their task (Oldham and Hackman, 1980), 
hence they will put more effort in the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Together, Thomas and 
Velthouse (1990) stated that experiencing empowerment is derived directly from a task manifest 
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in cognitions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice. In other words, individuals feel 
empowered if they are confident they have the skills and ability to do their task well, the task is 
important to them, they have freedom to make decisions regarding the task, and believe that they 
can have an impact on task outcomes.  
Measuring psychological empowerment 
Psychological empowerment is an overall construct or “gestalt” of four dimensions, viz. 
perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice (Spreitzer 1995a). This indicates that 
psychological empowerment is a four-dimensional construct. This further suggests that the 
overall degree of psychological empowerment is limited if one of the dimensions is low or 
absent (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer, 1995a). For instance, although people may 
believe they can have an impact and that they have discretion to make decisions, if they do not 
feel they have skill to perform the task competently or lack of sense of meaning concerning the 
task, they will not feel empowered (Spreitzer, 1995a). Spreitzer (1995a) developed a single 12-
item (3 items per dimension) to measure psychological empowerment. Her measure has been 
used predominantly in empirical research in various settings (Spreitzer, 2007). The measurement 
of psychological empowerment assumes that empowerment is continuous, using a 7-point Likert 
scale. 
Spreitzer (1995a) found support for the idea that all four dimensions may be loaded onto 
a single second-order psychological empowerment construct. Further, Kraimer et al. (1999) 
performed a second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and found support for the notion 
that psychological empowerment is made up of the four cognitions. The fit statistics indicated 
that the one-factor model (all 12 empowerment items were hypothesized to represent a single 
construct) provided a much worse fit than the four-factor model. Thus, the results provided 
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support for the convergent and discriminant validity for Spreitzer’s (1995a) multidimensional 
construct of psychological empowerment. Empirical evidence across various fields, and across 
both cultures and work contexts has supported Spreitzer’s (1995a) findings (e.g., Spreitzer, 
1995b, Spreitzer, 1996, Chen and Klimoski, 2003; Carless, 2004; Alge et al., 2006; Zhang and 
Bartol, 2010; Ford and Tetrick, 2011).  
Although the four-dimensional measure of psychological empowerment was supported in 
the literature, a meta-analysis concluded that the factor loadings were not consistent either across 
dimensions or samples (Maynard et al., 2012). This suggests that there is scientific merit to 
assess the dimensions separately (Maynard et al., 2012). Spreitzer et al. (2007) posited that these 
different dimensions may predict different outcomes, and are influenced by different 
antecedents. Some researchers have investigated how each of the four dimensions of 
psychological empowerment predicted different outcomes and is influenced by different factors 
(Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999, Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2005; Logan 
and Ganster, 2007). For instance, several studies have investigated the influence of perceived 
meaningfulness of a job on positive work outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999; 
Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2005). Wat and Shaffer (2005) conducted a survey to assess 
how supervisors and subordinates perceptions of meaning of their work affects their 
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Using a sample from investment banks in Hong 
Kong, they found that perceived meaning was related to courtesy behavior, a dimension of OCB. 
Wat and Shaffer (2005) explained that when task values are consistent with individuals’ values, 
they feel a commitment to and involvement with the goals. In addition, Wat and Shaffer (2005) 
found that the self-determination dimension relates to altruism or helping behavaior. In a cross-
sectional study among mid-level employees in manufacturing industry, Spreitzer et al. (1997) 
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assessed how job satisfaction, job strain, and task performance are affected by perceptions of 
impact of one’s job. This results indicated that perceptions of impact best predict task 
performance, and not significantly related to job satisfaction and job strain. However, they found 
that perceptions of competence were related to satisfaction and negative to job strain (Spreitzer et 
al., 1997). 
While this perspective has not received due attention in the literature, Maynard et al. 
(2012) has called for research to determine the influence that the four dimensions have on 
various outcomes. This study seeks to answer the call by investigating the association between 
dimensions of psychological empowerment and individuals performance, in a context of IS 
security.  
Individual performance-related outcomes of psychological empowerment 
Findings across a wide range of studies showed that psychological empowerment 
influences various outcomes, including organizational level performance, team level 
performance, individual attitudes, individual behaviors, individual performance, and many others 
(Spreitzer et al., 2007; Chen and Klimoski, 2003; Zhang and Bartol, 2010; Ford and Tetrick, 
2011). Meta-analytic evidence has supported this (Seibert et al., 2011; Maynard et al., 2012). The 
scope of the literature review is limited to individual level performance-related outcomes as this 
study focuses on individuals’ IS security policy compliance behaviors. To comply means to exert 
energy to perform the IS security tasks in order to achieve the organizational IS security 
objectives. Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation theory postulates that the level 
of psychological empowerment is likely to affect outcomes, such as active and concentration of 
energy upon task. Active and concentration of energy upon task can be described as putting more 
“effort” or “working hard” towards accomplishing the goals of the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 
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1990). This indicates that the stronger the cognitions of competence, meaning, impact, and 
choice deriving from a task, the greater the individuals’ motivation to invest more energy in 
behaviors towards achieving that task. Related outcomes include individual task performance, 
work effort, task or work  effectiveness, and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) 
(Spreitzer et al., 1997; Wat and Shaffer, 2005; Ke and Zhang, 2011; Campbell et al., 2003; Chen 
and Klimoski, 2003). The following section reviews the influence of different dimensions of 
psychological empowerment on individual performance-related outcomes. 
Spreitzer et al. (1997) investigated the impact of each of the dimensions of psychological 
empowerment on employee work effectiveness. Effectiveness may be described as the degree to 
which individuals fulfill or exceed work role expectations. Their results showed that individuals 
who experience a stronger sense of competence and impact in the workplace tend to be more 
effective on the job (Spreitzer et al., 1997). Spreitzer et al.’s (1997) findings suggest that 
employees may see that their effort has made a difference (based on their prior performance) and 
feel that they can have an impact. In addition, the findings indicate that competence is necessary 
for employee effectiveness. Thus, employees who feel empowered in terms of impact and 
competence on the job are more motivated to invest their energy in the job and perform 
effectively.  
Perceived competence increases task performance and goals accomplishment by 
increasing task effort and persistence (Bandura, 1977). That is, the stronger the perceived 
competence, the more persistence and active employees efforts. Task effort may be described as 
the amount of energy employees expend when carrying out their job. Rhee et al. (2009) showed 
that self-efficacy in IS security influences individual intention to strengthen their IS security 
efforts, both in terms of security technology use and IS security-conscious behaviors. 
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Furthermore, their results showed that perceived self-efficacy influenced individuals’ intention to 
continue their IS security efforts. That is, higher efficacious employees tend to strengthen their 
IS security behaviors, enforce IS security procedures, and add additional security measures in the 
future. In another research, Kraimer et al. (1999) found that perceived meaningful of a job was 
related to employees’ intention to stay longer in the job. Individuals who found their job 
meaningful are likely to be motivated to continue putting more effort into their current job. Thus, 
employees who find meaning in their work tend to engage in a high level of sustained work 
effort. 
In addition, the meaning dimension of empowerment has been found to result in task 
performance (Ke and Zhang, 2011), as individuals reported more value and worth in the task 
they were required to complete. Employee task performance describes individual behaviors that 
are aimed at achieving firm goals (Campbell et al., 1993). In other words, task performance 
reflects behaviors that employees engage in to accomplish desired organizational objectives. Wat 
and Shaffer (2005) conducted a study to assess how supervisors and subordinates perceptions of 
meaning of their work affects their organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB). They found that 
perceived meaning was related to courtesy behavior, a dimension of OCB. Wat and Shaffer 
(2005) explained that because the work values are consistent with individuals’ values, they feel a 
commitment to and involvement with the work goals. Therefore, individuals with higher levels 
of meaningfulness related to the work may engage in behaviors that helps their organization to 
achieve specified goals.  
In sum, the reviewed studies provide support for the notion that the perceptions of 
competence, meaning, impact, and choice drive individuals to expend effort to perform a related 
task, as well as to achieve goal of the task.  
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Antecedences of psychological empowerment 
Theories have documented the need of drivers to enhance one’s intrinsic motivation 
related to his/her task or job (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and 
Velthouse, 1990). For example, Hackman and Oldham (1980) posited that enhancing intrinsic 
motivation concerns the properties of the job itself. Hackman and Oldham’s job characteristics 
model suggests five job characteristics, namely skill variety, task identity, task significance, 
autonomy, and feedback from a job, as antecedents to influence one’s intrinsic motivation. 
Similarly, Thomas and Velthouse (1990) contended that an individual’s work environment is an 
important factor that can influence the level of intrinsic motivation.  
In a study of the intrinsic motivation behind IS security policy compliance, Bulgurcu et 
al. (2010) suggested that an organization may use external instrumentals, such as training, to 
influence employees’ perceptions of intrinsic benefits. Similarly, Son (2011) stated that an 
organization can implement training and education programs, and tighten the connection 
between the objective of the IS security policy and employees internal value to drive employees’ 
intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, Herath and Rao (2009a) have suggested to enhance 
appropriate IS security climate in order to improve employees perceived effectiveness of their IS 
security tasks. Rather than exploring the range of external factors, these studies simply 
acknowledged their importance. Hence, it is imperative to explore the antecedents to influence 
employees’ intrinsic motivation, specifically their psychological empowerment.   
Thus far, a broad range of antecedents of psychological empowerment has been reported 
in the organizational literature. These include job characteristics, structural empowerment, and 
leadership style (Spreitzer, 1995b; 1996; Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et al., 2000; Hon and 
Rensvold, 2006; Logan and Ganster, 2007). For instance, Kraimer et al. (1999) linked Hackman 
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and Oldham’s (1980) five job characteristics to the four dimensions of empowerment. Kraimer et 
al. (1999) found that job meaningfulness was related to perceptions of meaning, task feedback 
was related to perceptions of impact and competence, and job autonomy was related to the 
experience of self-determination. The role of leadership may also influence one’s feelings of 
empowerment. For instance, transformational leadership, leader-member exchange (LMX), and 
trust in one’s leader were associated with feelings of empowerment among subordinates (Kark et 
al., 2003; Avolio et al., 2004; Ergeneli et al., 2007). Specifically, this current study focuses on 
structural empowerment, based on Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment theory. The 
argument is that, when management transfers power to subordinates, feeling of empowerment 
should follow.  
Kanter’s Structural Empowerment Theory 
Although several researchers have explored the conception of structural empowerment, 
Kanter (1977) identified it first. Structural empowerment refers to conditions or practices where 
an organization provides subordinates with an amount of power. According to Kanter, power is 
derived from the structural conditions in an organization, not inherent from personality traits or 
effects of socialization. Thus, the focus of Kanter’s theory is on the employees’ perception of the 
work conditions, rather than the individuals, which determine what happened.  
Kanter (1977) discussed several practices that indicate structural empowerment: (1) 
access to opportunity, (2) access to information, and (3) participation in decision-making. First, 
access to opportunity relates to job or task conditions that provide individuals with chances for 
growth and development within the organization, as well as chances to develop their skills, 
abilities, and knowledge. Access to opportunity allows an individual to learn about skills and the 
economies of the larger organization (Lawler, 1986). Lancshinger (1996) defined access to 
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opportunity as opportunities for growth and movement within an organization as well as 
opportunities to enhance and develop one’s knowledge and skills. This could be achieved 
through training and education programs. Educational efforts contribute to individuals’ intrinsic 
motivation by increasing the belief in their capability to perform task activities skillfully 
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 2007). According to Gist and Mitchell (1992), 
attempts to improve sense of competence or self-efficacy should involve some formal training. In 
addition, a training program that provides information on the effectiveness of performance (task 
feedback) should enhance individuals’ belief about the impact of their work activities (Hackman 
and Oldham, 1980).  
Liao et al. (2009) argued that if management invests in training programs, it may enhance 
employees’ human capital, employees’ knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) to provide quality 
service to customers. In return, the KSAs acquired through the training may positively influence 
employees’ confidence in their competence in service delivery. The study showed that high 
performance work systems (HPWS), which include training programs was positively related to 
cognitions of empowerment. Bonias et al. (2010) found support for Liao et al’s (2009) results in 
the context of quality care to patients in hospitals. Bonias et al.’s (2010) study showed that 
training, part of a HPWS, was positively associated to the dimensions of psychological 
empowerment – perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice. Logan and Ganster 
(2007) conducted a field experiment that tested the effects of an empowerment intervention (i.e. 
training) among unit managers of a large trucking company in the USA. However, their results 
were contrary to the hypothesis, as training had a negative significant effect on the participants’ 
sense of competence. This indicates that although training leads to increases in KSAs, it can also 
reduce the participants’ perceived level of competence.  
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Second, Kanter (1977) posited that access to information refers to ability to obtain 
knowledge and information necessary to carry out an individual’s task as well as information 
concerning what is going on in the larger organization. In her second edition of the book, she 
posited that “to be empowering, top management must make more information available to more 
people at more levels through more devices” (Kanter, 1986 p.5). Lancshinger (1996) referred to 
access to information as having information regarding organizational goals and policy changes. 
More specifically, previous researchers have focused on information regarding the mission and 
future direction of the organization (Lawler, 1992; Spreitzer, 1995b, 1996; Bordin et al., 2006). 
Access to information related to goals and strategic directions allows an individual to see the 
“big picture”, which creates an understanding on how his or her work contributes to the firm’s 
goals (Bowen and Lawler, 1992). Thus, such an individual will be able to make better decisions 
related to his/ her task.  
Quinn and Spreitzer (1997) conducted interviews with 12 senior executives in a 
manufacturing company. The results of the interviews showed that empowerment is about 
delegation and accountability. It is a process in which top management develops a clear 
organizational mission, along with a vision and values, and communicates said vision to the 
members of the organization (Quinn and Spreitzer, 1997). They found that providing a clear 
vision allows people in the organization to feel highly empowered, as they understand top 
management’s vision and strategic direction of the organization. With an understanding of the 
vision and the direction of the organization, they experience enhanced levels of confidence and 
the ability to act without waiting for approval from a supervisor. Earlier, Lawler (1992) posited 
that accessing organization’s mission contributes to individuals’ intrinsic motivation by 
increasing the belief in their ability to make and influence decisions that are congruent with the 
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organizational goals and mission. In addition, studies found that access to information may help 
employees to perceive a given job or task as meaningful and important, because they see and 
understand how their task can contribute to the goals (Spreitzer, 1995a; Liao et al., 2009). 
Third, Kanter’s (1977) theory also suggests an empowerment through participation. This 
indicates that employees are able to provide inputs and influence over decisions. Inputs in this 
context consist of strategic and day-to-day operational decisions related to their job or task. 
Knoop (1995) stated that participation is the act of sharing decision-making with others to 
achieve organizational goals. As employees are at the operational level, they know better how 
specific actions related to their job or task affect the organization. Employees are also more 
likely to offer valuable ideas on how operations may be improved. Subsequently, their 
meaningful suggestions are more likely to be accepted and adopted. Participative climate helps 
employees to belief that they are an important asset of the organization and that they can make 
significant impact to the organization (Spreitzer, 1996). Lawler (1992) reasoned that when 
employees are more involved in the decision-making process concerning organizational tasks, 
they are more aware of the tasks requirements (i.e. sense of meaningful), and, hence are more 
likely to take effective actions. 
Spreitzer’s (1996) study reported that participative organizational climate significantly 
correlated to individuals’ feelings of empowerment. In the context of service industry, Liao et al. 
(2009) argued that increased decision-making power may enhance employees’ confidence in 
their competence to handle customers. Their findings showed that employee experience with the 
high performance work system (HPWS), including participation in decision-making, influences 
one’s feelings of empowerment. Bordin et al. (2006) also found support for this argument in the 
context of white collar IT employees. 
  
42 
 
 
In addition, Wallach and Mueller (2006) examined opportunities for employees to 
participate in decision-making within human service organizations. Their study confirmed earlier 
findings (e.g., Bordin et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009) that structures in organization that allow 
employees to participate in decision-making enhances their psychological empowerment, 
manifested by four cognitions, competence, meaning, impact and autonomy. However, the study 
also reported that when controlling for variables such as role ambiguity, peer support, and 
supervisory working alliances, the relations between participation in decision-making and 
perceived empowerment did not remain statistically significant.  
As shown, many studies have examined the relations between structural empowerment 
and the psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1996; Laschinger et al., 2004; Siu et al., 2005; 
Wallach and Mueller, 2006). However, most of the studies have conceptualized structural 
empowerment as a ‘bundle’ of practices (e.g., Laschinger et al., 2004; Siu et al., 2005) that make 
it difficult to identify which structural empowerment elements are actually associated with 
psychological empowerment. Additionally, as Spreitzer’s (1996) and Wallach and Mueller’s 
(2006) work has exemplified, psychological empowerment has been conceptualized as a 
composite of perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice. Again, this makes it 
difficult to tease apart which dimensions were actually driven by the elements of structural 
empowerment. Spreitzer (2007) noted that the different dimensions of psychological 
empowerment may be influenced by different antecedents. Similarly, Maynard et al. (2012) 
called for future research to take in-depth considerations of the various elements of structural 
empowerment and their association with the dimensions of psychological empowerment. In 
response to these notions and calls, this study attempts to investigate the relations among the 
elements of structural empowerment (i.e., training, access to information regarding strategy and 
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goals, and participation in decision-making) and the dimensions of psychological empowerment 
(i.e., perceptions of competence, meaning, impact and choice) in the context of IS security.  
The mediating role of psychological empowerment 
The concept of psychological empowerment serving as mediator between structural 
empowerment and individual performance-related outcomes has been repeatedly supported in 
numerous studies (e.g., Spreitzer, 2007; Maynard et al., 2012). Changing an organizational 
structural context is not enough to change individual behaviors; ultimately, an individual’s sense 
of empowerment is necessary to influence such behaviors (Nielsen, 1986 cf. Spreitzer, 1995a). 
For example, Spreitzer (1995b) found that psychological empowerment partially mediated the 
relation between social structural and innovative behavior. In addition, Liao et al. (2009) found 
that cognitions of empowerment fully mediate the relations between a HPWS and service 
performance. Further, Laschinger et al. (2001) found that psychological empowerment mediates 
the relations between structural empowerment and individual satisfaction. In these studies, both 
the structural and psychological empowerments were measured as composite constructs. 
  When considering the dimensions of psychological empowerment independently, Gist 
and Mitchell (1992) reported that self-efficacy did mediate the effects of training on individual 
performance. Further, Liden et al. (2000) found that perceived meaning partially mediated the 
relations between job characteristics and job satisfaction. In a different context, Bonias et al. 
(2010) tested for a mediating effect of all dimensions of psychological empowerment and found 
that senses of competence, meaning, and autonomy fully mediated the relations between a 
HPWS and quality care to patients. This dissertation partly replicates these previous studies, by 
investigating the mediating role of each individual dimension of psychological empowerment in 
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the relations between elements of structural empowerment and IS security policy compliance 
behavior (i.e., individual performance-related outcomes).  
2.4 Conclusion 
Reviewing what has been discussed thus far in the literature review section, a number of 
conclusions may be drawn. First, this study classified and identified current research direction in 
IS security policy compliance research. The views were systematically classified according to 
Ryan and Deci’s (2000) extrinsic-intrinsic motivation framework. The literature review 
established the dominance of the extrinsic motivation paradigm. There have only been a few 
attempts diverting from this mainstream view. The limitations of these approaches have led to 
the emergence of the intrinsic motivation perspective. Drawing upon Thomas and Velthouse’s 
(1990) intrinsic motivation/empowerment model, psychological empowerment is conceptualized 
as intrinsic motivation, which is formed based on individuals’ assessments or judgments of a task 
regarding four cognitions: competence, meaning, impact, and choice. Empirical studies 
concluded that the dimensions of psychological empowerment lead to various individual 
performance-related outcomes, specifically task effort, task performance, and work 
effectiveness. However, prior studies in the context of IS security have given little focus to the 
four dimensions of psychological empowerment, except for perceptions of competence. Thus, 
the current study includes all four dimensions as predictors of IS security compliance intentions.  
Second, Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) theory posits that intrinsic motivation should be 
enhanced or driven by environmental factors. While the IS security compliance literature 
acknowledged the importance of external factors to influence intrinsic motivation, no study has 
empirically explore the associations (see Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son, 
2011). Based on Kanter’s structural empowerment theory, studies have found that individuals in 
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positions with access to power, as measured by opportunities to obtain training, access to 
information, and participation in decision-making, experience an increase in their psychological 
empowerment. Although theory and empirical studies have provided support for the assertion 
that these structural empowerment facets are antecedents of one’s psychological empowerment, 
few studies have investigated the impact of each structural empowerment facet on the 
dimensions of psychological empowerment. This study seeks to fill that gap in the context of IS 
security.  
Finally, the vast majority of research has considered psychological empowerment as a 
mediator. This study follows that notion, investigates the mediating role of the dimensions of 
psychological empowerment on the relations between structural empowerment facets and IS 
security policy compliance intentions. Accordingly, the next chapter of this study proposes a 
research framework that incorporates the constructs derived from the two theories, Thomas and 
Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model and Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment 
theory, along with the hypothesized relations.  
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has reviewed the effects of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on IS 
security policy compliance. Although extrinsic motivation dominates the literature, IS security 
scholars have begun to consider intrinsic motivation as another predictor of IS security policy 
compliance. Despite the contribution of intrinsic motivation to IS security compliance behaviors, 
relatively little research has been conducted within this paradigm (Herath and Rao, 2009a; 
Padayachee, 2012), and there is a lack of theoretically driven approaches. Preston (1991) 
specifically called upon information systems researchers to investigate the underlying 
assumptions and theoretical constructs that shape their understanding. Thus, the objective of this 
study is to develop a comprehensive model of intrinsic motivation and empirically test the role of 
psychological empowerment (i.e., intrinsic motivation model) in mediating the relations between 
structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance intentions. This study adopts 
Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model. 
This chapter is organized into four sections. Section 3.2 describes how intrinsic 
motivation theory can be applied in the context of IS security. Section 3.3 presents the 
development of hypotheses. It is divided into three subsections: influences of psychological 
empowerment on IS security policy compliance, drivers for psychological empowerment, and 
psychological empowerment as mediator. Section 3.4 provides the conclusions of this chapter.  
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3.2 Linking intrinsic motivation theory and IS security policy compliance 
Thomas and Velthouse (1990) posited that “intrinsic motivation involves positively 
valued experiences that the individual derives directly from the task” (p. 688). From the previous 
chapter, Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) theory proposes that intrinsic motivation is a cognitive 
assessment of four components of empowerment derived from a specific task: feelings of 
competence, meaningfulness, impact, and choice of the task. Competence has been defined as 
the belief in one’s capability to perform the task activities skillfully and successfully. For 
example, individuals with the proper skills in an organization may feel confident about some 
portion of the IS security task they choose to work on. Cognitive assessment of meaning relates 
to an individual’s belief regarding the value of the task in relation to one’s personal beliefs, 
specifically attitudes and values. In the context of this study, individuals in an organization may 
identify with protective values and regard their performing IS security-related tasks as 
meaningful. Impact refers to the belief that one can make a significant difference or contribute to 
the organization in accomplishing the goal of the task. For instance, individuals in an 
organization should consider if their IS security actions produce intended effects, such as a 
reduction in the IS security breaches. Choice refers to a sense of freedom or autonomy to select 
tasks that makes sense and perform in ways that seem appropriate, and being personally 
responsible for the results. In the context of IS security, individuals may decide how they want to 
carry out a given IS security task.  
Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) model of intrinsic motivation is grounded on the thesis 
that individuals’ assessment of four dimensions of empowerment exerts influence on that 
individuals’ feeling towards performing the task well (see also Oldham and Hackman, 1980; 
Deci and Ryan, 1985). Prior studies have examined the direct effects of competence, meaning, 
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impact, and choice of a task on individuals’ performance-related outcomes in organizational 
contexts (e.g., Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et al., 2000), as discussed in 
previous chapter.  
An assessment of positive feelings of competence, meaning, impact and choice of a task, 
should motivate individuals to initiate actions. Although these feelings are innate to individuals 
and derived from a specific task, these feelings must be enhanced by external factors (Thomas 
and Velthouse, 1990; Ryan and Deci, 2000). One way an organization can stimulate these 
feelings is the provision of structural empowerment. Structural empowerment refers to practices 
that allow individuals to enhance their knowledge and skills through training and education 
related to the task, access to information about strategy and goal, and participate in decision-
making related to the task (Seibert et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2009; Logan and Ganster, 2007). 
Educational efforts influence psychological empowerment in terms of increasing individual’s 
belief in his/her capability to perform a specific task skillfully (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; 
Spreitzer, 2007). Decision making responsibility related to a task can enhance one’s perception 
of meaningful, autonomy, and impact of the task (Spreitzer, 1996; Hon and Rensvold, 2006; 
Logan and Ganster, 2007; Seibert et al., 2011). Furthermore, access to information about the 
strategy and goals has been found to be associated with feelings of competence and 
meaningfulness of the job (Spreitzer, 1996; Liao et al., 2009).  
The notion of individuals’ feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and choice of a task 
can be extended to IS security context for two reasons. First, tasks in IS security are similar to 
job tasks in organizations, with activities and goals (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). IS security 
tasks are defined as activities that protect the organisation’s information with the goals of 
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information (Loch et al., 1992). 
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These activities include the appropriate use of computer hardware and software, the appropriate 
selection of a password, the using and updating of anti-virus software, backing up of data, 
appropriate use of e-mail and the internet, checking for encryptions, not sharing the computer 
with others, etc. (Stanton et al., 2005; Albrechtsen, 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Herath and Rao, 2009a). 
These IS security tasks to protect the information resources of a firm and  are typically described 
in IS security policies, which is part of the formal control structure in an organization (Dhillon, 
1997; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Second, similar to other job tasks (e.g., payroll, teaching students, 
serving customers, and so on) IS security tasks are important to organizations. In order for 
employees to create value for their organization, they must complete these IS security tasks. For 
instance, employees that create a strong password help to protect their organization from security 
threats and vulnerabilities. It is through exerting effort and performing IS security tasks (e.g., 
complying with the IS security policy) that employees contribute to the organization and other 
stakeholders.  
3.3 The Research Model and Hypotheses  
 This section is divided into 3 subsections. The first subsection describes psychological 
empowerment in the context of IS security and how it influences the intention to comply with an 
IS security policy. The second subsection identifies the drivers that enhance the psychological 
empowerment of employees. The third section explains the mediating role of psychological 
empowerment between structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance.  
Influences of psychological empowerment on IS security policy compliance intentions   
Extending Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model to the IS security 
context, this study contends that psychological empowerment, which is conceptualized as 
individuals’ belief regarding their ability to carry out the IS security tasks, individuals’ feelings 
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of meaningfulness of the IS security tasks, individuals’ feelings of impact of their IS security 
actions, and the freedom individuals’ feel in executing the IS security tasks, may help explain 
individuals’ intention to execute and perform IS security efforts (i.e., compliance with IS security 
policy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, this study seeks to investigate how individuals’ psychological empowerment 
can be enhanced through structural empowerment. Figure 3.1 illustrates the research framework. 
It is proposed that employees’ innate feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and choice 
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H10 – Competence mediates the relation between SETA and IS security policy compliance 
H11 – Meaning mediates the relation between Access and IS security policy compliance 
H12a – Meaning mediates the relation between Participation and IS security policy compliance 
H12b – Impact mediates the relation between Participation and IS security policy compliance 
H12c – Choice mediates the relation between Participation and IS security policy compliance 
Figure 0.1: Proposed Research Framework 
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derived from the IS security tasks influence their intention to comply with the IS security policy. 
Although these feelings are innate to individuals, they might be enhanced by structural 
empowerment, through the three following mechanisms: (a) IS security education, training and 
awareness (SETA), (b) access to IS security strategy and goals, and (c) participation in IS 
security decision-making. Each of the constructs and its relations are discussed in the following 
sections. 
IS security policy compliance intention can be defined as individuals’ intention to 
perform or execute the IS security tasks in order to protect information and technology resources 
from potential security breaches (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). That is, individuals intent on 
strengthening their IS security efforts by investing their time and energy to execute the IS 
security tasks. Based on the theory of planned behavior (TBP), behavioral intention is a strong 
indicator of an individual’s readiness to perform the actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, in this 
research individuals’ intentions to comply with the IS security policy is the dependent variable.  
Competence and IS security policy compliance intention 
Perceived competence refers to one’s ability to perform a task (Bandura, 1977). When 
individuals perceive that there have the competence and skills regarding a specific task, they will 
engage and regulate their efforts in the task activities (Bandura, 1977). Further, the intrinsic 
motivation theory purports that individuals are likely to put more effort and energy towards 
completion of a task when they feel they are performing the task well (Thomas and Velthouse, 
1990).  
There is extensive research linking competence or self-efficacy on task-related behaviors 
and actual performance (e.g., Stajkovic and Luthans, 1996; Hsu and Chiu, 2004; Ke and Zhang, 
2011). In a meta-analysis, Stajkovic and Luthans (1996) assessed the impact of competence on 
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task performance. Task performance was measured by the required acts necessary to perform the 
task and the product of the task. The meta-analysis of 114 studies concluded that the relations 
between competence and task performance was significant (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1996). 
Perceived competence may also provide motivation for employees to engage in IT usage (Hsu 
and Chiu, 2004; Ke and Zhang, 2011). A study conducted by Hsu and Chiu (2004) showed a 
significant positive relations between users’ confidence in their skills of service on service usage. 
Further, Ke and Zhang (2011), reported that perceived competence in an open source software 
(OSS) task was found to be a significant predictor of OSS project participation. These findings 
suggest that an individual who has confidence in the capability to undertake a task is more likely 
to take the required associated actions.  
With regards to IS security policy compliance, employees who have confidence in their 
ability to carry out IS security tasks as prescribed in the IS security policy are more likely to have 
positive feeling towards the IS security tasks. In return, the positive feeling increases their 
motivation to take acts necessary to perform the IS security tasks. Some empirical studies have 
examined the influences of perceived competence on IS security behaviors (e.g., Chan et al., 
2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath and Rao, 2009b; Rhee et al., 2009). For instance, Chan et al. 
(2005) found that employees’ belief in their efficacy in IS security influences their decision to 
perform IS security related activities, particularly those prescribed under an organizational IS 
policy. More recently, Rhee et al. (2009) demonstrated that self-efficacy in IS security influences 
individuals’ intention to strengthen their security efforts, use security protection software, and 
other security compliance behaviors.  
Consistent with self-efficacy theory, intrinsic motivation theory, and the findings of Chan 
et al. (2005), Workman et al. (2008), Herath and Rao (2009b), and Rhee et al. (2009), it is 
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expected that perceived competence of IS security tasks will encourage IS security task 
performance in the form of IS security policy compliance. That is, employees do not approach IS 
security tasks devoid of any presumptions about thier ability to successfully perform the tasks. 
This prediction is formally recognized in the following hypothesis:  
H1: Perceived competence in IS security tasks positively affects one’s intention to comply 
with the requirements of the IS security policy 
 
Meaning and IS security policy compliance intention 
Meaning refers to judgments of the value of a task goal or purpose in relation to an 
individual’s own ideals and standards (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Theory suggests that 
individuals are more likely to engage, do well and exert energy into a task if the task activities 
are meaningful, serve an important purpose, and are in accordance with their own values and 
goals (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Individuals who believe that an assigned task is 
meaningful are more likely to be motivated to invest their resources to accomplish the goal of the 
task because by doing so, their goals are met.  
Research has provided evidence that meaning is associated with numerous work-related 
benefits, such as courtesy behavior, higher commitment to work, engagement at work, and work 
performance (e.g., Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2005; Wang and Lee, 2009; May et al., 
2004). For example, Wat and Shaffer (2005) found that the perceived meaningfulness of a job 
was a significant predictor of courtesy behaviors, which refer to actions taken to prevent problem 
with other employees. This suggests that individuals who perceive that their job is meaningful 
are motivated to engage in behavior that helps organization from work-related problems from 
occurring, due to their commitment to the goals (Wat and Shaffer, 2005). Further feelings of 
meaningfulness of a given work activity have been positively linked to employee engagement in 
the associated work activities (May et al., 2004). A study by Wang and Lee (2009) found an 
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increased propensity to commit to work when said work was perceived as personally meaningful. 
Employees who believe that the work activities are personally meaningful were willing to invest 
themselves more fully in the associated activities.  
Regarding IS security policy compliance, employees who perceive that IS security tasks 
as prescribed in the IS security policy are meaningful, are more likely to engage and perform the 
tasks. For example, good or poor performance of IS security literally mean the difference 
between survival and death for the organization (i.e., IS security breach may result in significant 
loss, both monetary and nonmonetary, to the organization). If employees care about the survival 
of their organization, they are likely to rate IS security tasks as highly meaningful to them, which 
should increase intrinsic motivation to act in accordance with IS security policy. This indicates 
that individuals who believe that IS security tasks serve a purpose, typically to help the 
organization from IS security-related problems, which is incongruous with their value, are more 
willing to exert effort into the task. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Perceived meaningfulness of IS tasks positively affects one’s intention to comply with 
the requirements of the IS security policy. 
 
Impact and IS security policy compliance intention 
Impact refers to the belief that one’s behavior or act to perform a task can make a 
significant difference or contribute to an organization, especially in terms of accomplishing the 
purpose of the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Per stewardship theory, it is expected that 
individuals may be motivated to take action for collective benefits, such as for the well-being of 
the organization, co-workers, and the communities in which they operate (Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Such individuals engage in activities that are beneficial to others 
because they believe that their actions will be able to influence and improve the organizational 
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outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Herath and Rao, 2009a). Thus, there may also be intrinsic 
motivation factors (i.e., perceived impact) to arrive at an outcome that benefits others. 
Prior data provide evidence of the relations between perceived impact of acts to perform 
a task and engagement as well as performing well with the task (e.g., Spreitzer et al., 1997; 
Kraimer et al., 1999; Wang and Lee, 2009; Liao et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009; Agarwal and 
Anderson, 2010). For example, Spreitzer et al. (1997) found that perceived impact significantly 
related to work effectiveness, which is the degree to which individuals fulfill or exceed work 
expectation. Furthermore, an empirical investigation by Kraimer et al. (1999) in the hospital 
setting found that nurses’ belief in the impact of their job tasks influences their commitment to 
the organization. Commitment refers to a strength of one’s involvement with a a particular 
organization (Porter et al., 1974). These results indicate that individuals are willing to engage 
and work hard in their job when they believe that their actions provide significant influence to 
organizational outcomes.  
In the IS security context, few researchers have considered a concept similar to perceived 
impact (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Anderson and Agarwal, 2010). Herath and Rao (2009a) 
considered perceived effectiveness as the belief of individuals that their IS security action can 
make a difference and have impact on the overall organizational IS security goal. Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) considered perceived citizen efficacy as an individual’s belief that one’s actions 
can make a difference in securing the Internet. Taken together, these studies concluded that the 
relation between perceived impact and IS security behavior and intention to comply with 
organizational IS security policy was significant. This suggests that individuals with a strong 
belief that they can engage in IS security actions and behaviors that contribute to the betterment 
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of others (e.g., organization, society) are more likely to undertake the prescribed and required IS 
security actions or behaviors.  
Consistent with the intrinsic motivation theory, stewardship theory, and the empirical 
evidence, it is predicted that if employees believe that the IS security actions can have an impact 
and influence on the organization IS security goals, they are motivated to carry out IS security 
tasks in the form of the required IS security policy compliance behaviors. For example, if 
employees believe that by creating a strong password, they will contribute to the IS security 
goals, such as ensuring confidentiality of the information, they try hard to undertake the 
password protection task (i.e. complying with password policy). Thus, it can be hypothesized 
that: 
H3: Perceived impact of IS security tasks positively affects one’s intention to comply with 
the requirements of the IS security policies.  
 
Choice and IS security policy compliance intention 
Perceived choice refers to individual’ assessment of freedom or experience of self-
determination in their actions of a specific task (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 
1990). According to  intrinsic motivation theory, when individuals experience a high degree of 
choice regarding a task, they are aware that their views and insights related to the task matter 
(Thomas, 2009). As a result, such individuals will feel a strong sense of ownership of the task 
and feel a personal responsibility towards the outcomes of their decisions, and, thus, be more 
likely to put more effort towards accomplishing the goals of the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 
1990). Similarly, self-determination theory (SDT) holds that individuals have a psychological 
need for self-determination. This need motivates individual to engage and accomplish tasks that 
may provide them with a sense of self-determination (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 
2000).  
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Kraimer et al. (1999) defined self-determination at work as relating to an individual’s 
identification with and involvement in a particular organization. Kraimer et al. (1999) found that 
individuals who experience a sense of self-determination with their job were more committed to 
the organization, by means of more involvement with the job. Similarly, Logan and Ganster 
(2007) reported that self-determination of task significantly related to improved performance of 
the task. Performance was measured by a composite of the frequency of accidents, breakdowns, 
and maintenance expenses related to the task. This indicates that employees who experience a 
high degree of discretion in carrying out their task feel a personal responsibility towards the 
outcomes of the task. Consequently, they put more effort to improve the performance of the task.  
In the IS literature, perceived choice has also been shown to have a significant impact on 
open source software (OSS) projects (Ke and Zhang, 2011). The authors recorded that 
individuals with a sense of autonomy in tasks related to an OSS project are more likely to expend 
high levels of effort on the project tasks. In the context of IS security policy compliance in 
organizations, if employees believe that their views and insights related to IS security task matter 
and are the responsible decision makers that regulate their own IS security tasks, they are more 
likely to carry out the prescribed IS security behaviors. Thus, perceived choice would translate 
into accomplished IS security tasks by means of the effort expended on the required tasks. 
Taking into account the above supporting evidence, it is hypothesized that: 
H4: Perceived choice of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with 
the requirements of the IS security policies 
As a conclusion thus far, it is predicted that an intrinsically motivated employee 
anticipates complying with the requirements of the IS security policy when he/she assesses the 
intrinsic value experience (rewards) in term of feelings of competence, meaningfulness, impact, 
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and choice, through the IS security task itself. Table 0.1 summarizes the four constructs of 
psychological empowerment of IS security task and IS security policy compliance intentions. 
 
 
 
Table 0.1: Summary of constructs 
Construct Definition Sources 
Sense of Competence An employee’s assessment of personal skills, knowledge, 
or competency about the IS security task. 
Deci and Ryan (1985); 
Thomas and Velthouse 
(1990) 
Sense of 
Meaning  
An employee’s assessment on how the goal or value of 
the IS security task is significant to their own value.  
Hackman and Oldham 
(1980); Thomas and 
Velthouse (1990) 
 
Sense of Impact  An employee’s assessment on how the IS security task 
can make a significant difference to the organization in 
terms of accomplishing the goal of the IS security. 
Hackman and Oldham 
(1980); Thomas and 
Velthouse (1990) 
Sense of Choice 
(Autonomy) 
An employee’s assessment of freedom or experience self-
determination in the IS security task. 
Hackman and Oldham 
(1980); Deci and Ryan 
(1985); Thomas and 
Velthouse (1990) 
 
Intention to comply 
with IS security 
policy 
An employee’s intention to execute the IS security task in 
order to protect the information and technology resources 
of the organization from potential security breaches. 
Bulgurcu et al. (2009) 
 
Drivers to enhance the psychological empowerment  
As previously hypothesized, an employee’s perception of intrinsic motivation, 
operationalized in terms of the four dimensions of psychological empowerment—sense of 
competence, meaning, impact, and choice of IS security tasks—are antecedents of one’s IS 
security policy compliance intention. This study also investigates how an employee forms these 
perceptions. Theory and literature have acknowledged that perceptions of psychological 
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empowerment may be influenced by factors external to individuals (Hackman and Oldham, 
1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985: Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer, 1995a). Furthermore, 
Maynard et al. (2012) urged researchers to determine potential factors that may serve as 
antecedents to certain dimensions (and not to others) of psychological empowerment. Based on 
Kanter’s (1977) work on structural empowerment, three factors were investigated (a) security 
education, training and awareness (SETA) programs, (b) access to information about the strategy 
and goals of organizational IS security, and (c) participation in IS security decision-making. The 
following section explains how these factors enhance one’s intrinsic motivation.  
Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) and psychological empowerment 
Intrinsic motivation theory purports that educational efforts contribute to individuals’ 
intrinsic motivation in terms of increasing their belief in their capability to perform task activities 
skillfully (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 2007). Further, Bandura (1997) 
proposed that self-efficacy beliefs are developed through “enactive mastery experiences that 
serve as indicators of capability; vicarious experiences that alter efficacy beliefs through 
transmission of competencies and comparisons with the attainments of others; verbal persuasion 
and other types of social influence that one possesses certain capabilities; and physiological and 
affective states from which people judge their capableness, strength, and vulnerability to 
dysfunction” (p. 79). Accordingly, Agarwal et al. (2000) stated that training provides 
opportunities for enactive mastery through the hands-on experience of a task, vicarious 
experience by watching others perform a task, verbal persuasion through feedback on one’s 
performance, and psychological and affective states induced by the interaction with a task, such 
as stress and anxiety.  
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There is extensive prior research linking training and education, and competence or self-
efficacy (e.g., Gist et al., 1989; Agarwal et al., 2000; Liao et al., 2009). In a meta-analysis study, 
Seibert et al. (2011) examined the impact of training on perceived competence. The authors 
concluded that employees’ feelings of competence in work roles were reflected by enhanced 
knowledge, skills, and abilities resulting from the training programs. Extensive training may also 
enhance employees’ confidence in their competence in service tasks (Liao et al., 2009). In an 
experiment with 108 managers and administrators in a university, Gist et al. (1989) found a 
significant positive relations between training of computer and software, and computer and 
software self-efficacy. Further, Karsten and Roth (1998) reported that training experience is 
associated with student perceptions of their ability to use computers effectively. These findings 
suggest that within a training environment, individuals are progressively provided with greater 
opportunity for learning, experience, and practice with a particular task, computer or software, 
and over time, develop self-efficacy regarding the task, computer or software. 
In the IS security context, security, education, training and awareness (SETA) programs 
focus on providing users with general knowledge of IS security environment, along with the 
skills necessary to perform the required IS security tasks (Whitman et al., 2001; Lee and Lee, 
2002; c.f. D’Arcy et al., 2009). The content and scope of the SETA program may vary. For 
example, SETA programs could include information on day-to-day physical security issues, the 
certainty and severity of penalties, the range of technical and managerial controls to cope with 
systems risks, and how this information can be used to take actions (Straub and Welke, 1998; 
Furnell et al., 2002). From a different perspective, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) suggested 
that IS security training should consider the individuals’ past knowledge of IS security policy 
compliance. Irrespective of the specific content of these programs, the main reason for SETA 
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programs is to review the IS security policies and educate employees on how best to protect 
organizational information systems (Straub and Welke, 1998, Harris, 2010). This can take the 
form of various efforts, including reviewing media reports of recent security attacks on other 
companies and discussing how those companies could have avoided the attacks, showing a 
security video, a combination of courses, seminars, handouts, directives, reminders, and 
newsletters (Murray, 1991; Mitnick, 2002).  
Three out of the four sources of information that are considered essential to self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1977) will be able to obtain from a SETA program. For example, individuals gather 
personal mastery of IS security via hands-on exercises and activities of IS security or regular 
demonstration of IS security issues and respective countermeasures. Further, SETA provides 
opportunities to observe the successes and failures of other IS security behaviors. Consequently, 
this information provides a guideline to employees against which they compare their own self-
efficacy (Gist et al., 1989). In addition, verbal persuasion is regularly delivered in a SETA 
program. Individuals receive suggestions from instructors that encourage and support their IS 
security skills and foster a responsible development. Thus, it is expected that self-efficacy in IS 
security may be developed through the ongoing acquisition of knowledge related to IS security, 
such as knowledge about  IS security issues, the consequences, the controls to cope with the 
issues, and how to take action when such issues  occur through  SETA. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: SETA programs are positively associated with one’s perception of competence of IS 
security tasks 
 
Access to organizational IS security strategy and goals and psychological empowerment 
Hoffman (1994), in the context of emerging information technology (IT), stated that, “to 
support worker empowerment throughout our enterprise we will be prepared to provide every 
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worker with all information relevant to that worker’s job regardless of its effect on the company 
as a whole” (Hoffman, 1994, p. 55). Information might include data about a firm’s strategy and 
goals (Lawler, 1992; Spreitzer, 1996). Liao et al. (2009) asserted that an employee’s experiences 
of a HPWS, including information sharing, might assist an employee in perceiving the service 
tasks as meaningful and important. Information about a strategy or operational goals allows 
employees to see their work as personally meaningful because they understand how it fits into 
their organization’s goals and strategies (Seibert et al., 2011). In other words, access to 
information about strategy and goals allows an individual to see the “big picture” and hence 
creates and understanding on how one’s work can contribute to organizational goals (Bowen and 
Lawler, 1992). The broader research into the effect of access to information regarding 
organizational strategy and goals supports this view as well. For instance, Spreitzer (1996) 
showed that providing access to information about the strategy and goals of an organization 
enhances employee knowledge about the direction of the organization. As a result, employees 
felf confident in how their work roles can contribute to these goals. In support of this, a meta-
analysis by Seibert et al. (2011) concluded that there was a significant relation between HPWS, 
including sharing of information about organizational strategy and goals and the four dimensions 
of psychological empowerment.  
Accordingly, in the context of this study, access to an organization’s IS security strategy 
and goals denotes the extent to which the work structure provides opportunities for employees to 
obtain and understand the organization’s IS security strategic information, objectives, and goals. 
This could be accomplished by communicating a IS security policy that consists of the goals 
regarding IS security (Straub, 1990; Boss et al., 2009). Access to information regarding an IS 
security strategy and goals should allow individuals to feel informed about where an 
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organization is headed in the context of IS security. When employees understand the direction in 
which the organization is heading, they tend to be more aware about how their own IS security 
tasks contribute to achieving the stated IS security goals. That is, employees acquire a greater 
sense that the IS security task is meaningful to be executed because they know that their IS 
security task is supporting the IS security goals and benefit the organization. Thus, access to an 
organization’s IS security strategy and it’s associated goals is expected to correlate with 
perceived meaning. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6: Access to the organizational IS security strategy and goals is positively associated 
with one’s perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.  
Participation in IS security decision-making and psychological empowerment 
Participation in decision-making refers to the act of sharing decision-making with others 
to achieve organizational goals (Knoop, 1995). Thus, participation in decision-making indicates 
that employees at all levels are able to provide input and influence over decisions related to a 
specific task or job (Cotton et al., 1988). In the context of IS security, participation relates to an 
individual’s involvement in the IS security decision-making process. Spears and Barki (2010) 
defined participation in security risk management (SRM) as a set of activities assigned to 
individuals during risk assessment, design, and implementation of IS security controls. SRM 
comprises of strategies, policies, roles, and procedures to manage the security risks (Spears and 
Barki, 2010). Participation in IS security decision-making should allow individuals to contribute 
their inputs and thoughts pertinent to the IS security in order to achieve the organizational IS 
security goals. Fostering participation in decision-making in turn strengthens the motivation of 
employees to engage in IS security-related behaviors  by providing them with the opportunity to 
attain intrinsic rewards from their work, including a greater experience of self-determination, 
  
64 
 
 
meaningfulness, and impact (Scandura et al., 1986; Manz and Sims Jr, 1987; Lawler, 1992; 
Spreitzer, 1996).  
When employees are involved in decision-making processes related to IS security tasks, 
they have the opportunity to contribute their inputs, such as ideas and thoughts, to accomplish 
the goals of the IS security policy. Thus, participation allows employees to feel that they have the 
opportunity for freedom and independence for IS security task-related decisions. Participation is 
an influential source of self-determination because it provides evidence that ones’ inputs, 
thoughts, contribution, and activities related to their job matter (Lawler, 1992; Spreitzer, 1996). 
In a case study setting in IS security, Dhillon et al. (2004) found that most employees in an 
organization did not feel a sense of freedom because they were left out from all major decision-
making and had no say on the latest developments related to IS security in the organization.  
In addition, greater participation might be the impetus to enhance individuals’ feeling of 
impact (Seibert et al., 2011). When employees participate in the decision-making process related 
to their IS security task, they have the opportunity to set decisions jointly with the superiors. This 
likely influences the extent to which employees feel that they can impact their work 
environment. Spreitzer (1996) provided empirical evidence of the relations between participation 
in decision-making and perceived impact. The study concluded that participation signals to the 
employees that they are an important asset of the organization and that they can impact, or make 
a significant difference to the organization (Spreitzer, 1996). Further, when employees are 
allowed to participate in the decision-making process related to their IS security task, they have 
the opportunity to provide input that is consistent with their own values or needs. That is, the IS 
security task is shaped by their own values and needs. Because of this, they are more likely to 
perceive that the IS security tasks are meaningful and important. Hon and Rensvold (2006) has 
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provided evidence showing that participation was strongly related to perceived meaning of a 
task. Collectively, it is thus expected that if employees involved in decision-making processes 
related to the IS security tasks, they have opportunities to contribute their input to accomplish the 
IS security objectives and affect the work environment. Consequently, their perceptions of 
meaning, impact, and choice of the IS security tasks should be higher. This predicted effect is 
formally recognized in the following hypotheses: 
H7: Participation in IS security decision-making is positively associated with perceived 
meaning of IS security tasks. 
H8: Participation in IS security decision-making is positively associated with perceived 
impact of IS security tasks. 
H9: Participation in IS security decision-making is positively associated with perceived 
choice of IS security tasks. 
Mediating effect of dimensions of psychological empowerment 
 The above nine hypotheses combine to form a mediation model. It signifies that the 
psychological empowerment dimensions (i.e., feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and 
choice) mediate the relations between the structural empowerment facets (i.e., SETA, access to 
IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making) and the intention 
to comply with organizational IS security policy.  
 In the context of this study, psychological empowerment reflects how individuals feel 
about their self-determination over their IS security task-related decisions, their IS security task 
competence, and their sense of meaning and impact of the IS security tasks. Based on the 
previously presented arguments, it is expected that psychological empowerment is influenced by 
organizational practices that provide opportunities to nurture self-efficacy through IS security 
training, get involved in IS security decision-making processes, and access information about the 
IS security strategy and it’s goals. In return, the increased feelings of empowerment that 
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individuals receive motivate them to perform well with the IS security tasks, measured by their 
IS security policy compliance intentions.  
Prior studies provide evidence that elements of structural empowerment are associated 
with psychological empowerment, which in turn are related to work related performance 
(Spreitzer, 2007). For instance, training influences employees’ task performance by empowering 
them to feel competent (Gist and Mitchell, 1992; Seibert et al., 2011). Thus, it is expected that 
employees develop a sense that their capability to perform IS security-related tasks that increases 
their IS security task performance as a consequence of SETA programs. Further, access to 
information can affect task performance through psychological empowerment by giving 
employees the perception that their work tasks are meaningful (Spreitzer, 1996). In the context of 
this study, it is predicted that access to IS security strategy and its goals influences employee IS 
security task performance by empowering employees to feel how their IS security tasks would 
contribute to achieving the IS security goals. Meta-analytic research has provided evidence that 
participation in decision-making can motivate employees to perform well through psychological 
empowerment by giving employees the perception that they have a choice and have an impact in 
their work (Seibert et al., 2011). Thus, employees feel that the IS security task is self-determined, 
has meaning, and is impactful when they are involved in the IS security task decision-making 
process. Consequently, their intention to comply and engage in IS security tasks should increase. 
Taken together, different dimensions of psychological empowerment may mediate the relations 
between structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance intentions. 
H10: Perceived competence mediates the relations between SETA and one’s intention to 
comply with the IS security policy.  
H11: Perceived meaning mediates the relations between access to information regarding 
IS security strategy and goals, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy. 
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H12a: Perceived meaning mediates the relations between participation in IS security 
decision-making, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy.  
H12b: Perceived impact mediates the relations between participation in IS security 
decision-making, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy.  
H12c: Perceived choice mediates the relations between participation in IS security 
decision-making, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter started by explaining how the theory of intrinsic motivation can be applied 
to explain IS security policy compliance behavior. Following this discussion, a conceptual 
framework and specific hypotheses were developed based on Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) 
intrinsic motivation theory and Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment theory. Table 0.2 
summarizes the hypotheses. The proposed conceptual framework will be tested in Chapter 5 
using the data gathered in this study. 
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Table 0.2: Summary of Proposed Hypotheses 
 
  
Hypotheses Description 
H1 Perceived competence of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with the 
IS security policies.
H2 Perceived meaningfulness of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with  
the IS security policies.
H3 Perceived impact of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with the IS 
security policies.
H4 Perceived choice of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with the IS 
security policies.
H5 SETA programs are positively associated with one’s perceived competence of IS security task.
H6 Access to the organizational IS security strategy and goals is positively associated with one’s 
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
H7 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s perceived 
meaningfulness of IS security task.
H8 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s perceived 
impact of IS security task.
H9 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s perceived 
freedom of IS security task.
H10 The effect of SETA on one’s intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by 
perceived competence of IS security task.
H11 The effect of access to IS security strategy and goals on one’s intention to comply with IS 
security policies is mediated by perceived competence and meaningfulness of IS security task.
H12a The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s intention to comply with IS 
security policies is mediated by perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
H12b The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s intention to comply with IS 
security policies is mediated by perceived impact of IS security task.
H12c The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s intention to comply with IS 
security policies is mediated by perceived choice of IS security task.
H13 The interaction of access to IS security strategy and goals and participation in IS security 
decision-making is related to perceived meaningfulness of IS security task. 
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has identified the theoretical background of this research and 
subsequently developed the research framework (see Figure 3.1). The proposed research 
framework has been designed to explore the relations among structural empowerment facets, 
psychological empowerment dimensions, and IS security policy compliance intentions. This 
chapter describes the methodology used to assess the proposed relations. The remainder of this 
section presents the research population and sample, the data collection procedures, the 
measures, and the data analysis approach. 
4.2 Research population and sample  
As the primary thrust of this study is to investigate the relations between individuals’ 
perception of psychological empowerment related to IS security tasks and IS security policy 
compliance intention at the workplace, employees in different jobs and levels were thought to be 
appropriate as the target population. The unit of analysis is individual and the convenience-
sampling technique was used as the sampling strategy. The convenience sampling is a sampling 
procedure to obtain people who are easily available (Zikmund, 2000). Specifically, the 
respondents in this study were MBA, Executive MBA, and Executive MIS students enrolled in 
two public universities in the US. The rationale of selecting students in the US as a sample are 
because the researcher herself is a student in the US, which has enabled easy access to the data 
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sources; and to obtain a larger number of completed questionnaires quickly and economically 
(Zikmund, 2000). The limitations of using a student sample is discussed later in chapter 7.  
Hair et al. (2010) recommended a sample size in the range of 100 to 400 as appropriate to 
run data using structural equation modeling (SEM). Other researchers have claimed that a sample 
size of 300 is enough (e.g., Comrey and Lee, 1992; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). This, however, 
is subject to other considerations such as the number of constructs and items (Hair et al., 2010). 
Nunnally (1978) suggested that in SEM estimation, a good rule is to have at least ten times as 
many subjects as variables. In MIS research that used SEM, the rule of thumb of 10 cases per 
indicator in setting a lower bound of sample size was widely used (Westland, 2010). Therefore, 
this study has attempted to yield approximately 250 or above usable samples in order to satisfy 
the statistical recommendations of 10 cases per indicator, based on twenty-five items in the 
questionnaire.  
4.3 Data collection procedures 
This study is a cross-sectional study because the data was collected at a single point in 
time. The data were collected using a self-administered survey, where the researcher 
administered the questionnaires in classes or sent through e-mail to graduate students. Zikmund 
(2003) stated that self-administered questionnaires could be widely distributed to a large number 
of respondents with minimal cost compared to other types of data collection. Another strength of 
this method is that respondent confidentiality and anonymity can be assured (Davis, 2000).  
The instructors for the MBA, the Executive MBA, and the Executive MIS programs were 
contacted to ask for permission to distribute the questionnaire in their classes. Once permission 
was granted, the researcher attended the classes and explained to the students the purpose of the 
study. Then, the questionnaire and a cover letter explaining the purpose of the study, the 
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information about voluntariness, confidentiality, and anonymity were distributed. With the help 
of the instructors, the questionnaires were collected after class. In addition, the students were 
able to submit the completed questionnaires in a box at the graduate student office. Some 
instructors allocated 20 to 30 minutes of the class time for the students to immediately answer 
the questionnaires. This helped to increase the response rate. 
For some classes, a web survey was distributed to students by e-mail sent directly by the 
instructors. The web survey was prepared using the Google doc survey tool. The e-mail stated 
the purpose of the study and asked students to complete the survey. The students were able to 
access the survey through clicking the survey site URL (hyperlink) embedded within the e-mail. 
In both methods (paper and pencil and electronic), respondents were required to answer a set of 
exclusion criteria questions to determine whether a person should participate in a research study 
or whether he/she should be excluded in a systematic review. The exclusion questions were: (1) 
How long you have been working with the current organization; (2) Is your organization has IS 
security policy; and (3) Do you aware of the requirements of the IS security policy? This criteria 
help to identify suitable participants that are currently employed and have knowledge about their 
organization’s IS security policy. 
Overall, 410 surveys (paper and pencil and electronic) were distributed to the participants 
and 326 complete responses were returned within five months. The final response rate for the 
survey data collection was 79.5%. Detailed response profiles are reported in Chapter 5, in 
addition to an evaluation of missing data, an assessment of normality, an examination of outliers, 
and an assessment of common method variance.  
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4.4 Measurement of constructs 
Reliability is a test of the consistency and repeatability of the items to measure a 
construct (Zikmund, 2003). One of the common methods to assess the reliability of a measure is 
an average of split-half correlation (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha, α) with a cut-off value of .7 
(Zikmund, 2003). The following section defines and describes the measures to assess the 
constructs in the proposed research framework. All measures were adapted from previously 
validated studies. All the questionnaire items were self-assessments and used seven-point Likert-
type scales with anchors ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
IS security policy compliance intentions. IS security policy compliance intentions refer 
to the extent to which employees intend to perform the IS security tasks in order to protect the 
information and technology resources of the organization from potential security breaches. The 
compliant behaviors do not imply that one security behavior is better than the other, but 
involvement in one or more behaviors can help mitigate security breaches, thus improving 
organizational IS security performance. Three items were used from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) to 
measure IS security policy compliance intentions. For instance, respondents were asked how 
much do they agree or disagree with statements, such as “I intend to comply with the 
requirements of the IS security policy of my organization,” “I intend to protect information and 
technology resources according to the requirements of the IS security policy of my 
organization,” and “I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the IS security policy 
of my organization when I use information and technology.” Likert-type scale with response 
options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The measure had an acceptable 
level of internal consistency (α = .75). 
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Psychological empowerment. In order to assess the appropriateness of using the 
individual dimensions of psychological empowerment instead of a single, global psychological 
empowerment construct, consistent with previous research, CFAs was used. These CFAs shown 
that the hypothesized four-factor model (χ2 = 91.45 with df = 48; RMSEA=.056; SRMR = .047; 
CFI = .98; NFI = .96) fit the data better than a model with one construct (χ2 = 111.85 with df = 
50; RMSEA=.066; SRMR = .075; CFI = .97; NFI = .95). These results are consistent with 
previous research that showed that the four dimensions of psychological empowerment are 
distinct (e.g. Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). Further, a chi-square difference test was 
performed and the result confirms that the models are different (p < .05). Thus, the four 
individual facets of psychological empowerment, feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and 
choice, were used to separately test the hypotheses. 
Competence. This measure captures the employees’ perception regarding their personal 
skills and competence about IS security tasks. Specifically, the items represent the extent to 
which employees feel confidence in their ability to master the skills needed to protect the 
organizational information. Three items were adapted from Spreitzer (1995a) to measure 
perceived competence. Respondents were asked how much do they agree or disagree with 
statements, such as “I am confident about my ability to do my job of securing information and 
information systems” and “I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my job of securing 
information and information systems activities.” Likert-type scale with response options ranged 
from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale has a high level of internal consistency 
reliability (α = .89). 
Meaning. Meaning captures the extent to which employees perceive the value of the IS 
security tasks as significant to their own value. Perceptions of meaning was measured using three 
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items from Spreitzer (1995a). Respondents were asked to specify the degree to which they 
agreed or disagreed with a set of statements using a likert-type scale with response options 
ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. Items included, “My work of securing 
information and information systems is very important to me,” “My work of securing 
information and information systems is personally meaningful to me,” and “My work of securing 
information and information systems is meaningful to me.” The scale had a high level of internal 
consistency reliability (α = .91). 
Impact. Perceived impact is an employee’s assessment on how performing the IS 
security tasks can make a significant difference to the organization in terms of accomplishing the 
goal of IS security. More specifically, this construct captures the extent to which employees feel 
that their action related to IS security affects the organization. Perceived impact from the 
employees’ perspective was measured using three items from Spreitzer (1995a). As an example, 
respondents were asked to what degree to which they agreed or disagreed with “my impact of 
what happens in my department related to IS security is large” and “I have significant influence 
over what happens in my department related to IS security.” Likert-type scale with response 
options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale had a high level of 
internal consistency (α = .90). 
Choice. Perceived choice is an employee’s assessment on how he/she has experience a 
sense of choice in initiating and regulating the IS security tasks. Perceived choice was measured 
from the employee perspective, using three items from Spreitzer (1995a). For instance, 
respondents were asked to specify the degree to which they agree or disagree with a set of 
statements, such as “I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job of securing 
information and information systems” and “I have considerable opportunity for independence 
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and freedom in how I do my job of securing information and information systems.” Likert-type 
scale with response options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale 
had an acceptable level of internal consistency (α = .78). 
Security education, training and awareness (SETA). The SETA measure was created 
to assess the employees’ perceptions regarding the amount of education, training and awareness 
of the IS security breaches and the counter-measures the employees receive from the 
organization. SETA was measured using five items from D’Arcy et al. (2009). Respondents were 
asked to what degree they agree or disagree with various statements, such as “I receive training 
to help me improve my awareness of computer and IS security issues,” “I am briefed on the 
consequences of modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way,” and “I receive an 
education on my computer security responsibilities.” Likert-type scale with response options 
ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale had an acceptable level of 
reliability (α = .88). 
Access to IS security strategy and goals. Three items, adapted from Spreitzer (1995a), 
were used to assess employees’ perceptions of the extent of access they have to strategic 
information related to IS security in the organization. As an illustration, respondents were asked 
to specify the extent to which they agree or disagree with statements, such as “I have access to 
the strategic information I need to do my job of securing information and information systems 
well” and “I understand the IS security strategies and goals of the organization.” Likert-type 
scale with response options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale 
showed an acceptable level of internal consistency (α = .76). 
Participation in IS security decision-making. The scale to assess participation in 
decision-making related to IS security was used to assess employees’ perceptions of their 
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involvement in defining, reviewing or approving IS security control, as well as how well they 
can contribute to the risk management activities in the organization. Two items to measure 
participation were adapted from Spears and Barki (2010). Respondents were asked to specify the 
extent to which they agree or disagree with statements, including “I actively participate in 
defining, reviewing or approving any IS security controls related to protecting the organization’s 
information” and “In managing risk to information and information systems in my company, I 
actively perform, or contribute to decision-making in any risk management activities.” Likert-
type scale with response options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The 
scale had an acceptable level of reliability (α = .78). A summary of the variables investigated in 
this dissertation is included in Table 0.1. 
Common method variance 
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003, p. 879), “method variance refers to the variance that 
is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the construct of interest.” Common 
method variance (CMV), one of the sources of measurement errors, can have serious influences 
on the observed relations between the predictor and outcome variables in organizational and 
behavioral research (Podsakoff et al., 2003). CMV may occur when data is collected by one 
method or at a single point of time. When data is collected in such a way, the variance that the 
items have in common with each other may be due to the collection method, rather than to the 
relations between the items and their respective constructs or the relations among the constructs. 
In order to control for CMV, Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggested two techniques: (1) procedural 
remedies and (2) statistical control.  
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Table 0.1: Measurement items and the source 
 
 
 
Variable Item Source
ISPC1 I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my organization in the future. Bulgurcu et al. (2010)
ISPC2 I intend to protect information and technology resources according to the requirements of 
the ISP of my organization in the future.
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010)
ISPC3 I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I 
use information and technology in the future.
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010)
PACT1 My impact of what happens in my department related to IS security is large. Spreitzer (1995a)
PACT2 I have a great deal of control over what happens in my department related to IS security. Spreitzer (1995a)
PACT3 I have significant influence over what happens in my department related to IS security. Spreitzer (1995a)
COMP1 I am confident about my ability to do my job of securing information and information 
systems.
Spreitzer (1995a)
COMP2 I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my job of securing information and information systems activities. Spreitzer (1995a)
COMP3 I have mastered the skills necessary for my job of securing information and information 
systems.
Spreitzer (1995a)
MEAN1 My work of securing information and information systems is very important to me. Spreitzer (1995a)
MEAN2 My work of securing information and information systems  is personally meaningful to me. Spreitzer (1995a)
MEAN3 My work of securing information and information systems is meaningful to me. Spreitzer (1995a)
CHOI1 I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job of securing information and information systems. Spreitzer (1995a)
CHOI2 I can decide on my own how to go about doing my job of securing information and information systems. Spreitzer (1995a)
CHOI3 I have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom in how I do my job of 
securing information and information systems. Spreitzer (1995a)
SETA1 I receive training to help me improve my awareness of computer and information security issues.
D’Arcy et al. 
(2009)
SETA2 I receive education on computer software copyright laws. D’Arcy et al. (2009)
SETA3 I am briefed on the consequences of modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way. D’Arcy et al. (2009)
SETA4 I receive education on my computer security responsibilities. D’Arcy et al. (2009)
SETA5 I am briefed on the consequences of accessing computer systems that I am not authorized 
to use.
D’Arcy et al. 
(2009)
ACC1 I have access to the strategic information I need to do my job of securing information and information systems well. Spreitzer (1996)
ACC2 I understand top management's IS security vision of the organization. Spreitzer (1996)
ACC3 I understand the IS security strategies and goals of the organization. Spreitzer (1996)
PART1
I actively participate in defining, reviewing or approving any IS security controls related 
to protecting the organization's information (e.g. access control, separation of duties, 
employee training on IS security awareness and etc.)
Spears and Barki 
(2010)
PART2
In managing risk to information and information systems in my company, I actively 
perform, or contribute to decision-making in any risk management activities (e.g. 
documenting business processes or transactions for risk evaluation, ensuring key 
controls exist to mitigate specific types of risks, implementing control and etc.)
Spears and Barki 
(2010)
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Procedural remedies are aiming to minimize or mitigate CMV between predictor and 
criterion variables through the design of the research. First, CMV can be controlled by obtaining 
different sources for independent variable (IV) and dependent variables (DV) (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Therefore, the measures for the DV (IS security policy compliance intentions) and the IVs 
(dimensions of psychological empowerment and structural empowerment) should be collected 
from different sources. However, this option was not practical for this study due to time and 
resource constraints. In addition, it might not be appropriate in this research setting because 
students were used as the respondents. If the data were collected in an actual organizational 
setting, the researcher could have collected information from the employees (IVs) and 
management or supervisors (DV). 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggested a temporal separation in collecting the IV and the DV. 
To do this, a longitudinal study that involves a series of measurement for a period of time should 
be used. However, as this research used a cross-sectional design rather than a longitudinal 
approach, both the IVs and DV were measured at the same point in time, due to time and 
resources constraints. Another reason for the used of a cross-sectional design was to ensure 
anonymity of the respondents. If the collection of IVs and DV are separated, researchers need to 
apply some kind of method to link the data from the different time periods, which can 
compromise the anonymity. Protection of respondents’ anonymity is another method to control 
for common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Anonymity allows respondents to answer 
as honestly as possible. Consequently, they are less likely to respond based on social desirability 
or what the researcher wants. Thus, this study used this technique wherein respondents’ identities 
were not collected. The counterbalancing question order is another method suggested by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to reduce CMV. This technique requires that the items for the same 
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construct are not clustered together. This is to reduce the item-context-induced mood state 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). This technique was used to reduce CMV. To ensure the items were 
grouped back into their specific construct for the data analysis purpose, each item was assigned a 
unique identifier.  
Although a substantial effort has been made during the design stage to reduce CMV using 
two procedural remedies, Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggested that it may be useful to use one of 
the statistical remedies to minimize, if not totally eliminate, the effect of CMV. Researchers use 
many statistical remedies to control for CMV, such as Harman’s single-factor test, partial 
correlation procedures designed to control for method biases, controlling for the effects of a 
single unmeasured latent method factor, and use of multiple-method factors to control method 
variance etc. (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Harman’s single-factor test is one of the most widely used techniques to address the issue 
of CMV (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Conventionally, researchers load all the variables in the study 
into an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and examine the unrotated factor solution to determine 
the number of factors that are necessary to account for the variance in the variables (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). This technique assumes that CMV exists if a single factor will emerge from the 
analysis or one general factor will account for the majority of the covariance among the variables 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). More recently, some researchers have used confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) as a more sophisticated method to test of the hypothesis that a single factor accounts for 
all the variance in the data (Iverson and Maguire, 2000; Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995; 
Mossholder, Bennett, Kemery, and Wesolowski, 1998 cf. Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Harman’s 
single-factor was used to statistically assess the possibility the CMV has affected the reported 
results (see section 5.2).  
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4.5 Analysis of data 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to analyze the measurement model and to 
test the hypotheses of the proposed research model. Empirical studies show that the use of SEM 
is widespread in information systems research (Gefen et al., 2000). SEM, a multivariate 
statistical technique, is a powerful quantitative data analytical tool that enables researchers to 
observe the structural element (path model) and measurement element (factor model) 
simultaneously (Gefen et al., 2000). Hair et al. (2010) stated that SEM is most appropriate when 
the research has multiple constructs that can be differentiated as DVs and IVs, and each construct 
is assessed with multiple items. Unlike other multivariate techniques, SEM can handle constructs 
that act as the IV in one relations and as the DV in another relations, and the relations can be run 
simultaneously (Hair et al., 2010). AMOS version 18 was used. Following Hair et al. (2010), this 
study used the six stage decision process of SEM as shown in Figure 0.1 below. 
Stage 1 involves the process of defining the individual constructs. At this stage, a 
researcher operationalizes a construct by selecting scale items and the scale type (Hair et al., 
2010). In this study, items and scales were obtained from prior research studies (section 4.4). 
Stage 2 involves the development and specification of the measurement model. A key element in 
this process is the labeling of indicators, constructs, and error terms, and specifying the relations 
between items and constructs, and among the constructs (Hair et al., 2010). Using AMOS 
version 18, a measurement model for this study was developed (see Figure 9.1). The 
measurement model represents the relations between the latent constructs (unobserved variables) 
and measured variables (observed variables or indicators). The observed variables are 
represented by rectangles, constructs are represented by ovals, and measurement error is depicted 
by small circles.   
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At stage 3, a researcher is required to discuss the issues of research design and model 
estimation. In the area of research design, careful consideration should be given to the type of 
data to be analyzed, impact and remedy of missing data, and impact of sample size (Hair et al., 
2010). As recommended by Hair et al. (2010), covariance matrices were used to analyze the data. 
Next, one must address the issue of missing data, which could affect the generalizability of the 
obtained results (Hair et al., 2010). A missing data pattern should be identified to determine an 
appropriate treatment for the missing data. In doing this, the percentage of variables with missing 
data for each case and the number of cases with missing data for each variable was tabulated. 
The analysis was performed with the Missing Value Analysis (MVA) module in SPSS. During 
this analysis, variables and cases that would be possible candidates for deletion were identified, 
depending on the severity of the missing percentage (Hair et al., 2010). After that, diagnosis for 
the randomness of the missing data was performed to determine whether the missing data are 
distributed randomly across the cases and variables (Hair et al., 2010). The analysis of 
randomness provides insights into the appropriate remedy methods. Hair et al. (2010) suggested 
four basic methods, namely the complete case approach, all-available approach, imputation 
approach, and model-based approach. Detailed analysis for missing data is presented in section 
5.2. 
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Figure 0.1: Stages of Structural Equation Modeling  
 
 Note: adopted from Hair et al. (2010) 
Stage 4 contains a process of assessing the validity of the measurement model. This stage 
seeks to provide empirical support for the relations between the measured variables and the latent 
constructs (i.e., the model). SEM uses two tests to achieve this. The first is construct validity and 
the second is to test for acceptable levels of goodness-of-fit for the measurement model (Hair et 
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al., 2010). Construct validity is whether the measured variables (items) related to a specific latent 
construct are really measuring the latent construct as theoretically predicted. Two types of 
construct validity are convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is 
whether the indicator items of a specific latent construct converge or share a very high 
proportion of variance. CFA outputs provide a range of information to evaluate convergent 
validity, such as factor loadings and average variance extracted (AVE). Factor loadings examine 
the size of loadings of each of the items to the latent construct. A rule of thumb is that 
standardized loading estimates should be .5 or higher (Hair et al., 2010; Klein, 2011). AVE may 
be estimated to provide additional information for the convergent validity (Hair et al, 2010). 
AVE is calculated as the mean variance extracted for the items loading on a construct, with a rule 
of thumb of .5 or higher (Hair et al, 2010). An AVE of higher than .5 indicate that, on average, 
more variance in the items explained by the latent construct than error remains in the items (Hair 
el al., 2010).  
Discriminant validity is whether a construct is truly distinct from other constructs in the 
model. Discriminant validity shows that a construct is unique and captures a phenomenon other 
constructs do not. For discriminant validity, Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) test was conducted. 
This test compares the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct with 
the correlations associated with that construct. AVE is the mean of the variance extracted for the 
items loading on a construct. To provide evidence that a construct has discriminant validity, the 
square root AVE should be greater in value than the correlation coefficients. That is, the variance 
that uniquely belongs to the construct should be greater than the variance shared between the 
constructs (Hair et al., 2010).  
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The next step is to assess the overall fit of the measurement model. Evaluation of fit, or 
goodness-of-fit (GOF), is a comparison between theory and reality by measuring the similarity 
between the observed (the proposed model) and estimated (the data) covariance matrices among 
the indicator items. In other words, the purpose of GOF is to check whether the proposed model 
explains the data or not, and if any modification is needed to improve the model fit (Kline, 
2011). Hair et al. (2010) identify three classes of GOF measures: 
• Absolute measures 
• Incremental measures 
• Parsimony fit measures 
There are various fit indices produced by SEM (e.g., Chi-Square (χ²) Statistic, 
comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), standardized 
root mean square residual (SRMR) with a different minimum or maximum value of good fit 
were used as the rule of thumb (Hu and Bentley, 1999; Byrne, 2009; Hair et al. 2010). However, 
it is unlikely to find research that reports all of those fit indexes. In fact, different fit indices were 
reported in different research articles in the IS domain (Gefen et al., 2000). Hair et al. (2010) 
asserted that it is not necessary to report all the indices to provide an assessment of fit, and 
suggested that researchers should rely on at least one absolute index and one incremental index 
in addition to the χ² Statistic. Kline (2011) advocates the use of the χ² test, the RMSEA, the CFI, 
and the SRMR.   
Absolute Fit Indices is the most direct measure to assess on how well a proposed model 
fits the data (Kline, 2011; Byrne, 2009). The χ² statistic is looking for no difference between 
covariance matrices of the proposed model and the data (i.e., the lower the χ² the better) (Hu and 
Bentler, 1999). A good model fit would provide an insignificant result (p > .05), that is, the null 
hypothesis fails to be rejected (Hu and Bentler, 1999). However, since the mathematical 
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properties of χ² has sample size, the value of χ² is affected by the sample size. This means that 
the greater the sample size, the higher the value of χ². Due to the limitation of χ² related to 
sample size, researchers have sought alternative indices to assess model fit. CMIN (χ² /df) is a 
statistic that minimizes the impact of sample size on the χ² statistic. Although there is no 
consensus regarding an acceptable ratio for this statistic, a value below 2.0 indicates a very good 
fit (Byrne, 2009; Kline, 2011).  
Another fit measure that can deal with the issue of sample size sensitivity of the χ² 
statistic is the RMSEA. RMSEA adjusts for both model complexity and sample size by including 
each in its computation (Hair et al., 2010). RMSEA is regarded as the most widely used measure 
and the most informative fit index (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010). Low 
values indicate a better fit. Hu and Bentley (1999) suggested cut-off value lower than .06 for 
RMSEA. Still, values as high as .08 may be acceptable (Hu and Bentler, 1999). In addition, 
Browne and Cudeck (1989) also suggested that values in the range of .05 to .08 indicate a fair fit, 
and that values greater than .10 indicate poor fit. One of the advantages of RMSEA is that it can 
report range values for a given level of confidence (e.g. 95% confidence). This study applies the 
cut-off value of .08.  
The root mean square residual (RMR) and SRMR assess to the square root of the 
difference between the sample covariance matrix and the proposed covariance model. The RMR 
is an average of the covariance residuals whereas SRMR adjusts for the scale of the covariances 
(Hair et al., 2010). According to Byrne (2009,) the value for SRMR ranges from zero to 1.0, with 
well-fitting models obtaining values less than .05. Still, values as high as .08 may be acceptable 
(Hu and Bentler, 1999). Thus, this study applies a cut-off value of .08. 
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Another group of statistics to measure the fit of the model are incremental fit indices, 
such as the incremental fit index (IFI), the Tucker Lewis index (TLI), and the comparative fit 
index (CFI). Incremental fit indices differ from absolute fit indices in that they assess how well 
the estimated model fits any alternative baseline model (i.e., the null model) (Hair et al., 2010). 
Null model is hypothesized to be the simplest model that can be theoretically justify (Hair et al., 
2010). The CFI is one of the most often reported fit index due to being one of the measures least 
affected by sample size (Bentler, 1990). The CFI ranges from zero to 1.00 with a value greater 
than .90 indicating acceptable model fit (Byrne, 2009). Hair et al. (2010) provided cut-off values 
ranges from greater than .90 to greater than .97, depending on situations (i.e., sample size and 
number of variables). Following Kline (2011), this study uses χ² statistic to assess model fit 
along with the SRMR, the RMSEA, and the CFI. The cut-off values are presented in Table 0.2. 
The analysis of measurement model is reported in section 5.3. 
Table 0.2: SEM Fit Indexes and the cut-off values used for this study 
 
Note: RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean  
square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index. 
Sources: Adopted from Kline (2011); Byrne (2009); Hu and Bentley (1999). 
Stage 5 is a process of specifying the structural model. At this stage, the validated 
measurement model is transformed into a structural model by assigning the relations from one 
construct to another, which is the proposed research framework or theoretical model. The 
structural model for this research is represented by the hypothesized paths, H1 to H12, as shown 
in Table 0.2. Figure 9.2 presents the structural model produced by AMOS. 
RMSEA SRMR CFI
Recommended value of good and acceptable fit ≤.08 ≤.08 ≥.9
Modification for model misspecification >.08 >.08 <.9
Overall Model Fit : Chi-Square (χ² ) Statistic
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The final stage is validating the structural model. The goal of this stage is to test the 
proposed theoretical model. In doing so, two tests are emphasized; model fit and consistency of 
the structural relations with theoretical expectations (Hair et al., 2010). Similar to the assessment 
of measurement model validity, the test of model fit uses the fit measures, such as χ² statistic, the 
SRMR, the RMSEA, and the CFI. The second test of structural model validity is to examine 
individual path estimates. One has to assess whether each path coefficent is consistent with the 
expectation (e.g., directionality, magnitude, etc). The analysis of structural model has been 
reported in section 5.4. 
Testing for mediating effects 
A mediation effect is an indirect effect of a predictor variable on an outcome variable 
through a mediating or intervening variable (MacKinnon et al., 2002). The indirect effect may be 
calculated using methods such as the causal steps procedure, or by calculating  the difference in 
coefficients (MacKinnon et al., 2002). To formally test the mediation effect, the significance of 
each hypothesized indirect relation must be tested. However, according to MacKinnon et al. 
(2002), of 50 studies reviewed mediation, fewer than one third included any test of significance 
of the mediating variable. Prior studies provide much information for various methods for 
conducting significance tests for indirect effects, including Baron and Kenny (1986), Freedman 
and Schatzkin (1992), Sobel (1982), and Mackinon and Lockwood (2001). Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) suggested that the product-of-coefficients strategy is appropriate, as well as the 
bootstrapping method. Hence, this study uses product-of-coefficients test by Sobel (1982), also 
known as Sobel test (Sobel 1982, 1986) and the bootstrapping method (Shrout and Bolger, 
1992), using the SPSS macro from Preacher and Hayes (2008). 
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Chapter 5. Analysis and Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4, the research methodology and the design were discussed. This chapter 
provides information about the respondents’ profile along with the data screening process, as 
well as the results of measurement and structural models. Most of the data in this study were 
analyzed using AMOS version 18. Apart from AMOS 18, SPSS was used for some analysis. 
The following sections describe the tests performed, divided into three subsections: Initial 
data screening, assessment of measurement model, and assessment of structural model. Section 
5.2 explains the following: respondents’ profile, analysis of missing data, test of multivariate 
normality and outliers, and analysis of common method variance. In section 5.3, the 
measurement model will be examined. The assessment of construct validity comprises 
assessments of reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. In section 5.4, the 
results of the path or structural model will be presented. The following analyses were performed: 
model fit, parameter estimates and diagnostics, and mediation.  
5.2 Data Screening 
 Methodological approaches, including tests of multivariate normality, identification of 
missing data, identification of outliers, and analysis of common method variance (CMV) will be 
discussed in this section. Initial data screening of 326 complete responses identified that some 
respondents met the exclusion criteria questions. Those who selected that they have no IS 
security policy in the organization or were completely unaware of the IS security policy 
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requirements were excluded from the study. Additionally, respondents who did not provide 
information regarding years of working in their current company were also excluded. It was 
assumed that these respondents were not currently being employed. This resulted in a final sample 
size of 290 responses with potentially useable data.  
Demographic Information 
 As reported in Table 0.1, most of the respondents were male (69%). The data also 
showed that the majority of the respondents have undergraduate or graduate degrees (combined 
81.4%). This was expected given that the sample of respondents was obtained from graduate 
students. Age differences were also apparent, with most of the respondents (50.7%) were 
relatively young, between the ages of 26 and 35. Most of the respondents have been working 
with their current company less than five years (70%). Almost 35% of them were at the 
managerial level. In terms of the intensity of using computers at work, the respondents reported 
an average of 7.7 hours per day. This may indicate that the jobs require the respondents to use 
computers heavily, suggesting that their IS security behaviors may be important.   
 The results in Table 0.2 show that the industry types of the firms diverse widely. No 
industry dominates the others. In terms of firm size (number of employees), one-third of the 
firms has employees less than 500, which can be considered as small and medium sized (U.S 
Small Business Association [SBA],  2012). 
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Table 0.1: Respondents' Profile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Features      Frequency (n=290) Percentage
Gender
Male 202 69.7
Female 86 29.7
Missing 2 0.7
Level of Education
College degree 45 15.5
Undergraduate degree 118 40.7
Graduate degree 118 40.7
Other 6 2.1
Missing 3 1
Age
20 – 25 72 33.4
26 – 35 147 50.7
36 – 45 49 16.2
46 – 55 18 14.8
56 – 65 1 27.9
Missing 3 1.7
Years of working in current organization
Less than 5 years 203 70
More than 5 years 87 30
Position in current organization
Owner of the Firm 8 2.8
Managing Director / Director 24 8.3
Chief Executive Officer 2 7
General Manager/Manager 47 16.2
Executive/Leader/ Officer 28 9.7
Non-management 155 53.4
Missing 26 9
Mean SD
Hours of computer usage at work per day 7.7 2.5
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Table 0.2: Companies' Profile 
 
Examination of Missing Data 
 Non-ignorable missing data is data that cannot be classified as ignorable. It could be 
known or unknown. Known missing data is due to procedural factors such as errors in data entry 
and morbidity of the respondents. Researchers have little control over known non-ignorable 
missing data (Hair et al., 2010). Unknown missing data are instances related directly to the 
respondent. For example, a respondent may refuse to respond to certain questions due to the 
sensitivity of the question or the respondent may not have sufficient knowledge or no opinion 
about the question. In this situation, researchers should anticipate these problems and minimize 
Demographic Features      Frequency (n=290) Percentage
Firm size (by number of employees)
Fewer than 500 97 33.4
500 – 999 17 5.9
1,000 – 4,999 47 16.2
5,000 – 10,000 43 14.8
More than 10,000 81 27.9
Missing 5 1.7
Industry
Education 49 16.9
Financial Services 49 16.9
Government 24 8.3
Food/Beverage 5 1.7
Health Care 35 12.1
Manufacturing 17 5.9
Non-Profit 4 1.4
Medical, Bio-Technology, Pharmacology 6 2.1
Real Estate 2 0.7
Other Services 18 6.2
Information Technology 23 7.9
Telecommunications 5 1.7
Travel 0 0
Wholesale/Retail 13 4.5
Others 31 10.7
Missing 9 3.1
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them in the research design and data collection process. However, if this still happens, 
researchers can apply certain types of remedies to mitigate the effect of missing data. 
Hair et al. (2010) suggested four steps of missing data diagnosis: (1) determining the type 
of missing data, (2) determining the extent of missing data, (3) diagnosing the randomness of 
missing data, and (4) selecting a method to deal with missing data. In step 1, the type of missing 
data, ignorable or non-ignorable was determined. The second step was conducted to assess the 
extent and impact of the missing data. This was performed by tabulating the percentage and the 
number of missing data for each variable and case.  
Table 0.3 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables, including the percentage of 
missing data on each variable. The lowest amount of missing data in these metric variables was 0 
cases for CHOI1 (Item 1 for the construct choice), MEAN1 (Item 1 for the construct meaning), 
MEAN2 (Item 2 for the construct meaning), PACT3 (Item 3 for the construct participation), 
SETA2 (Item 2 for the construct SETA), SETA3 (Item 3 for the construct SETA), SETA4 (Item 
4 for the construct SETA), ACC1 (Item 1 for the construct access), and ACC2 (Item 2 for the 
construct access), and the highest was 1.7% (5 cases) for COMP2 (Item 2 for the construct 
competence). This shows that all the variables have low levels of missing data. 
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Table 0.3: Missing Data by Variables 
 
Note. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived 
meaning; COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education,  
 training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation 
 in IS security decision-making. 
 
Table 0.4 contains information regarding the amount of missing data per case. Based on 
the complete case approach (listwise deletion), 272 cases were identified as being valid. It was 
apparent that only one case has an excessive number of missing values (40%), making it likely to 
be a candidate for deletion. Nevertheless, the extent of missing data for another 17 cases was low 
(< 20%). Of these 17 cases, 13 cases were missing one data only. According to Little and Rubin 
(1987), excluding cases with missing data reduces the sample size and valuable information. 
This decrease can lead to reduced statistical power, overestimated variances, and wider 
confidence intervals (Allison, 2003). Hence, apart from conventional listwise deletion, an 
alternative missing data method was performed wherein only one case was deleted and the 
remaining 17 cases were imputed (replaced).   
Count Percent Count Percent
ISPC1 289 6.24 1.128 1 0.3 SETA1 289 4.46 2.036 1 0.3
ISPC2 288 5.71 1.287 2 0.7 SETA2 290 3.36 2.081 0 0
ISPC3 288 5.48 1.412 2 0.7 SETA3 290 4.44 2.027 0 0
CHOI1 290 4.45 1.78 0 0 SETA4 290 4.75 1.97 0 0
CHOI2 288 4.24 1.761 2 0.7 SETA5 288 4.61 2.005 2 0.7
CHOI3 289 4.51 1.841 1 0.3 ACC1 290 4.49 1.832 0 0
MEAN1 290 5.09 1.759 0 0 ACC2 290 4.81 1.651 0 0
MEAN2 290 4.94 1.759 0 0 ACC3 289 5.03 1.582 1 0.3
MEAN3 286 4.98 1.694 4 1.4 PART1 289 3.99 1.983 1 0.3
COMP1 286 5.09 1.436 4 1.4 PART2 287 3.57 2.111 3 1
COMP2 285 5.08 1.347 5 1.7
COMP3 287 4.79 1.461 3 1
PACT1 289 4.69 1.791 1 0.3
PACT2 289 4.31 1.933 1 0.3
PACT3 290 4.44 1.968 0 0
N Mean Std. Deviation
Missing
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation
Missing
Variable
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Table 0.4: Missing Data by Cases 
 
 
A decision to choose the alternative missing data method depends on the randomness of 
the missing data. Step 3 involves a procedure to determine whether the missing data are 
distributed randomly across the cases and variables. If the missing data pattern is missing 
completely at random (MCAR), all imputation methods for remedies are appropriate (Hair et al., 
2010). However, if the missing data is missing at random (MAR), researchers can use a model-
based approach to impute the missing data (Hair et al., 2010). The condition of MCAR was 
examined using Little’s multivariate test (Little and Schenker, 1995). A MCAR missing data 
pattern is indicated by a non-significant statistical level (p < .05), showing that the observed 
pattern does not differ from the random pattern (i.e., null hypothesis). The results showed that 
the little’s MCAR test had a significance level of .034, indicating a significant result. Thus, the 
null hypothesis was rejected and the missing data was deemed to be MAR. Based on this result, a 
model-based imputation method was selected as the alternative missing data method.  
In step 4, the model-based imputation was performed based on the 289 cases. For this 
study, the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm method was used. The primary advantages 
of the EM algorithm are simplicity and ease of computing (Little and Rubin, 1987). According to 
Little and Rubin (1987), The EM algorithm formalizes a relatively old ad hoc idea for handling 
missing data: (1) replace missing values by estimated values, (2) estimate parameters, (3) re-
Number of Missing 
Data per Case
Percentage of Missing 
Data per Case Number of Cases Percentage
0 0% 272 94
1 4% 13 4.5
2 8% 2 0.7
3 12% 1 0.3
4 16% 1 0.3
10 40% 1 0.3
Total 290 100%
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estimate the missing values assuming the new parameter estimates are correct, (4) re-estimate 
parameters, and so forth, iterating until convergence (p. 129). In other words, EM is an iterative 
method to find the best possible value for the parameters (means, standard deviations, or 
correlations), assuming the missing data were replaced. EM is readily available in the Missing 
Value Analysis (MVA) module in SPSS.  
Sensitivity analyses were performed to compare the results of the listwise deletion (272 
cases) and EM methods (289 cases). CFAs showed that the model with 289 cases (χ2=484.45 
(df=247, p <.05); RMSEA=.058; SRMR=.05; CFI=.94) fits the data slightly better than the 
model with 272 cases (χ2=467.62 (df=247, p <.05); RMSEA=.065; SRMR=.07; CFI=.93). In no 
instances did the imputation method change the overall model fit considerably. Consequently, it 
was decided to leave all 289 observations in the analysis. 
Examination of Univariate Normality and Outliers 
A next data-screening step was completed, which involved assessing a multivariate 
normality. Kline (2011) purported that multivariate normality is an assumption of Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE). As this study is using AMOS for data analysis, where the 
structural model estimation was performed with MLE, the analysis is subject to the assumption 
of multivariate normality. The normality problem exists when the multivariate distribution of the 
observed variables has tails and/or peaks that differ from the normal distribution (Byrne, 2009). 
There are statistical tests to detect multivariate normality, such as Mardia’s (1985) test, but there 
are some weaknesses (Klein, 2011). Fortunately, multivariate non-normality can be detected 
through inspection of univariate distributions (Klein, 2011).  
Two tests are appropriate to determine the univariate normality, skewness and kurtosis. 
Data distributions with either highly skewed or with high kurtosis is indicative of non-normality, 
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which will have an effect on the estimation parameters and/or model specification (Hall and 
Wang, 2004). Variables with values of skew index (SI) > ±3 are seen as extremely skewed 
wherein the sign of the SI indicates the direction of the skew (Klein, 2011). Klein (2011) also 
suggested that variables with values of the kurtosis index (KI) > ±10 suggest a problem. Table 
0.5 provides the results of skewness and kurtosis. By the rules of thumb mentioned above, no 
item exhibited significant skew or kurtosis.  
Table 0.5: Assessment of Normality – Skew and Kurtosis 
 
Note. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived 
meaning; COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education,  
training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation 
 in IS security decision-making. 
 
 
The next step of data screening involved the identification of potential outliers. 
Multivariate outliers refer to data that do not fit the standard sets of correlations exhibited by the 
other data in the dataset. Although univariate outliers have an extreme score on single variable, 
multivariate outliers have extreme scores on more than one variable (Kline, 2011). Specifically, 
they are cases with extreme scores on two or more variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
Outliers can influence the analysis results by pulling the mean away from the median. To detect 
multivariate outliers in AMOS, a Mahalanobis d-squared (D2) test can be performed. D2 
Variable min max skew kurtosis Variable min max skew kurtosis
ISPC1 1 7 -1.893 4.142 PACT1 1 7 -0.48 -0.804
ISPC2 1 7 -1.114 1.046 PACT3 1 7 -0.34 -1.019
ISPC3 1 7 -1.127 1.105 PART1 1 7 -0.06 -1.23
CHOI1 1 7 -0.328 -0.775 PART2 1 7 0.22 -1.333
CHOI2 1 7 -0.283 -0.899 ACC1 1 7 -0.52 -0.779
CHOI3 1 7 -0.356 -0.912 ACC2 1 7 -0.66 -0.238
MEAN1 1 7 -0.767 -0.394 ACC3 1 7 -0.66 -0.359
MEAN2 1 7 -0.708 -0.374 SETA1 1 7 -0.36 -1.13
MEAN3 1 7 -0.703 -0.387 SETA2 1 7 0.37 -1.183
COMP1 1 7 -0.728 0.23 SETA3 1 7 -0.35 -1.135
COMP2 1 7 -0.708 0.462 SETA4 1 7 -0.52 -0.92
COMP3 1 7 -0.608 -0.073 SETA5 1 7 -0.43 -1.084
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indicates the distance in standard deviation units between a set of scores (vectors) for an 
individual case and the means for all variables (centroid) (Kline, 2011). According to Kline 
(2011), a case with a very high D2 and a low p-value (p <.05) may lead to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the case comes from the same population as the rest. This case is the most likely 
candidate to be considered outlier. 
Table 0.6: Observations farthest from the centroid (Mahalanobis distance) 
 
Table 0.6 provides the excerpt of D2 for this study. The results showed that 43 cases have 
D2 values with a p-value of less than .05, indicating that these cases could potentially be outliers. 
Casewise diagnostics during each regression procedure were completed using the SPSS software 
to identify whether the potential outliers are influential cases. Field (2009) suggested that 
standardized residuals with an absolute value greater than 3 are cause for concern for influential 
Observation 
number
Mahalanobis 
d-squared p1
189 72.07 0
224 63.832 0
118 59.699 0
125 57.693 0
102 57.622 0
143 56.217 0
151 55.612 0
276 52.021 0.001
109 50.589 0.002
. . .
. . .
. . .
213 38.703 0.039
219 38.604 0.04
24 38.433 0.042
8 37.871 0.048
. . .
. . .
. . .
261 28.475 0.286
71 28.44 0.288
273 28.133 0.302
289 28.034 0.306
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case. Regression analyses were performed with and without these outliers to see the impact of 
the outliers on regression coefficients. In no instances did the removal of potential outliers exert 
undue influence over the parameters of the model. Consequently, it was decided to leave all 
potential outliers in the analysis leaving 289 cases. 
Examination of Common Method Variance (CMV) 
The final step of data screening involved an examination of CMV. Since only self-report 
data was collected, the possibility of CMV was present. Harman’s one-factor test was conducted 
to assess whether CMV is present (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In conducting the Harman’s 
single-factor test, all variables of IS security policy compliance intentions, competence, meaning, 
impact, choice, SETA, access, and participation related to IS security were entered into factor 
analysis using principal axis factoring with varimax rotation. Results showed the presence of six 
distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (see Table 0.7). These six factors together 
accounted for 70.3% of the total variance and the largest factor did not account for the majority 
of the variance (i.e., 32.0%), indicating that CMV should not pose a pervasive issue (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003).  
Summary 
This section described the respondents’ and companies’ profile, examined the 
possibilities of missing data, multivariate normality, outliers, and common method variance. As 
stated, an initial 290 usable cases were used to report the demographics. The data screening 
process identified one case with extreme missing data (40%), which was removed from the 
sample. The remaining missing data (<20% per case) were imputed using the EM model-based 
imputation method. The remaining 289 cases were tested for univariate normality and outliers. 
The results showed that the data was normally distributed. However, several cases were 
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identified as potential outliers, but none was excluded leaving 289 usable cases for hypothesis 
testing. 289 valid cases with seven IVs and 25 items indicate a very good case-to-variable ratio 
(i.e., 12:1). This ratio satisfies the suggested ratio of 10:1 for CFA (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).  
Table 0.7: Harman's Factor Score 
 
 
Total
%  of 
Variance Cumulative % Total
%  of 
Variance Cumulative %
1 8.02 32.08 32.08 3.648 14.592 14.592
2 3.477 13.907 45.987 2.87 11.48 26.072
3 1.912 7.647 53.634 2.762 11.047 37.119
4 1.694 6.775 60.409 2.165 8.66 45.779
5 1.314 5.255 65.664 2.045 8.181 53.961
6 1.158 4.63 70.294 1.916 7.664 61.624
7 0.939 3.756 74.05
8 0.766 3.064 77.114
9 0.658 2.632 79.747
10 0.546 2.185 81.931
11 0.515 2.06 83.991
12 0.485 1.94 85.931
13 0.463 1.853 87.784
14 0.406 1.626 89.41
15 0.365 1.46 90.869
16 0.316 1.264 92.134
17 0.301 1.204 93.338
18 0.262 1.049 94.386
19 0.262 1.048 95.434
20 0.232 0.928 96.362
21 0.207 0.828 97.19
22 0.189 0.757 97.948
23 0.183 0.734 98.681
24 0.171 0.683 99.365
25 0.159 0.635 100
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
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5.3 Measurement Model and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
 Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach, in which the measurement model was 
assessed and improved prior to testing of the structural model, was used. This section describes 
the assessments of measurement model. The assessment seeks to provide empirical support for 
the hypothesized relationships. Hair et al. (2010) suggested two types of assessments, construct 
validity or CFA, and overall model fit. The following section reports the results of these 
assessments.  
Construct validity  
 The aim of the construct validity analysis was to assess whether the measured variables 
(indicator items) related to a specific latent construct are really measuring the latent construct as 
theoretically predicted. To assess construct validity, Hair et al. (2010) suggested assessing the 
model’s convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity was assessed by 
factor loadings and average variance extracted (AVE). At a minimum, all the factor loadings 
must be statistically significant (p < .05). A good rule of thumb is that the standardized loading 
estimates and the AVE should be .5 or higher (Hair et al., 2010). Table 0.8 reports the 
standardized loading estimates for the data. The lowest loading estimate obtained was .53, 
linking the latent variable Choice to the variable CHOI2. More importantly, none of loadings 
falls below the acceptable cut-off of .5, indicating that all items loaded significantly well to their 
respective latent construct.  
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Table 0.8: Factor loadings  
 
Note. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived 
meaningful; COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education, training 
and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decision-
making. 
 
Table 0.9 reports the means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, AVEs, correlations, 
and the square root of AVEs of the latent constructs. AVEs were estimated to provide 
additional information for the convergent validity. An AVE of .5 or greater is considered 
acceptable (Hair et al., 2010). The AVE for the latent constructs competence, meaning, impact, 
SETA ACCESS PART IMPACT COMPETENCE MEANING CHOICE ISP COMPLIANCE 
INTENTION
SETA1 0.84
SETA2 0.62
SETA3 0.74
SETA4 0.91
SETA5 0.78
ACC1 0.74
ACC2 0.66
ACC3 0.74
PART1 0.81
PART2 0.79
PACT1 0.83
PACT2 0.9
PACT3 0.86
COMP1 0.89
COMP2 0.81
COMP3 0.87
MEAN1 0.88
MEAN2 0.87
MEAN3 0.89
CHOI1 0.87
CHOI2 0.53
CHOI3 0.84
ISPC1 0.61
ISPC2 0.85
ISPC3 0.69
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and choice, the dimensions of the psychological empowerment construct, were .73, .77, .74, 
and .58, respectively.  
Similarly, the latent constructs IS security policy compliance intentions, SETA, Access, 
and Participation had AVE estimates of .52, .63, .51, and .64. The results confirm that the 
items of a specific construct measure the same construct. Further, the Cronbach’s alpha values 
for all of the constructs were greater than .75. A Cronbach’s alpha values of .7 or greater is 
considered acceptable (Gefen et al. 2000; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The results indicate 
that the responses are consistent across the items within a construct.  
In addition, to confirm the discriminant validity of the constructs, the square root of the 
AVEs for each construct were compared to the correlations of the constructs with their latent 
variables (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). As reported in Table 0.9, the square root of the AVEs for 
all constructs, reported in the diagonal of the correlation matrix, were larger than the 
corresponding off-diagonal correlations. The off-diagonal scores are the correlations associated 
with that constructs. These results indicate that the latent constructs of this study have 
appropriate discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
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Table 0.9: Descriptive Statistics, Inter-correlations, and Internal Consistency 
 
Note: N = 289. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; Choice = Perceived choice; Meaning = Perceived meaningfulness; Competence = Perceived competence; Impact 
= Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education, training and awareness; Access = Access to IS security strategy and goals; Participation = Participation in IS security decision-
making; Mean = Average; SD = Standard deviation; α = Cronbach’s Alpha, CR = Composite reliability, and AVE = Average Variance Extracted. Values below the diagonal are 
correlation estimates among constructs and diagonal elements are square root AVE.  
*p <.05, **p <.01 (2-tailed). 
 Mean SD α CR AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. ISPC 3.378 0.623 0.752 0.762 0.521 0.722
2. SETA 4.416 1.502 0.881 0.870 0.631 0.502** 0.794
3. Acess 3.842 1.005 0.756 0.758 0.512 0.595** 0.573** 0.716
4. Participation 4.276 1.501 0.778 0.779 0.639 0.220** 0.286** 0.482** 0.799
5. Impact 3.693 1.412 0.895 0.895 0.740 0.069 0.028 0.239** 0.638** 0.860
6. Competence 4.930 1.224 0.889 0.891 0.732 0.541** 0.571** 0.514** 0.466** 0.182** 0.855
7. Meaning 5.093 1.480 0.910 0.910 0.772 0.557** 0.381** 0.621** 0.523** 0.281** 0.622** 0.878
8. Choice 4.207 1.432 0.781 0.798 0.579 0.211** 0.096* 0.154** 0.524** 0.366** 0.279** 0.271** 0.761
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Table 0.9 also reports the correlations among the latent constructs. Most of the 
correlations are significant (p <.05), except the correlations between impact and IS security 
policy compliance intentions, and between choice and SETA. Interestingly, there was a 
significant positive correlation between SETA and participation in IS security decision-making 
(r =.29, p <.01). There were also strong positive correlations between SETA and access to IS 
security strategy and goals (r =.57, p <.01) as well as IS security strategy and goals, and 
participation in IS security decision-making (r =.48, p <.01). These large magnitude correlations 
are consistent with previous research that suggested that there should be strong relations between 
empowerment work practices (Spreitzer, 1996). In addition, there were large magnitude 
correlations between perceived meaning and competence (r =.62, p <.01) as well as perceived 
choice and competence (r =.37, p <.01). There were moderate relations between meaning and 
impact (r =.28, p <.01), competence and impact (r =.18, p <.05), choice and competence (r 
=.28, p <.01), as well as choice and meaning (r =.27, p <.01). These large to moderate 
magnitude correlations are consistent with previous research that suggested that there should be 
“strong relations” between dimensions of psychological empowerment, such as perceived 
meaning, competence, impact, and choice (Spreitzer, 1996).  
Also of note, none of the significant correlations were too large (r > .80), indicating no 
issues of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Still, variance inflation factors (VIF) were computed to 
assess the threat of multicollinearity. A VIF of more than 10.0 is an indication of a severe issue, 
and less than 4.0 is an indication of no issue of multicollinearity (Bowerman and O’Connell, 
1990). As none of the VIF in this study exceeded 4.0, it can be concluded that multicollinearity 
was not a problematic issue. Together with the results of the assessment of reliability, as well as 
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convergent and discriminant validity, these results suggest the latent constructs and the overall 
model have validity. Thus, all items were retained for further analysis. 
Assessment of the measurement model fit 
Table 0.10 presents the values of the fit indices for the measurement model of this study. 
The overall measurement model fit was χ2=484.45 (df=247, p <.001), SRMR=.063, RMSEA 
.058 with CI90: (.05, 0.065), and CFI=.94. The results reported that the values of SRMR and 
RMSEA are less than the selected cut-off values of .08 (Hu and Bentley, 1999; Byrne, 2009; 
Kline, 2011) corresponds to an “acceptable” fit (McDonald and Ho, 2002). Further, the value of 
CFI is marginally lower than the cut-off of .95 (Hu and Bentley, 1999; Klein, 2011). However, 
many researchers use a cut-off value of .90 as acceptable fit (McDonald and Ho, 2002). Thus, 
overall, the results signify a reasonably good fit for the proposed measurement model. 
Table 0.10: Fit Indices of the Proposed Measurement Model 
  Chi-Square (χ²) Statistic = 484.45 (df = 247, p < .001) 
 
 RMSEA SRMR CFI 
Proposed Measurement Model  
 
.058  
CI90(.05, 0.065) 
0.063 .943 
Note: RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean  
square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index; CI90 =90% Confidence interval. All results were  
computed by AMOS. 
 
Model diagnostics, such as modification indices (MIs) were conducted to ensure that the 
measurement model was well specified. MIs refers to any possible relation that is not estimated 
in a model (Byrne, 2009). The purpose of MIs is to check for model fit. While the χ² statistic, 
SRMR, RMSEA, and CFI provide global fit assessments, MIs focus on fit in various part of the 
model separately, and, thus, local fit. A model could have a reasonable fit, but it may contain 
severe misspecifications on one specific parameter. Overall fit assessments are based on specific 
free parameters and constrained parameters. The free parameter means that the parameter is 
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estimated, whereas constrained parameters are fixed at a certain value. For example, referring to 
the factor loadings in Table 0.8, the variable ACC1 has a loading on the construct Access, but 
not on the construct SETA. This indicates that the loading of the variable ACC1 on the construct 
SETA is fixed to 0 whereas the loading between the variable ACC1 and the construct Access is 
estimated. AMOS calculates a MIs for the possible loading of the variable ACC1 to other 
constructs (e.g., SETA). MIs indicate how much the χ² value of a model would drop if the 
parameter is freed instead of constrained. In other words, MIs indicate by how much the model 
fit could improve if a variable (i.e., ACC1) is allowed to load to another construct (i.e., SETA). If 
an MI shows a value higher than 20, it indicates that the respective fixed parameter is ‘wrong’ 
and should be considered a serious misfit (Byrne, 2009). MIs for the factor loadings (see Table 
0.11) were all below 20, indicating no serious impact on model fit (Byrne, 2009). Thus, no 
modification was made.  
Table 0.11: Modification Indices 
 
Note. ISPC = ISP compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived meaningful; 
COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education, training and 
awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decision-
making. 
 
M.I M.I
PACT1 <--- MEANING 11.99 COMP2 <--- CHOICE 4.907
PACT1 <--- COMPETENCE 6.411 PACT3 <--- MEANING 4.115
PACT1 <--- ACCESS 7.203 PACT3 <--- ISP COMPLIANCE 6.385
PACT1 <--- SETA 4.074 ACC1 <--- SETA 7.987
PACT1 <--- ISP COMPLIANCE 15.95 ACC1 <--- SETA2 5.16
ISPC3 <--- COMPETENCE 4.288 ACC2 <--- SETA 4.343
CHOI1 <--- ACCESS 5.956 ACC3 <--- CHOICE 4.384
CHOI1 <--- ISP COMPLIANCE 8.158 SETA2 <--- CHOICE 17.25
CHOI2 <--- COMPETENCE 5.988 SETA2 <--- PART 18.04
CHOI3 <--- MEANING 4.151 SETA2 <--- ISP COMPLIANCE 5.15
CHOI3 <--- COMPETENCE 9.962 SETA2 <--- PART2 4.208
PACT1 <--- MEANING 6.303 SETA3 <--- MEANING 5.209
PACT1 <--- COMPETENCE 6.079 SETA4 <--- PART 6.231
CHOI3 <--- ISP COMPLIANCE 8.228 SETA5 <--- CHOICE 4.606
Loading Loading
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Overall results of the measurement model  
 In summary, the fit assessments generally supported the proposed measurement model. In 
the measurement validation process, the model showed convergent validity and discriminant 
validity. The measured items had significant loadings with their respective latent constructs. The 
AVEs for all the constructs were higher than the minimum threshold of .5 (Hair et al., 2010). The 
square root of the AVEs for each construct were higher than the correlations of the constructs 
with their latent variables. Further, the fit indices indicated that the measurement model achieved 
a fairly satisfactory level of fit (χ2=484.45 (df=247, p <.001), SRMR=.063, RMSEA .058, and 
CFI=.94). Both the RMSEA and SRMR were below the recommended cut-off values of .08, and 
the CFI was slightly below the cut-off value of .95. Furthermore, the MIs showed no issue of 
misfit. Thus, it can be concluded that the proposed measurement model was well specified. 
 5.4 Assessment of Structural Model  
After assessing the measurement model, the second step of Anderson and Gerbing’s two-
step approach is to evaluate the appropriateness of the proposed structural model (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). A structural model is a composite of a measurement model and a path model 
(Mcdonald and Ho, 1992).  
Structural Model Fit 
Structural model validity is assessed by comparing the estimated covariance matrix with 
the observed covariance matrix. A structural model cannot fit any better (e.g., lower χ2) than the 
measurement model because the structural model cannot have more relations between constructs 
than the measurement model (Hair et al., 2010). The measurement model assumes that a relation 
exists between each pair of constructs whereas the structural model relations are simpler. That 
means, the measurement model is a “larger” model with more freely estimated parameters, and 
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the structural model is a “smaller” model with fewer parameters freely estimated, and that the 
structural model is nested in the measurement model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Therefore, 
measurement model fit provides a baseline to assess structural model fit. The fit indices of the 
proposed structural model are presented in Table 0.12.  
Table 0.12: Proposed Structural Model Fit Indices 
 
Note: df = degree of freedom; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 
Standardized root mean square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index; CI90 =90% Confidence interval.  
All results were computed with AMOS. 
 
The structural model fit was χ2=608.55 (df =263, p <.001), SRMR=.09, RMSEA=.068 
with CI90: (.061, .075), and CFI = .92. The RMSEA was lower than the cut-off value of .08, the 
SRMR was slightly above the cut-off value of .08, and the CFI was lower than the cut-off value 
of .95, but still acceptable at the cut-off value of .90. The fit indices indicated that the structural 
model achieved a fairly satisfactory level of fit. The proposed structural model is shown in 
Figure 5.1 with the estimated regression coefficients of the paths (β) and their p-value.  
Also of important note, the structural model was a composite of a measurement model 
and path model (Mcdonald and Ho, 1992). Therefore, it might be useful to decompose the 
measure of fit into measurement and path models (Mcdonald and Ho, 1992; Williams and 
O’Boyle, 2010; O’Boyle and Williams, 2011). Mcdonald and Ho (1992) purported that if a 
composite model has an unacceptable fit, it is important to know if the misfit is contributed by 
the measurement model, path model or both.  Thus, global fit indices produced by a composite 
Fit Measures RMSEA SRMR CFI
Proposed Structural Model Fit .068 .09 .92
CI90(.61, .075)
χ² (df) of the Proposed Structural Model
χ² (df) of the Measurement Model
Overall Model Fit
608.55 (263) ( p < .001)
484 (247) ( p  < .001)
  
110 
 
model may yield misleading conclusions about the adequacy of a path model (Williams and 
O’Boyle, 2010). Mcdonald and Ho (1992) revised the formula for the RMSEA that focuses on 
path model. O’Boyle and Williams (2010) have referred to this RMSEA as RMSEA-P. The 
RMSEA-P for the proposed structural was .15, slightly higher than the cut-off of .10 (Brown and 
Cudeck, 1993). The results indicate that the path model had a poor fit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Note: † p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); ISPC = ISP compliance intentions; SETA = IS security 
education, training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS 
security decision-making. The full SEM model is shown in Appendix-Figure 9.3.  
 
 
Hypothesis Testing  
Good fit alone is not sufficient to support the validity of the structural model (Hair et al., 
2010). Assessment of the validity of the structural model must include an examination of the 
individual structural parameter estimates against the corresponding hypotheses. A researcher 
Meaning 
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Figure 0.1: Results of the Proposed Structural Model  
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needs to investigate the extent to which the parameter estimates are statistically significant and in 
the predicted direction (Hair et al., 2010). In addition, variance-explained estimate, or R2 for the 
relations between the predictor variables and the outcome variable should also be reported.  
 The validity of the structural model were assessed based on the standardized estimated 
path coefficient (β) along with the critical ratio (CR) and the p-value, as shown in Table 5.13. 
The standard decision rules (CR ≥ 1.96 and p ≤ .05) were applied to determine the significance 
of all path coefficients (Byrne, 2009). In addition, Figure 5.1 displays the path model with the 
standardized estimated path coefficients (β), the significance levels, and the explanatory power 
or variance explained (R2).  
The effect of the dimensions of psychological empowerment on IS security policy compliance 
intentions (Hypothesis 1 – 4) 
Hypothesis 1 stated that perceived competence of IS security tasks positively relate to IS 
security policy compliance intentions. Table 0.13 shows that perceived competence was 
positively related to IS security policy compliance intentions (β=.35, p <.01). The finding 
supports Hypothesis 1. This result suggests that a high degree of competence of IS security tasks 
tends to increase one’s intentions to comply with organizational IS security policy.  
Hypothesis 2 stated that perceived meaningfulness of IS security positively relates to IS 
security policy compliance intentions Table 0.13 shows that the path coefficient was significant 
(β=.42, p <.01), providing a support for this hypothesis. This indicates that the higher the degree 
of perceived meaningfulness of the IS security tasks, the greater the intention to comply with the 
required tasks. In other words, if one perceives that IS security tasks are meaningful and 
important, it motivates him/her to comply with organizational IS security policy. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 was supported.    
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Table 0.13: Hypothesized Path Relations for Proposed Structural Model 
 
     Note: † p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); S.E = Standard Error; CR = Critical Ratio 
 
 
Standardized 
Parameter Estimate
S.E C.R. (t) p
H1 Perceived competence of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to 
comply with the IS security policies. 0.35 0.04 8.97 .000 Supported
H2 Perceived meaningfulness of IS security task positively affects one’s intention 
to comply with  the IS security policies. 0.42 0.04 12.00 .000 Supported
H3 Perceived impact of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to 
comply with the IS security policies. -0.13 0.03 -4.19 .051 Not supported
H4 Perceived choice of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to 
comply with the IS security policies. 0.07 0.03 2.41 .332 Not supported
H5 SETA programs are positively associated with one’s perceived competence of 
IS security task. 0.59 0.06 9.37 .000 Supported
H6 Access to the organizational IS security strategy and goals is positively 
associated with one’s perceived meaningfulness of IS security task. 0.52 0.1 5.25 .000 Supported
H7 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s 
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task. 0.27 0.12 2.31 .000 Supported
H8 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s 
perceived impact of IS security task. 0.64 0.07 9.85 .003 Supported
H9 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s 
perceived freedom of IS security task. 0.52 0.06 8.13 .000 Supported
Hypothesis
Proposed Structural Model
Results*
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Hypothesis 3 suggested that perceived impact of IS security positively relates to IS 
security policy compliance intentions. Table 0.13 shows that perceived impact was negatively 
related to IS security policy compliance intentions at a marginal level of significance (β=-.13, p 
<.1). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 stated that perceived choice in IS security positively relate to IS security 
policy compliance intentions. Unlike competence and meaning, the result in Table 0.13 showed 
that perceived choice did not predict IS security policy compliance intentions (β=.07, p >.1). As 
a result, there was no evidence that choice or self-determination predicted IS security policy 
compliance intentions. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.  
The R2 for intentions to comply with IS security policy is .37, indicating that 37% of the 
variance of the intentions to comply can be explained by these four dimensions of psychological 
empowerment. This suggests that feelings of empowerment do have a significant influence on IS 
security policy compliance intentions. 
The effect of elements of structural empowerment (Hypothesis 5 – 9) 
Hypothesis 5 stated that SETA positively relates to psychological empowerment, 
specifically perceived competence. Table 0.13 shows that SETA was positively related to 
perceived competence (β=.59, p <.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was supported. The R2 for 
perceptions of competence was .35, indicating that the variance of competence explained by 
SETA is 35%. 
Hypothesis 6 stated that access to IS security strategy and goals positively relates to 
perceived meaning. The result (see Table 0.13) shows that access to IS security strategy and 
goals predicted meaning (β=.52, p <.01). Further, Hypothesis 7 stated that participation IS 
security decision-making is associated with perceptions of meaning. The results indicate that 
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participation in IS security decision-making is related to perceptions of meaning (β=.27, p <.01). 
Therefore, Hypotheses 6 and 7 were supported. Both access to IS security strategy and goals, and 
participation in IS security decision-making explained 47% the variance of meaning. 
Hypothesis 8 and 9 stated that participation in IS security decision-making predicts 
impact and choice, respectively. The results (see Table 0.13) show that participation in IS 
security decision-making predicts perceptions of impact (β=.64, p <.01) and perceptions of 
choice (β=.52, p <.01). Both Hypotheses 8 and 9 were supported. The R2 for perceptions of 
impact and choice are .44 and .27 respectively.  
In sum, two of four dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e., perceived 
competence and meaning) did predict IS security policy compliance intentions. However, 
contrary to the predictions, perceived impact negatively related to IS security policy compliance 
intentions and perceived choice did not predict employee’s intentions to comply with IS security 
policy. Additionally, all structural empowerment facets related to the dimensions of 
psychological empowerment, as hypothesized. SETA positively related to perceived competence, 
access to IS security strategy and goals was related to perceived meaning and impact, and 
participation in IS security decision-making predicted perceived meaning, impact, and choice.  
Results for the mediating effects (Hypothesis 10 – 12) 
Table 0.14 displays the five hypotheses for mediating effects.  Hypothesis 10 predicted 
that SETA was related to IS security policy compliance intentions via competence.  The indirect 
effect (βIND) was .1285 (SE=.0222). Using the Sobel test, the indirect effect of SETA was 
statistically significant (z=5.788, SE=.0222, p <.01). Also, the bootstrap analysis supported the 
conclusion of mediation (the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the total indirect effect 
excluded zero ([.0901, .1764]) (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Thus, perceptions of competence did 
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mediate the relations between SETA and IS security policy compliance intentions, providing 
support for Hypothesis 10.  
Hypothesis 11 stated the effect from access to IS security strategy and goals to IS security 
policy compliance intentions will be mediated by perceptions of meaning. Notably, the indirect 
effect (βIND) was .1865 (SE=.0344). The results of the Sobel test (z=5.422, SE=.0344, p <.01), 
and the bootstrap analysis (the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the total indirect effect 
excluded zero ([.1217, .2567])) support a conclusion of mediation. As a result, the findings 
indicated that the perceptions of meaning mediated the relations between access to IS security 
strategy and goals, and IS security policy compliance intentions. Hypothesis 11 was thus 
supported.  
Hypothesis 12a through 12c proposed that three dimensions of psychological 
empowerment (i.e., perceptions of meaning, impact, and choice) act as mediators of the relations 
between participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy compliance 
intentions. As shown in Table 0.14, the indirect effect (βIND) through meaning was .1684 
(SE=.0204). The Sobel test suggested that the indirect effect is statistically significant (z=8.255, 
SE=.0204, p <.01). The bootstrap analysis supported the conclusion of mediation as well. The 
results show that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the total indirect effect excluded 
zero ([.1324, .2122]). Thus, the results suggest that perceptions of meaning mediated the 
relations between participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy compliance 
intentions. Thus, Hypothesis 12a was supported.  
The indirect effect (βIND) from participation in IS security decision-making process to the 
perceived impact to IS security policy compliance intentions was -.0879 (SE=.078). The results 
of the Sobel test (z=-1.127, SE=.078, p >.1) and the bootstrap analysis (the 95% bias-corrected 
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confidence interval for the total indirect effect included zero ([-.142, .043])) fail to support 
hypothesis 12b. Thus, perceived impact did not mediate the relation between participation in IS 
security decision-making and IS security policy compliance intentions. 
Hypothesis 12c was not supported too. Notably, the indirect effect (βIND) was .0128 (SE = 
.0189). The Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of participation in IS security decision-
making via choice was not statistically significant (z=.0677, SE=.0189, p >.05). The bootstrap 
analysis did not supported a conclusion of mediation as well (the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval for the total indirect effect included zero ([-.023, .0621]). This results suggest that 
perceptions of choice do not mediated the relations between participation in IS security decision-
making and IS security policy compliance intention.  
In sum, perceived competence served as mediating variable between SETA and IS security 
policy compliance intentions. As hypothesized, perceptions of meaning was an important mediator of 
the relations between access to IS security strategy and goals and IS security policy compliance 
intentions (i.e., Hypothesis 11), and participation in IS security decision-making and IS security 
policy compliance intentions (i.e., Hypothesis 12a). However, perceived impact and choice do not 
mediate the relations between participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy 
compliance intentions. Overall, there was empirical support for Hypotheses 10, 11, and 12a, but not 
for 12b and 12c.    
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Table 0.14: Mediation of the SETA, Access and Participation of Employees on Intentions to Comply with IS security policy through Employees' 
Perception of Competence, Meaning, Impact, and Choice 
 
Note: = ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; SETA = IS security education, training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; 
PART = Participation in IS security decision-making; BC = bias corrected; 5,000 bootstrap samples.  
.
Specific Indirect Effect Point Estimate 
(βIND)
SE Z p Lower Upper
H10 The effect of SETA on one’s intention to comply with IS security 
policies is mediated by perceived competence of IS security task. SETA --> Competence --> ISPC 0.1285 0.0222 5.788 .000 0.09 0.1764
H11 The effect of access to IS security strategy and goals on one’s 
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by 
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
ACCESS --> Meaning --> ISPC 0.1865 0.0344 5.422 .000 0.122 0.2567
H12a The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s 
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by 
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
PART --> Meaning --> ISPC 0.1684 0.0204 8.255 .000 0.132 0.2122
H12b The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s 
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by 
perceived impact of IS security task.
PART --> Impact --> ISPC -0.0879 0.078 -1.127 .130 -0.1421 0.0431
H12c The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s 
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by 
perceived choice of IS security task.
PART --> Choice --> ISPC 0.0128 0.0189 0.677 .499 -0.0229 0.0521
Hypothesis
Bootstrapping
Product of Coefficent BC 95%  CI
  
5.5 Supplementary Analyse
Testing for types of mediating effect
The reported results showed that feelings of meaning and competence can act as mediators 
in the relations between structural empowermen
intentions. Although no prediction was made as to whe
meaning and competence in the model are partial or full mediation
using the method suggested by Kenny and Baron (1986). 
the coefficient for each independent variable
dependent variable (i.e., IS security policy compliance) without the mediator
‘Path c’’ is the coefficient of the link between independent variable and dependent variable when 
the mediator is in the model (see
c’, this suggests partial mediation. If ‘path c’’ becomes statistically insignificant and close to 
zero, it suggests a full mediation.
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The results of mediation are presented in Table 0.15. The results indicate that competence 
partially mediated the effects of SETA on intentions to comply with IS security policy. 
Perceptions of meaning fully mediated the effects of participation in IS security decision-making 
on intentions to comply with IS security policy, and it partially mediated the effects of access to 
IS security goals on intentions to comply with IS security policy. 
Table 0.15: Results of mediating analysis 
 
Note: † p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); IV = Independent variable 
 
Testing for potential moderating effect 
 In addition, although not directly hypothesized, an assessment of the moderating effects 
of access to IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making on 
perceived meaning, was considered important. Moderation is the effect of a third variable that 
changes the magnitude or direction of the relations between two other variables (MacKinnon et 
al., 2012). An interaction term was calculated using mean-centered variables of access to IS 
security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making. As shown in Table 
0.16 perceived meaning was not predicted by the access-participation interaction (β =-0.032, p 
>.05). Hence, the possibility of interaction effects was not supported. 
 
 
 
Mediator: Competence
IV: Access IV: Participation IV: SETA
Path c .3777** .1424** .2198**
Path c' .1900** -.0259 .0913**
Partial Mediation Full Mediation Partial Mediation
Mediator: Meaning
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Table 0.16: Interacting participation and access on perceptions of meaning 
 
Note: = ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; ACCESS = Access to IS security strategy  
and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decision-making.  
† p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); S.E = Standard Error; CR = Critical Ratio 
 
Testing for second-order construct of psychological empowerment 
Finally, to further investigate the notion that empowerment has an overall positive effect 
on IS security performance, a post hoc test was conducted by introducing psychological 
empowerment as a second-order construct. The second-order construct of empowerment was 
treated as a reflective construct with the measures of the latent variable scores of its four 
dimensions (i.e., competence, meaning, impact, and choice). Figure 5.3 summarizes the 
empirical model as analyzed with AMOS 18. The R2 for IS security policy compliance was .44 
and the R2 for psychological empowerment was .77. In addition, all the paths were significant at 
the level of p <.001. This indicates that psychological empowerment as a single, global construct 
has a positive effect on IS security behavior, and is strongly predicted by structural 
empowerment facets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Standardized 
Parameter Estimate
S.E. C.R. P
Meaning <--- PART 0.258 0.047 5.498 **
Meaning <--- ACCESS 0.577 0.048 12.103 **
Meaning <--- Access_X_Part -0.032 0.039 -0.825 0.409
ISPC <--- Meaning 0.64 0.045 14.142 **
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Note: ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; SETA = IS security education, training and awareness; ACC 
= Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decision-making. R2 = variance 
explained.  
† p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); 
 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter reported the analysis and the results of the proposed research model. The 
chapter started with a description of the data screening processes where 289 cases were identified 
valid. The 289 valid cases with seven IVs and 25 items indicate a very good case-to-variable 
ratio (i.e., 12:1). This ratio satisfies the suggested ratio of 10:1 for CFA (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). The CFA indicated that the proposed measurement model was well specified. Following 
the CFA, the assessment of the validity of the structural model was performed. It was discovered 
that the proposed structural model was marginally fit. Four of the 14 hypotheses were not 
supported. Hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12a were supported, and Hypotheses 3, 4, 
12b, and 12c were not supported. The next chapter provides a discussion of the results. 
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Figure 0.3: Structural model with empowerment as a second-order construct 
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overall synthesis of the research findings and a 
discussion of implications. A discussion of the implication focuses on the contribution of the 
research to the IS security field; that is, whether the results confirm previous work or not. This 
demonstrates the entire research agenda reflected in the dissertation. 
This chapter is organized into three sections. After the introduction, the three research 
questions discussed in Chapter 1 are re-examined. The third section examines the main findings 
of the research and discusses whether they confirm previous studies or break new ground, and 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the study.  
6.2 Reexamination of the research questions 
Studies of the relations between extrinsic or controlled motivation of individuals and their 
IS security behaviors have a long and rich tradition. Earlier work in this vein has shown that 
sanctions, rewards, and social pressures, predict IS security policy compliance (Straub, 1990; 
Chan et al., 2005; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009a). However, 
other studies reported that intrinsic factors could also motivate IS security behavior (Herath and 
Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Son, 2011). In his study, Son (2011) found that intrinsic motivation—
perceptions of legitimacy and value congruence—are more likely than any set of extrinsic 
motivational factors to encourage compliance with IS security policy. However, the IS security 
literature has paid far less attention to intrinsic motivational factors when compared to extrinsic 
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motivational factors. Consequently, calls were made to study the effect of intrinsic motivational 
factors on IS security policy compliance (Padayachee, 2012; Herath and Rao, 2009a).  
Responding to the call, and drawing upon Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic 
motivation model, this dissertation used psychological empowerment as the intrinsic 
motivational factor. The model purported that psychological empowerment is a manifestation of 
four cognitions derived from a specific task—competence, meaning, impact, and choice. That is, 
employees are likely to feel empowered if they perceive that they have the capability to perform 
the task activities skillfully and successfully, perceive that the value of the task is consistent with 
their personal beliefs, perceive that they can make a significant difference or contribute to the 
organization if they execute the task, and finally, perceive that they feel in control to select tasks 
and perform in ways that seem appropriate.  
Theory and prior studies have both argued that feelings of empowerment exert influence 
on individuals to put more effort towards the execution and performance of a task (Oldham and 
Hackman, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 1997; 
Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et al., 2000). Although empirical studies found that these four 
dimensions are capturing the essence of psychological empowerment construct (Spreitzer, 
1995a; Kraimer et al., 1999), researchers argued that it is also crucial to disentangle which 
psychological empowerment dimension actually associates with outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; 
Kraimer et al., 1999; Maynard et al., 2012). In fact, studies have found that each dimension 
contributes to different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). Hence, this study 
responded to the gaps in the IS security literature by investigating the influences of each 
dimension of psychological empowerment on IS security compliance intentions. 
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The argument presented in the first chapter states that employees’ intrinsic motivation 
may be driven by factors external to the employees (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Ryan and 
Deci, 2000). Prior studies in IS security compliance have suggested various external factors and 
strategies, such as providing training, improving the task design, enhancing the IS security 
climate, and so on, to drive employees’ intrinsic motivation (Herath and Rao, 2009b; Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010; Son, 2011). However, rather than exploring the range of external factors empirically, 
most studies have simply acknowledged their importance. Thus, this current study was motivated 
to fill the gap. One way an organization can stimulate the feelings of empowerment among its 
employees is providing empowering work structures. This include the enhancement of their 
knowledge and skills through training and education related to the task, providing them access to 
information about the strategy and goal of the task, and involve them in decision-making 
processes related to their tasks (Spreitzer, 1995a; Wallach and Meuller, 2006; Hon and Rensvold, 
2006; Lanschinger et al., 2004). Although most studies have ‘bundled’ these practices, Maynard 
et al. (2012) argued that it is difficult to determine which structural empowerment facets are 
actually related to the four dimensions of psychological empowerment. Therefore, this study has 
attempted to uncover the relations among the structural empowerment facets and the dimensions 
of psychological empowerment in the context of IS security.  
The idea of psychological empowerment serving as mediator between structural 
empowerment and individual performance-related outcomes has been supported in numerous 
studies (Spreitzer, 2007; Maynard et al., 2012). Nielsen (1986) claimed that changing the 
organizational structural context is not enough to change individual behavior; ultimately, an 
individual feeling of empowerment is necessary to influence such behaviors (cf. Spreitzer, 
1995b). Consistent with this line of argument, this study has replicated previous studies to 
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investigate the mediating role of psychological empowerment on the relations between elements 
of structural empowerment, and IS security policy compliance intentions. 
In sum, the review presented above led to three specific research questions: What is the 
impact of  the four dimensions of employees’ psychological empowerment, on IS security policy 
compliance intentions? How do elements of structural empowerment, including SETA, access to 
information regarding IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-
making, enhance the dimensions of psychological empowerment with respect to IS security? Do 
the four dimensions of psychological empowerment mediate the relations between elements of 
structural empowerment and IS security policy compliance intentions? The following 
subsections discuss the findings and the implications. 
Research Question 1 
This study argued that employees’ intrinsic motivation affects their IS security policy 
compliance intentions. Specifically, this study examined how employees’ perceptions of 
empowerment (i.e., their perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice) affect their 
intentions to display IS security compliance behavior. As Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) 
intrinsic motivation theory indicates, individuals who feel that their work or task is empowering, 
they are more motivated to expend more energy and work hard on the task (Thomas and 
Velthouse, 1990).  
The findings of this study are mixed. In general, the results suggest that the feeling of 
empowerment, dominated by the perceptions of competence and meaning dimensions, has 
positive effects on IS security policy compliance intentions, as predicted in Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
However, Hypothesis 3 and 4, which predict that feelings of impact and choice relate to IS 
security compliance, were not supported. These results are agreed with findings by Liden et al. 
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(2000), who found that meaning and competence are strong predictors of work satisfaction, 
behavioral intentions, and job performance.  
The results indicate that feelings of competence influence individuals’ intentions to 
comply with the IS security policy. The significant effect of competence implies that employees 
who saw themselves as having the skills and capability to manage the IS security tasks have the 
intention to perform those tasks. Previous studies have found evidence that employees’ belief in 
their competence in IS security influences their decision to perform (or not perform) IS security 
related activities, particularly those prescribed by the organizational IS security policies (Chan et 
al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath & Rao, 2009; Rhee et al., 2009). In fact, a meta-analysis 
by Stajkovic and Luthans (1996) concluded that the perceived competence influences task 
performance in various contexts.  
Furthermore, the results suggest that feelings of meaning are related to IS security policy 
compliance intentions. The significant effect of meaning indicates that employees who felt that 
the IS security tasks are meaningful are motivated to put more effort to accomplish the goals of 
the IS security tasks. As Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) theory indicates, individuals are more 
likely to engage, do well, and put more energy into a task if the task activities are meaningful, 
serve an important purpose, and are in accordance with their own values and goals. This result  is 
also consistent with previous studies showing that meaning is associated with numerous work-
related benefits, such as courtesy behavior, work performance, higher commitment to work, and 
engagement at work (e.g., Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2004; Wang and Lee, 2009; May 
et al., 2004). The result supports extant literature but not in IS security literature because 
perceptions of meaning derived from IS security tasks have never been studied in IS security 
research. Thus, this study contributes to the IS literature by concluding that employees tend to 
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intrinsically motivated to perform the IS security tasks and achieve IS security goals if they 
perceive that the IS security tasks are meaningful.  
Contrary to expectations, perceptions of impact had a marginal significant negative 
relations with IS security policy compliance intentions. This indicates that the stronger 
individuals’ feelings of impact of the IS security tasks, the lower their intentions to comply with 
IS security policy. This result is contrary to prior findings that found that impact is positively 
related to IS security behavior and other individual performance-related outcomes (Herath and 
Rao, 2009b; Seibert et al., 2011; Maynard et al., 2012). For instance, Herath and Rao (2009b) 
found that employees are found to adopt a favorable IS security compliance behaviors when they 
perceived that their IS security actions can benefit the organization. However, in the current 
study, the effect was only marginally significant.  
In addition, the results of this study do not support the hypothesized relations between 
perceived choice or self-determination and IS security policy compliance intentions. This 
indicates that whether or not the employees feel that they can operate the IS security tasks 
autonomously, may not matter. Spreitzer et al. (1997) also reported this somewhat surprising 
result. Spreitzer et al. (1997) found that self-determination was only marginally related to the 
affective outcomes of work satisfaction but not to performance-related outcomes. Further, Liden 
et al. (2000) found that self-determination did not relate to either affective or performance 
outcomes.  
Finally, as the post-hoc analysis results have indicated, psychological empowerment has 
an overall positive impact on employees’ IS security policy compliance intentions. This provides 
support for the intrinsic motivation model (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990) and the contentions of 
intrinsic motivation studies in various domains (e.g., Spreitzer, 1995a; Laschinger et al., 2004; 
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Aryee and Chen, 2006). However, when the dimensions of psychological empowerment were 
detangled and tested individually, only two of the dimensions (i.e., perceptions of competence 
and meaning) predicted IS security policy compliance intentions. Although another two 
dimensions (i.e., perceptions of impact and choice) are not positively related to IS security policy 
compliance intentions, the results were not surprising because different dimensions of 
psychological empowerment may influence different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997). The 
results of this study are also aligned with Kraimer et al.’s (1999) claim that perceived impact and 
choice may relate to affective outcomes, rather than behavioral intentions.   
Research Question 2 
This study argued that structural empowerment practices are associated with employees’ 
psychological empowerment. More specifically, structural empowerment allows employees to 
obtain power in terms of opportunity for training, participation in decision-making, and access to 
information, which hence may influence the feelings that they are empowered (Spreitzer, 1996; 
Spreitzer, 2008; Seibert et al., 2011). The position of intrinsic motivation theorists is that 
although intrinsic motivation is an innate part of individuals and derived from a specific task, it 
must be prompted and enhanced by external factors (Oldham and Hackman, 1980; Deci and 
Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Therefore, external factors such as structural 
empowerment work practices is vital in enhancing employees’ intrinsic motivation.  
The results of this study also support for the relations between structural empowerment 
work practices and psychological empowerment, which is aligned with prior studies in various 
contexts (Spreitzer, 1996; Siu et al., 2005; Wallach and Mueller, 2006; Bordin et al., 2006). In 
other words, the obtained results suggest that different structural empowerment facets relate to 
different dimensions of psychological empowerment, consistent with prior studies (Spreitzer et 
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al., 1997; Liden et al., 2000). Specifically, this study found that IS security training, education, 
and awareness (SETA) are significantly related to the competence dimension of psychological 
empowerment (Hypothesis 5). This indicates that employees develop their competence or self-
efficacy through the ongoing acquisition of knowledge regarding the IS security controls. As 
self-efficacy arguments indicate, self-efficacy beliefs are developed through an effective mastery 
experiences (Bandura, 1977). This is consistent with previous studies showing that perceived 
opportunity for training predicts perceptions of competence (Gist et al., 1989; Agarwal et al., 
2000; Liao et al., 2009).  
Next, access to information security strategy and goals are significantly related to 
meaning (Hypothesis 6). A meta-analytic by Seibert et al. (2011) concluded that information 
about strategy or operational goals allows employees to see the work as personally meaningful 
because they understand how their work fits into the goals and strategies. This indicates that 
access to information regarding IS security strategy and goals would allow employees to feel 
informed about where an organization is headed. Hence, they should know how their own IS 
security tasks contribute to achieving the IS security goals. That is, they acquire a greater sense 
that the IS security task is meaningful to be executed because they know that their IS security 
task is supporting the IS security objectives and benefit the organization at the end. This finding 
is apparently consistent with past findings reported by Spreitzer (1996) and Bordin et al. (2006).  
Interestingly, the study found that participation in IS security decision-making led to 
enhanced feelings of three dimensions of psychological empowerment. This is consistent with 
results reported by Wallach and Muller (2006), who found that actual participation in decision-
making pertinent to one’s own work had a strong positive influence on the meaning and 
autonomy, and was marginally related to the impact and competence dimensions of 
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psychological empowerment. This indicates that participation in decision-making should enable 
employees to contribute their opinions in the decision related to the IS security task alongside 
their superiors. Thus, participation allows employees to feel that they have opportunity for 
freedom and independence for IS security task-related decisions. Further, when employees 
participate in the decision-making process, they may enjoy the opportunity to set the IS security 
decisions jointly with their superiors. This could make them feel that they are an important asset 
to the organization and that they can impact their work environment. While participating, 
employees have the opportunity to provide input that is consistent with their own values or 
needs, increasing the feeling that the IS security tasks are meaningful and important. Finally, 
their involvement with the decision-making process allows them to enhance the mastery 
experience of IS security, which should increases their feelings of competence.  
In sum, all the hypothesized relations between the structural empowerment facets and the 
dimensions of psychological empowerment were supported. As expected, this study found that 
when employees were engaged in their work environment through empowerment work practices, 
such as opportunity for training, access to information, and participation in decision-making 
related to IS security, it is likely that employees felt more empowered in terms of their feelings 
competence, meaningfulness, impact, and choice. This supports the contention made in prior 
studies that different dimensions of empowerment are influenced by different antecedents (i.e., 
Spretizer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). 
Research Question 3 
Finally, this dissertation explored how the dimensions of psychological empowerment 
mediate the relations between structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance 
intentions. This study provides evidence that structural empowerment facets are associated with 
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two of the dimensions of psychological empowerment—and that both in turn are related to IS 
security policy compliance intentions. The mediating effects that were uncovered involved the 
competence dimension of psychological empowerment in the relations between SETA and IS 
security policy compliance (hypothesis 10) and the meaning dimension of psychological 
empowerment in the relations between access to IS security strategy and goals and IS security 
policy compliance (hypothesis 11), as well as participation in IS security decision-making 
processes and IS security policy compliance (hypothesis 12a). However, the impact and choice 
dimensions of psychological empowerment did not mediate the relations between participation and 
IS security policy compliance (hypothesis 12b and 12c). These findings suggest that the 
structural empowerment practices characterized by SETA, access to IS security strategy and 
goals, and participation in IS security decision-making processes are important in influencing 
two psychological empowerment dimensions (i.e., competence and meaning), which should 
ultimately motivate employees to engage and expend more time and energy in IS security policy 
compliance. This finding provides support for Liden et al.’s (1990), who reported that meaning 
and competence mediated the relations between job characteristics and work satisfaction as well 
as commitment. 
Finally, an ad hoc analysis was performed to determine whether the mediating role of 
perceptions of meaning and competence are partial or full mediation. The study found that 
meaning fully mediated the effects of participation in IS security decision-making on intention to 
comply with IS security policy. Competence was found to partially mediated the relations 
between SETA and intention to comply with IS security policy and meaning partially mediated 
the relations between access to IS security goals and IS security policy compliance intentions. 
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6.3 Summary 
This study identifies four components of psychological empowerment - feelings of 
competence, meaning, impact, and choice - to provide theoretical explanations for the 
antecedents of the employees’ intention to comply with IS security policy. Furthermore, the 
study postulates that structural empowerment facets, including SETA, access to IS security 
strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making, may influence employees’ 
compliance intentions indirectly through the dimensions of psychological empowerment.  
Overall, the study found support for the theoretical model. Based on the data collected from 289 
respondents who were familiar with the IS security policy requirements, all but four of the 
hypotheses were supported. Figure 6.1 represents the IS security policy compliance model 
derived from this study. 
A number of implications may be derived from the results. One of the more important 
implications follows from the indirect (full mediation via meaning) relations between 
participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy compliance intentions. A 
complete understanding of employees’ IS security behaviors in organizations requires the 
recognition of both intrinsic and external factors. Focusing only on providing structural 
empowerment (i.e. extrinsic factor) to the exclusion of psychological empowerment (i.e. intrinsic 
factor) provides an incomplete picture of IS security behaviors.   
 
 
Figure 0.1: Current study IS security policy compliance model 
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related to IS security tasks can be influenced by the structure in organizations that share power 
with their employees. The sharing of power is materialized in term of engaging employees in the 
IS security decision-making process, giving them more opportunities to access the IS security 
strategy and goals, and providing them with training and education programs related to IS 
security (SETA). Participation in IS security decision-making was found to positively relate to 
the three dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e. meaning, impact, and choice), SETA 
and access to IS security strategy and goals were related to the competence and meaning 
dimensions of empowerment, respectively. Participation in IS security decision-making allows 
employees to contribute their inputs, ideas, and thoughts in the risk assessment, design, and 
implementation of IS security controls, hence increasing their feelings of empowerment. This 
result is particularly interesting in light of Dhillon et al.’s (2004) view that employees who were 
left out from all major decision-making and had no say on the latest developments related to IS 
security in the organization has been attributed to feelings of oppression. Providing SETA to all 
levels of employees in organizations gives them the opportunity to impart general knowledge of 
IS security environment, along with the skills necessary to perform the required IS security tasks. 
Finally, communicating the well specified IS security policy that consists of goals of IS security 
allows individuals to feel informed about where an organization is headed in the context of IS 
security. Thus, organizations attempting to foster empowerment should pay particular attention 
to give employees opportunities to participate in IS security decision-making, access to SETA 
and IS security strategy and goals.  
An interesting feature of this study concerns the mediating effects of the competence and 
meaning, on the relations between the structural empowerment facets and the IS security policy 
compliance intentions. According to Nielsen (1986), changing the organization’s structural 
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context is not enough to influence individual behavior; ultimately, an individual feelings of 
empowerment are necessary to influence such behavior (cf. Spreitzer, 1996). Consistent with this 
line of argument, this study suggests that the meaning and competence dimensions may play a 
mediating role with respect to IS security compliance behavior. 
The mediating effects have an implication for the interpretation of many IS security 
studies that have tested the direct effects between work environment, such as participation, 
communication of the goals, and training, and IS security outcome while excluding the 
psychological state. The results of this dissertation indicate that SETA not only has a direct effect 
on IS security behavior shown in previous studies (e.g., D’Arcy et al., 2009) but also the indirect 
effect through feelings of competence. Similarly, studies that have examined the relations 
between participation and effective IS security (e.g., Spears and Barki, 2010) has not tested the 
mediating effects. The current study has found that the meaning dimension of psychological 
empowerment completely mediate the relations between participation in IS security decision-
making and IS security compliance. Furthermore, Boss et al. (2009) identified that a well-
specified IS policy that gives clear directions to achieve IS security goals, was related to 
precautionary behavior via perceptions of mandatoriness of IS security policy compliance. The 
present study provides similar results, but tested the mediating role of feelings of meaning in the 
relations between access to IS security strategy and goals and IS security policy compliance. 
Therefore, these findings indicate that focusing on extrinsic factors is not enough to truly 
understand the underlying reason of employee IS security policy compliance intentions.  
However, the results did not support earlier prediction that employees feelings of impact 
and choice may influence their IS security policy compliance intentions. While the results did 
not support Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model, this is not surprising. 
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Earlier studies found that different dimensions of psychological empowerment may have 
different strengths to influence different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kramier et al., 1999; 
Wat and Shaffer, 2005). For instance, Wat and Shaffer (2005) found that the meaning dimension 
relates to courtesy behavior, the competence dimension relates to consceintiousness and 
sportmanship behaviors, the impact dimension predicts consceintiousness, and the self-
determination dimension relates to altruism. In fact, Kraimer et al. (1999) purported that the 
impact and self-determination dimensions are personal control that are expected to be related to 
affective outcomes, rather than behavioral outcomes. 
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In the context of this study, impact refers to an individual sense of control over the 
outcomes of the IS security tasks. One possible explanation for the negative relations between 
feelings of impact and IS security policy compliance intentions would be that, while employees 
perceived that they can impact their organizations if they perform the IS security tasks, the IS 
security tasks might be too complicated or too technical. Due to the complexity of the IS security 
tasks, they might think that the IT team or IT department will take care of it, and thus, feel that 
there is no need to put too much effort on the IS security tasks. As a result, their IS security 
policy compliance intentions is not as high as others are. Another, more likely, explanation is 
that the negative coefficient is statistical artifact. When the correlated independent variables are 
regressed simultaneously, the regression coefficients become unstable, manifested in the form of 
either reduced magnitude of effect size or change in direction (Pedhazur and Schmelkin cf. Wat 
and Shaffer, 2005). In this study, the bivariate correlation between feelings of impact and IS 
security compliance was not even significant (see Table 0.9. Note the positive, but not significant 
correlation between impact and IS security policy compliance). Thus, the relations between 
feelings of impact and IS security policy compliance merits further investigation.  
Choice or self-determination refers to individuals sense of control of IS security tasks. 
The insignificant effect of self-determination on IS security policy compliance may indicate that 
having autonomy in IS security tasks is less important than having feelings of meaning and 
competence. One possible explanation might be the fact the IS security policy compliance is 
perceived as mandatory (Boss et al., 2009). Therefore, whether or not the employees may have a 
high degree of control over what IS security tasks to take and how to perform these IS security 
tasks, they may expend effort to comply with IS security policy. Also, while individuals may 
appreciate IS security task autonomy, the act of securing the information is considered as ‘part of 
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the job’ hence individuals apply much effort in doing the IS security tasks regardless of their 
autonomy. Another possible explanation is that, as suggested by Kraimer et al. (1999) having a 
sense of control of IS security tasks may be more related to affective outcomes, such as 
emotional distress, job satisfaction, and role stress, rather than task effort and performance. From 
a methodological perspective, as explained in the previous paragraph, the insignificant findings 
may be due to a statistical artifact (see Table 5.9. Note the positive and the significant correlation 
between choice and IS security policy compliance [r = .211, p <.01]). Thus, the relations 
between perceived choice and IS security behavior requires further investigation. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 This thesis has involved an empirical investigation of intrinsic motivation and IS security 
policy compliance intentions. This encapsulates theoretical reasoning from two theories. The 
central research question underpinning this thesis was: how does intrinsic motivational factor 
influence one’s intention to comply with IS security policy? All relevant literature towards 
identifying and answering the research questions were consolidated in Chapter 2. Based on the 
review in Chapter 2, a conceptual model and the hypotheses were developed in Chapter 3. The 
quantitative research approach was suggested to investigate the expectations, was discussed in 
Chapter 4. The quantitative model was tested in Chapter 5, followed by the discussion of the 
results in Chapter 6. This chapter addresses the practical and theoretical implications of the 
dissertation. Finally, a discussion of the limitations of this dissertation and possible future 
research directions are discussed. 
7.2 Contributions of the Study  
The most important part of any study is the contribution it makes to a body of knowledge. 
This research makes several contributions cross the practical and theoretical realms. The 
following sections highlight the contributions of research as these relate to the IS security 
literature and beyond.  
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Theoretical Contributions 
This research makes five major theoretical contributions. First, as far our review of the 
literature, this is perhaps the first study investigating effects of psychological empowerment 
derived from the assessment of IS security tasks. Such an investigation extends the use of 
Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model. Differing from previous studies that 
examine the effects of extrinsic and/or intrinsic motivations (e.g., Straub, 1990;  Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Boss et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009a; Herath and Rao, 2009b; Son, 2011), the present 
study focuses on how the assessments of IS security tasks stimulate the feelings of competence, 
meaning, impact, and choice and thereby motivates individuals to expend effort to perform the IS 
security tasks. Such a focus allows us to increase our knowledge of IS security behavior 
motivations. The results support prior studies that employees may be intrinsically motivated to 
comply with IS security policy. Further, the dissertation used the variables from Kanter’s (1977) 
structural empowerment theory, including training, access to information, and participation, as 
antecedents of the intrinsic motivation. Although the variables are not new in IS security 
literature, they are used in this study to predict psychological empowerment, and ultimately to 
influence IS security behavior, unlike other studies that used these variables to predict the direct 
association with IS security behavior (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Spears and Barki, 2010). Hence, the 
results of this study are able to explain how structural empowerment can contribute to 
improve IS security behaviors, via psychological empowerment. 
 Second, this study provides fresh empirical affirmation in the literature from a new 
context of investigation. The study investigated the relations between psychological 
empowerment and individual performance-related outcome on a very specific task (i.e., IS 
security tasks). The results imply that psychological empowerment, dominated by feelings of 
meaning and competence, shows relation with IS security policy compliance intentions. This 
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validates the extensive findings from different research settings for a very specific task and a 
new context, and helps with generalization.  
Third, this study contributes to the empowerment literature by investigating the 
individual dimensions of psychological empowerment and structural empowerment facets, 
separately. This study provides in-depth considerations of the various facets of structural 
empowerment and the dimensions of psychological empowerment, which have not received due 
attention in the literature (Maynard et al., 2012). Prior studies often ‘bundle’ these dimensions. 
Hence, this study is able to explain which dimensions are actually driving the associations. 
Among those structural empowerment facets, participation in IS security decision-making is 
related to three dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e, meaning, impact, and choice). 
SETA can only predict perceptions of competence, and access to IS security strategy and goals is 
related to the meaning dimension only. In terms of predicting IS security policy compliance 
intentions, only competence and meaning dimensions are the significant variables. These results 
further confirm prior studies that postulate different dimensions of psychological empowerment 
predict different outcomes and driven by different factors (Spreitzer et al., 1997).  
Fourth, the study investigated the mediating role of psychological empowerment. The 
mediating effects that were uncovered involve the meaning and competence dimensions in the 
relations between structural empowerment facets and IS security compliance behavior. The 
results further enhance the current body of literature across a wide variety of studies that have 
confirmed the mediating role of psychological empowerment. More interestingly, this study 
contributes to the literature by explicitly testing the individual dimensions as a mediator. Only 
two dimensions of psychological empowerment were found to be the mediators.  
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Finally, the current study further validated the single 12-item measure of psychological 
empowerment developed by Spreitzer (1995a). What is more interesting is that the measures 
were slightly modified to fit into a very specific work task, but still both the convergent and 
discriminant validity were achieved. Not only that, this study has integrated two models of 
empowerment, structural (i.e., organizationally-centric) and psychological (i.e., individually-
centric) to form a complete perspective of empowerment. Spreitzer (2007) posited that a 
thorough understanding of empowerment in the workplace requires the integration of both 
perspectives.   
Practical Implications  
The primary practical implication of this research is the connection between intrinsic 
motivation, measured by four dimensions of psychological empowerment, and IS security 
behavior. IS security behavior of employees is critical to the success of organizations, 
particularly when the incidents of IS security breaches originated from the insiders are more 
costly to handle than the outsider IS security breaches (Richardson, 2011). Employees are able to 
affect the IS security of the organization by engaging in, or complying with IS security policy 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Thus, it is useful to consider the factors that motivate employees to 
comply with the IS security policy (Straub, 1990; Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
Specifically, this dissertation focused on intrinsic motivation because it has received far less 
attention in IS security literature as compared to extrinsic motivation (Son, 2011; Padayachee, 
2011). 
In essence, this dissertation demonstrates how psychological empowerment, dominated 
by meaning and competence dimensions, can influence employees IS security policy compliance 
intentions. This is encouraging, as it suggests that employees who feel empowered about their IS 
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security tasks are more willing to expend more efforts towards accomplishing the IS security 
tasks. As such, organizations that are concerned about managing human functions related to IS 
security should note that in order to increase employees’ IS security policy compliance, imposing 
more external and controlled forces (e.g., sanctions, social pressures, and rewards) is not enough. 
Rather, management should find ways to maximize employees' intrinsic motivation, in terms of 
feelings of competence and meaning, in order to increase the likelihood of compliance.  
In relation to the above, the present study investigated factors to enhance the intrinsic 
motivation. The current study offers important strategies for organizations to increase 
employees’ intrinsic motivation. Rather than spending more money on providing rewards or 
implementing penalties to encourage (or discourage) IS security policy compliance (or non-
compliance), organizations may actually focus on empowerment practices. As the results have 
indicated, it is strongly recommended for management to share more ‘power tools’ to the 
subordinates at all levels. Specifically, it is suggested that organizations attempt to foster feelings 
of empowerment related to IS security, should pay specific consideration to allow employees to 
participate in IS security decision-making processes. A participation strategy should give an 
opportunity for employees to contribute their input, ideas and thoughts about the IS security that 
are consistent with their own values or goals, and opportunities to set decisions regarding IS 
security jointly with the superiors. When employees are able to participate, they will feel 
empowered, and ultimately motivate them to comply with the IS security policy. 
In addition, providing training related to IS security is important to increase employees’ 
feeling of competence. It is strongly recommended for management to create IS security training 
and education programs that strives to increase employees personal mastery of IS security via 
hands-on exercises and activities or regular demonstration of IS security issues and 
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countermeasures. This will provide opportunities to observe successes and failures of other IS 
security behaviors and hence encourage and support their own IS security skills and responsible 
development. Thus, when designing an IS security training program, particular attention should 
be given to increasing employee IS security skills. Furthermore, allowing access to IS security 
strategy and goals is an important strategy to enhance employees’ feelings of meaning of IS 
security tasks. It is recommended that management improves or diversifies the communication 
channels so that the well-specified IS security policy that consists of goals of IS security is 
conveyed to all employees. When employees understand the direction where the organization is 
heading related to IS security, they might know how their own IS security tasks would contribute 
to achieving the IS security goals. That is because employees find connections between the goals 
of IS security policy and their values. 
Finally, it is suggested that when there are limited resources in organizations to empower 
the employees, management can combine those strategies. For example, management can 
communicate IS security strategy and goals in IS security training programs in order to affect 
both feelings of competence and meaning. Further, participation strategy could include 
participation in goal-setting decisions instead of only in IS security task-related decisions.  
7.3 Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, this study employed cross-sectional approach to 
understand individuals IS security policy compliance. There are few weaknesses of this 
approach. For instance, it does not permit conclusions concerning causal direction. Further work 
should employ a longitudinal or an experimental design to lend further support to the causal 
relations hypothesized. Second, it is possible that the respondents’ feelings and thoughts in 
answering the survey questions were influenced by environments, known as a ‘halo effect’ 
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(Herath and Rao, 2009a). Future studies can consider capturing the information regarding 
employees IS security compliance behavior by observing the behavior of employees at their 
workplace, or by obtaining the information from other sources (i.e., supervisors, peers). Case 
studies from one or a few organizations would also be useful future research since such case 
studies could provide an opportunity to measure employees’ actual behavior related to IS 
security policy compliance and actual information regarding the structural empowerment 
practices at the workplace. In addition, respondents to this study self-reported their intention to 
comply with IS security policy. There is a possibility that they masked their true intention 
because noncompliance is socially undesirable (Trevino, 1992). To overcome the issue, Siponen 
and Vance (2010) suggested a use of hypothetical scenarios that provide a richer description.  
Second, limitations are identified related to selection of participation. The non-random 
selection of MBA, MBA Executive, and MS Executive students in the USA to represent 
employees in organizations has limitation on several fronts. The first is that not all of them were 
necessarily currently working. While careful consideration was made to ensure that only people 
currently employed were selected as respondents, there was still a possibility that they were not. 
The next limitation with using students is generalizing results to all employees. As the non-
random selection has represented different companies in various industries, the results are only 
generalizable to a similar population. Further, the limitations include data homogeneity, because 
the research only involved US data. Hence, one of the most important steps should be to conduct 
this study with a random selection of employees in various organizations across countries, and 
not just students. 
Finally, since all measures were self-reported, thus the identified relations may have been 
inflated by common method variance (CMV). However, the fact that the Harman’s factor score 
test found discriminant validity of the measures, it could weaken the issue of CMV.  
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7.4 Future Research 
To extend the findings of this study, three recommendations are suggested for future 
investigations. First, the results of the present study indicate that, different from what was 
hypothesized, feelings of impact have a negative effect, and feelings of autonomy have no effect, 
on IS security policy compliance intentions. Future researchers are urged to further investigate 
these two psychological empowerments components’ effects, and find possible contingent 
factors that may affect their influences on IS security policy compliance. It is speculated that the 
dimensions of psychological empowerment may interact.  
Second, this study has investigated and determined the importance of employees’ beliefs 
regarding competence of IS security tasks on their decision to perform or not to perform the IS 
security tasks. However, this study has used the term ‘IS security tasks’ to represent the overall 
or general IS security tasks. If more specific focus, such as complexity of IS security tasks were 
considered (e.g., security patching task and updating password task requiring different level of 
skills), we would be able to obtain more specific and meaningful results on how to design the 
SETA. Assuming the results show that respondents do not comply with IS security because they 
are not confident with their ability to do the patching task which is more difficult than the 
password changing task, SETA programs can be modified to focus on patching task. Thus, one 
possible direction for future research would be to focus on a very specific IS security tasks to 
truly understand the relation between employees’ perceptions of competence and behavioral 
outcome. Future study may also test for the moderating effect of IS security task complexity.  
Third, the focus of the current study is on structural empowerment practices, as 
antecedent of psychological empowerment. Therefore, examining the effects of other factors is 
beyond the scope of this study. Future research should use a more integrated model to compare 
and contrast different drivers to enhance feelings of empowerment. It would be desirable for 
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future studies to include other external variables such as task characteristics, leader-member 
exchange (LMX), formal and informal power, and personality traits.  
7.5 Summary 
In sum, this dissertation has provided three primary contributions to the IS security 
literature. First, this study has considered the influence of psychological empowerment on 
employees IS security policy compliance intentions answering previous calls for research that 
examines the intrinsic motivation for IS security behavior (Herath and Rao, 2009b; Padayachee, 
2011, Son, 2011). Most notably, the findings of this research have shown the importance of two 
dimensions of psychological empowerment, competence and meaning when investigating the 
intrinsic motivation for IS security compliance. In addition, different dimensions of 
psychological empowerment may predict different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et 
al., 1999). Consistent with this line of argument, this study has confirmed that the competence 
and meaning dimensions are more important than the impact and choice dimensions in predicting 
individuals performance-related outcome, in the context of IS security. Second, this dissertation 
has considered how structural empowerment influences the psychological empowerment 
(Spreitzer, 1995a; Spreitzer, 1996). The findings have indicated that different structural 
empowerment facets predict different dimensions of psychological empowerment. Finally, this 
dissertation has shown the potential for structural empowerment to affect IS security compliance 
intentions via two dimensions of psychological empowerment—competence and meaning. In 
other words, psychological empowerment is a key mechanism that explains how structural 
empowerment contributes to IS security compliance intentions. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 9.1: Visual Representation of the Measurement Model 
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Figure 9.2: Visual Representation of the Structural Model 
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Figure 9.3: Full SEM 
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Figure 9.4: Questionnaire 
 
  
163 
 
Coverage 
The study  relates employees in the USA and compliance with organizational IS security 
policies.  
 
Respondents 
Current and previous employees in various work setting should answer this questionnaire. 
Respondents must be at least 18 years of age. 
 
The Questions 
The questions only require your perception with respect to information systems and information 
security in your organization. Please keep information systems and information security of 
your organization in your mind while you fill up this questionnaire. Read the questionnaire 
statements and select the most appropriate answer for each. There is no right or wrong answer. It 
is your opinion that is most justifiable. Some of the questions look similar, but this is important 
to ensure that we can assess your response scientifically and draw valid conclusions.  
 
Confidentiality, risks and the use of data 
Your participation with this study is voluntary. By participating, you will help Information 
System (IS) research at VCU. As with any research study there are risks. The risks in this study 
are minimal. Participants could become uncomfortable while answering some of the questions, 
although there are no risks expected by participating in this study. Your response will be 
confidential, only group data will be analyzed. 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Part I: Survey questions 
  
1. Has your organization established IS security policies? 
□ Yes    □ No 
2. To what extent are you aware of the regulations prescribed by the IS security policies of 
your organization?  
                        Completely                      Completely 
              unaware                                                                              aware  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please answer the following questions using a 1 to 7 scale with 1-Strongly Disagree, and 
7-Strong Agree.  Please circle your answer to each question. 
 
3. I intend to comply with the requirements of the IS security 
policies of my organization in the future. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
4. I actively participate in defining, reviewing or approving any 
IS security controls related to protecting  
the organization's information (e.g. access control, separation 
of duties, employee training on IS security awareness and etc.) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
5. My organization provides employees with education on 
computer software copyright laws. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job of 
securing information and information systems. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
7. I have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom 
in how I do my job of securing information and information 
systems. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
8. In managing risk to information and information systems in my 
company, I actively perform, or contribute to 
decision-making in any risk management activities (e.g. 
documenting business processes or transactions for risk 
evaluation, ensuring key controls exist to mitigate specific 
types of risks, implementing control and etc.) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
9. I have significant influence over what happens in my 
department 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
10. I understand top management's IS security vision of the 
organization. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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11. My organization provides training to help employees improve 
their awareness of computer and IS security issues. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
12. I have access to the strategic information I need to do my job 
of securing information and information systems well. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
13. In my organization, employees are briefed on the consequences 
of modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
14. My work of securing information and information systems is 
personally meaningful to me. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
15. My work of securing information and information systems is 
very important to me. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
16. My organization educates employees on their computer 
security responsibilities. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
17. I have a great deal of control over what happen in my 
department. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
18. My work of securing information and information systems is 
meaningful to me. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
19. I have mastered the skills necessary for my job of securing 
information and information systems.  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
20. I am confident about my ability to do my job of securing 
information and information systems. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
21. My impact on what happens in my department related to IS 
security is large.  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
22. I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my job of 
securing information and information systems activities. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
23. I can decide on my own how to go about doing my job of 
securing information and information systems. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
24. I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the IS 
security policies of my organization when I use information 
and technology in the future. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
25. In my organization, employees are briefed on the consequences 
of accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to 
use. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
26. I intend to protect information and technology resources 
according to the requirements of the IS security policies of my 
organization in the future. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
27. I understand the IS security strategies and goals of the 
organization. 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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Part II: About yourself and your organization 
28. Your gender 
   □ Male    □ Female 
29. Your highest level of education 
□ Less than high school □ Undergraduate degree 
□ High school degree  □ Graduate degree 
□ College degree  □ Other 
30. Your age        
□ 20–25   □ 56–65 
□ 26–35   □ 66–75 
□ 36–45   □ 76–85  
 
31. How many years have you used a computer and the Internet? ___________ 
32. On average, how many hours do you use a computer for work every day? ___________ 
33. How many years have you worked for your current organization?  
□ less than 1 year  □ 10 - 15 years 
□ 1 – 5 years   □ more than 15 years 
□ 5 – 10 years  
34. How many years have you worked in your current position in the organization?  
□ less than 1 year  □ 10 - 15 years 
□ 1 – 5 years   □ more than 15 years 
□ 5 – 10 years  
35. Your job title is ______________________________________ 
36. Number of employees in your organization 
□ Fewer than 500  □ 5,000–10,000 
  
167 
 
□ 500–999   □ More than 10,000 
□ 1,000–4,999 
37. Annual sales revenue of your organization (in your local currency) 
□ Less than 1 million  □ 200 million – 500 million    
□ 1 million – 5 million □ 500 million – 1 billion    
□ 6 million – 10 million □ 1 billion – 5 billion    
□ 10 million – 50 million □ More than 5 billion    
□ 50 million – 200 million        
38. In which industry is your organization operating?  
□ Education   □ Real Estate 
□ Financial Services  □ Services 
□ Government   □ Information Technology 
□ Food/Beverage/CPG □ Telecommunications 
□ Health Care   □ Travel 
□ Manufacturing□  □ Wholesale/Retail 
□ Nonprofit   □ Other, please specify ______________ 
□ Medical, Bio-Technology, Pharmacology 
        
 
Thank you for participating 
  
  
  
168 
 
 
Vita 
 
Yurita Yakimin Abdul Talib was born in Ipoh Perak, Malaysia. She received his Bachelor of Arts 
(Honors) in Accounting and Finance from the University of the West of England, Bristol, United 
Kingdom in 1998. She received a Master’s of Science in Information Technology from the 
University Science of Malaysia in 2002. Her research interests include accounting information 
systems, behavioral information systems security, and empowerment. She has taught courses at 
Northern University of Malaysia and the Virginia Commonwealth University in accounting 
information systems, IT in accounting, system analysis and design, database, audit and control in 
information systems, formulation of information security policies, and web development.  
